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RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND PERMISSIBLE USE 
OF ARMED FORCE 
Jordan J. Paust 
           
Sovereignty is a term that does not appear in the United Nations Charter 
with respect to limitations on the use of armed force, but it is often part of 
claims and analyses regarding the difference between permissible and 
impermissible uses of force and intervention. Is sovereignty merely relevant 
with respect to claims of states to independent power or authority? Is it a 
construct or process that has been related also to other actors within the 
international legal process? How has the notion of sovereignty been used 
with respect to claims in favor of freedom from outside use of armed force 
and in favor of armed intervention? 
First, when addressing such questions, it should be noted that there have 
been many formal actors and participants in the international legal process 
other than the state. Claims of rigid state-oriented positivists, especially at 
the beginning of the last century, that states were the only actors with 
competencies, rights, and duties under treaty-based and customary 
international law were patently false. Quite clearly, this recognition is 
relevant to the notion of sovereignty or retained authority since it would not 
be incorrect to note that sovereignty has not been held merely by states. 
Within the international legal process, other actors such as nations, tribal 
groups and peoples can be understood to have claims to relative sovereignty 
as well. Yet, the state remains a primary actor and one that claims a relative 
sovereignty or independence. 
Interestingly, if you use Westlaw or Lexis to search for use of the term 
“sovereignty” in our federal courts, you will discover claims of the 
Founders and Framers that sovereignty is in the people of the United States, 
in all of us, and not in any particular political entity. That is because of our 
democratic revolution in the 1700’s and shared expectations that authority 
exists with and can be delegated by the people, and it is not simplistically in 
any institutional arrangement that people create. For example, the preamble 
to the United States Constitution states that “[w]e the People of the United 
States . . . do ordain and establish” the Constitution and the federal 
government, not the states or some magnanimous elite. This notion of 
authority in the people has also found expression in international law. For 
example, the preamble to the United Nations Charter states similarly that 
“[w]e the Peoples of the United Nations” have created the Charter, not the 
states or other actors in the international legal process. The United Nations 
Charter also identifies the right of self-determination as a right of peoples, 
not states, and certain forms of human rights law require that the legitimacy 
of any state’s government reflect the will of the people and not merely that 
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of state elites. An example of such a human right is reflected in Article 
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
A second aspect of sovereignty is worth stressing. Under international 
law, sovereignty is not absolute. This is especially so in an increasingly 
interdependent world. It was recognized, for example, by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice that sovereignty is relative. More generally, 
with respect to distinctions between permissible and impermissible 
intervention or what some term the norm of non-intervention, it is important 
to realize that one criterion often reiterated is contained in the delimiting 
phrase “external or internal affairs of” a particular state that is reflected, for 
example, in the normative statement that states have an “obligation not to 
intervene in the affairs of any other state.” But general patterns of practice 
and legal expectation over time have shifted the focus slightly to save from 
intervention that which is the affair merely of one state as opposed to that of 
the international community. Adding to the complexity, the affair of merely 
one state as such may not be the same as the affair of other actors within 
that state, such as a relevant nation or peoples, and the latter may more 
adequately relate to the affairs of a regional or global community. 
Violations of human rights are not simply the affair of a single state, nor 
are international crimes such as genocide in Rwanda or Darfur. In 2005, the 
international community also recognized what it terms the state’s 
responsibility to protect—an obligation of all states. However, in 2005, the 
international community apparently would not go further than stating that a 
particular state has a responsibility to protect its own people from certain 
deprivations and that if it fails it can be subject to certain sanctions such as 
political, diplomatic, economic, and perhaps juridic sanctions if the state 
agrees to such; but the community did not declare that violators can be 
subject to military sanctions involving use of armed force and/or 
intervention. More generally, there has been a split within the international 
community concerning the propriety of humanitarian intervention involving 
the use of armed force without prior authorization from the United Nations 
Security Council or a relevant regional organization such as NATO, the 
Organization of American States (O.A.S.), or the Organization of African 
Unity (O.A.U.). Quite clearly, such forms of humanitarian intervention as a 
sanction response would be an inroad on state sovereignty, but state 
sovereignty is not absolute to begin with and international law clearly 
conditions what a state may do to its own people within its own territory. 
Another inroad on state sovereignty that has been agreed to by the 
international community involves permissible use of force in self-defense. 
There is a rich history of use of such an inroad on sovereignty under 
customary international law, and today Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter allows a member state to use self-defense “if an armed attack 
occurs.” Additionally, as Colonel Wollschlaeger remarked, parties to the 
U.N. Charter have recognized the power and authority of the Security 
Council to authorize the use of armed force as an enforcement measure in 
2011] Relative Sovereignty and Permissible Use of Armed Force 3 
 
case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression—
assuming that a majority makes a decision to that effect and that it is not 
obviated by a veto of one or more of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council (which must be exercised, as the Soviet Union learned 
when it walked out of the room during the Korean war and had thought that 
its mere abstention would operate as a veto). This form of Security Council 
enforcement action occurred recently in the case of Libya. Clearly, the 
authority of the Security Council represents an inroad on sovereignty that 
has been accepted by each member of the U.N. and the international 
community as a whole. 
An interesting example of such an inroad occurred with respect to use of 
apartheid by the regime in South Africa during the last century. I remember 
the claim of the apartheid regime in the 1980s when the Security Council 
recognized that the system of apartheid constituted a threat to the peace. 
“What do you mean threat to the peace,” they said, “just leave us alone and 
keep our neighbors out of our country and there will be no threat to the 
peace.” The Security Council did not back down and issued various types of 
sanctions not amounting to the use of armed force. The U.N. General 
Assembly also responded in 1984 that the apartheid regime was illegal, that 
the people of South Africa have a right to overthrow the government and to 
receive outside assistance during their struggle for political self-
determination—what we term self-determination assistance involving the 
use of military force. Such outside armed force by other members in support 
of the people of South Africa did not occur, but the regime fell in the face of 
other forms of sanction and internal revolution. It is another example of 
Security Council and General Assembly inroads of sovereignty—inroads 
that are lawful and preferred by the international community in given 
contexts. 
Another permissible inroad on sovereignty that can result in the use of 
armed force involves what the United Nations Charter terms “regional 
action.” Under Article 52 of the Charter, a regional organization concerned 
with peace and security can authorize “regional action,” at least until the 
Security Council decides that such is not appropriate, which decision of the 
Council would be subject to a veto by one or more of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. “Enforcement action” as such can only be 
authorized by the Security Council, but the Charter expressly recognizes the 
possibility of “regional action” by a relevant regional organization, and such 
action would clearly be a permissible inroad on state sovereignty.  
Use of armed force in Kosovo in the 1990s under the authorization of 
NATO was an example, although, in my opinion, too many European states 
and text-writers have not agreed on the propriety of use of force in Kosovo. 
Recently in the case of Libya, the Arab League authorized use of force to 
create a no-fly zone over Libya before the Security Council acted to do the 
same and to further authorize use of armed force in Libya to protect 
civilians from armed attacks and threats of armed attack. The United States 
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was involved in the1960s in a regional action when interdicting Soviet 
missiles from coming into Cuba, under an authorization of the O.A.S. The 
U.S. did not say that it was engaged in a self-defense operation under 
Article 51 of the Charter. The U.S. stated that it was engaged in a regional 
action, according to an authorization from a regional organization; the U.S. 
was very careful not to mention the word “blockade,” which is an act of 
war, but that it was interdicting Soviet vessels. The remainder of my 
remarks will focus on issues concerning sovereignty, human rights, and the 
laws of self-defense and war in connection with U.S. use of armed drones in 
Pakistan as well as in Yemen. While doing so, I will address points that 
have been made in far more detail (often with extensive footnotes) in my 
article in Florida State University’s Journal of Transnational Law on Self-
Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan.  
One of those points involves some disagreement with Colonel 
Wollschlaeger and others concerning the status of the ongoing armed 
conflict in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan where the actual theatre of war 
has migrated. The Colonel was discussing issues concerning combatant 
status and combatant immunity of our military personnel that can pertain in 
case of an international armed conflict. Importantly, if the United States 
sends its armed forces abroad to engage in fighting and they engage in 
combat, we should recognize that such conduct has internationalized 
whatever armed conflict had been occurring, that our military personnel are 
participating in an international armed conflict so that they can have 
combatant and prisoner of war status as well as combatant immunity for 
lawful acts of war that pertains during an international armed conflict. What 
specifically does that give them? To lay this out a little bit more, any lawful 
military action during an international armed conflict is immune from 
criminal prosecution, and if you are not a combatant with combatant 
immunity, you are an unprivileged fighter, like various members of al 
Qaeda. Moreover, members of al Qaeda are not likely to be “combatants” as 
that term is used in the laws of war. Under the normal test, which requires 
that they be members of the regular armed forces of a party to an 
international armed conflict (such as the Taliban), most members of al 
Qaeda would not have combatant status. They would be unprivileged 
fighters that had engaged in actual fighting or unprivileged belligerents. I 
would not use the word “combatant” or the word “belligerent” because it 
gets confusing. Combatants are members of the regular armed forces of a 
party to an international armed conflict. They are subject to criminal 
prosecution for any unprivileged conduct, not as a war crime, but as the 
Colonel recognized, under relevant domestic law. Relevant domestic law 
might include that of Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the United States. 
For example, members of al Qaeda who engage in unprivileged fighting or 
violence are subject to prosecution for murder for killing another person. 
The U.S. soldier fighting in Afghanistan would not be if the U.S. soldier has 
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combatant status and combatant immunity and kills in an otherwise lawful 
manner under the laws of war. That’s why I think we should protect our 
military personnel by recognizing that they are participating in an 
international armed conflict whenever they are deployed abroad to engage 
in fighting.  
Under 19th Century international law, if the U.S. aided a recognized 
government to fight insurgents, the U.S. would not be involved in an 
international armed conflict. Yet, if the U.S. aids the insurgents fighting the 
government, it is well recognized that the U.S. is engaged in an international 
armed conflict. And if you are directly involved in a belligerency, like the 
United States armed forces during the U.S. Civil War (when the 
Confederate States of America (CSA) controlled territory as its own, which 
al Qaeda never has; the CSA had the semblance of a government, which I 
don’t think al Qaeda has had; the CSA could field military units in sustained 
hostilities, and I don’t think al Qaeda has done that; and when the CSA had 
outside recognition as a belligerent by England and certain other countries 
and, therefore, met the test for a belligerent), you are directly involved in 
what is known as an international armed conflict to which all of the 
customary laws of war apply. 
Moreover, under the laws of war, it is the fact of war that determines—
that drives application of the laws of war and proper labeling of the conflict. 
So we should be looking at actual context, and it is not critical whether a 
particular state has recognized that it is involved in a war or international 
armed conflict. The critical issue is whether there is in fact an armed 
conflict—what is termed a de facto armed conflict. This criterion, the fact of 
war, is relevant to proper consideration of the fighting or armed conflict 
occurring in Pakistan, especially around fluid border areas near 
Afghanistan. Our soldiers are getting killed and wounded in and near those 
areas and we are killing and wounding an enemy, at least the Taliban. The 
armed conflict has migrated, as a de facto theatre of war, into Pakistan and 
the laws of war provide rights and duties as well as competencies in terms 
of who you can target and when you can target them. Application of the 
laws of war to this expanded international armed conflict should be part of 
one’s use of the war and law of war paradigms and part of the recognition 
that they are applicable to parts of Pakistan even though one can disagree 
with the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration when they 
have stated that we are at war with al Qaeda (a non-state actor that has never 
achieved the level of an insurgent) because under international law the U.S. 
simply cannot be at war with al Qaeda as such. 
Of course, we were at war with the Taliban, especially when we went 
into Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 and were immediately fighting their 
regular armed forces and, with some embarrassment, discovered military 
personnel from Pakistan who were helping the Taliban fight the Northern 
Alliance during an international armed conflict that had been at least a 
belligerency. Members of al Qaeda within that theatre of war were covered 
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under the laws of war. They had rights and duties as civilians and could be 
prosecuted under domestic law as unprivileged fighters, but they would not 
have been combatants or entitled to prisoner of war status like members of 
the regular armed forces of the Taliban. John Walker Lindh reportedly took 
an actual oath of allegiance with the Taliban military, and he might have 
been considered a combatant and entitled to combatant immunity for lawful 
acts of war, like shooting at enemy soldiers, but I suspect that his defense 
counsel did not adequately raise such claims before a relevant court. In any 
event, enemy combatants such as members of the armed forces of the 
Taliban and civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities (DPH) are 
also lawfully targetable during an international armed conflict. Certainly 
each of these points about status, competencies, rights and duties under the 
laws of war are also potential inroads on state sovereignty, inroads that are 
applicable in the context of war.  
One such inroad during war and within the war and laws of war 
paradigms involves who you can lawfully target in a foreign country when 
the de facto theatre of war has migrated to such a country. In the case of 
parts of Pakistan, for example, where the top Taliban leader in Pakistan is 
directly involved in operations and is directing attacks on U.S. soldiers in 
Afghanistan, the top Taliban leader in Pakistan can be lawfully targeted 
without Pakistani consent. This is because the theatre of war is partly there, 
over the head of the Taliban leader, as it was over the head of Osama bin 
Laden. If there was a breach of the neutrality of Pakistan and its 
sovereignty, it was a breach by al Qaeda and the Taliban. And it should be 
noted that private individuals and other non-state actors can breach 
neutrality under international law. For example, in 1793 the United States 
prosecuted Gideon Henfield, a private actor, for his conduct in breach of 
U.S. neutrality with respect to the war between England and France. 
With respect to U.S. use of armed force in Pakistan to target those who 
are lawfully targetable under the laws of war and during a de facto war that 
has migrated into parts of Pakistan, some might claim that the United States 
would need the consent of Pakistan for each such targeting, that the 
targetings are violations of Pakistani sovereignty. As noted, however, such a 
claim would be incorrect. Such lawful inroads on sovereignty are 
permissible when viewing the use of force under war and law of war 
paradigms. But the alternative that one should use, some might say, is a law 
enforcement paradigm. Well, generally under international law, if one uses 
merely a law enforcement paradigm and the state is in a law enforcement 
mode, the state can only engage in law enforcement in a foreign state with 
the consent of the highest level officials of the government of that foreign 
state—therefore, with the consent of the government in the territory from 
which the attacks are emanating. With respect to armed attacks emanating 
from Pakistan, I would say that the situation is not simplistically one 
involving law enforcement or the law enforcement paradigm, especially 
when the U.S. is targeting the top Taliban leader who is involved in 
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ordering the killing of U.S. soldiers, or training people, directing operations 
from maybe a computer or cell phone, and so forth. 
With respect to Yemen, when the United States targets a member of al 
Qaeda who is directly involved in armed attacks on the United States or 
even U.S. military in Afghanistan, is this a circumstance to be addressed 
simplistically as a mere law enforcement paradigm? If a member of al 
Qaeda is giving orders to kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, has the theatre of 
war migrated to Yemen where he actually engages in such conduct? I would 
say yes, and it is not necessary to argue that we are at “war” with al Qaeda. 
Are we stuck with two or three paradigms—a war and law of war 
paradigm on the one hand and a law enforcement paradigm on the other? 
My article on self-defense targetings demonstrates why the answer is no. 
There is another paradigm that we should be thinking about. It is the self-
defense paradigm and it involves inquiry into the legality of conduct under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The article provides a great deal of detail 
concerning the propriety of targetings in a foreign state as a matter of 
permissible self-defense. 
After 9/11, even some writers who were opposed to that kind of 
interpretation of Article 51 came on board. Article 51 states that use of force 
is permissible in the case of an armed attack. It does not limit permissibility 
of self-defense measures in terms of who engaged in an armed attack. 
Moreover, patterns of practice and patterns of expectation about such 
practice demonstrate, especially after 9/11, that a state can engage in self-
defense against those who are attacking the country, its embassies abroad, 
and its military abroad. And it is fairly well recognized that an attack on a 
state’s nationals is an attack on the state. Al Qaeda has been attacking our 
nationals, at least since its attacks on our embassies, the attack on the USS 
Cole, and the attack on 9/11, and they continue to attack our soldiers, at 
least our solders in Afghanistan. 
In Yemen, do we have a U.S. national who is engaged in more than 
recruiting people and propagandizing for al Qaeda? Is this person involved 
in operations? Think about the underwear bomber who came from Yemen 
and the bags that were placed on a FedEx aircraft and you start to see an 
interesting picture: maybe he is also directly involved in operations. And if 
he is, as noted more generally in my article, and we are outside of the 
context of war, we would not be talking about a person who was DPH (a 
Direct Participant in Hostilities) and a targetable civilian. But he could be a 
DPAA (a Direct Participant in Armed Attacks). If an al Qaeda operative is 
directly participating in armed attacks against the United States, I point out 
that he is targetable under the law of self-defense in time of peace or in time 
of war wherever he is engaging in such conduct. There is no geographic 
limitation on exercise of the right of self-defense. Clearly, permissible self-
defense targetings can be an inroad on sovereignty and any other geographic 
limits.  
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I would like to challenge you to think about this further, but my 
conclusions have been that a state can use military force to target non-state 
DPAA who engage in such conduct within a foreign state, using the general 
principles that are well recognized to condition military force, under use of 
force principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality, and borrowing 
somewhat from related principles of the laws of war. In terms of the 
principle of distinction under the laws of war, we distinguish between 
civilians and DPH civilians (who are targetable) and combatants (who are 
targetable); and under the self-defense paradigm, one can use the same 
background or basic principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality 
and apply them as part of inquiry concerning restraints on the use of force.  
Moreover, the United States and any other state that is being attacked by 
a non-state actor does not need special consent of the territorial state from 
which those attacks emanate. This may be problematic for some of our 
neighbors to the south who have for a hundred years been leery of Big 
Brother intervening, under various pretexts, in their countries. We 
generalize that a lot of Central American, especially Mexico, and South 
American states are very restrictive in their interpretation of Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the U.N. Charter as if it prohibits all armed force instead of 
merely the three categories of force expressed therein. And they are very 
restrictive more generally about permissibility of use of force in self-
defense. I am much more open regarding the proper interpretation of Article 
2(4), but I agree with many others that in cases of self-defense under Article 
51, you need an armed attack. In any event, with respect to al Qaeda, there 
has been a process of armed attacks against the United States and its 
nationals and we do not need the consent of the territorial state from which 
those attacks emanate in order to engage in legitimate responsive measures 
of self-defense.  
Of course, this may create some diplomatic problems, but there has often 
been acceptance of such forms of self-defense. For example, there was 
acceptance during the famous Caroline incident in 1837 when the U.S. was 
rather weak and the British oppressors in Canada were still controlling 
Canada. At that time, there was an insurgent group of about one thousand 
people that had marched to Toronto and had failed to take over Toronto, but 
they took over Navy Island, near Niagara Falls. The Caroline was a ship 
that, on the day that it was attacked, had traversed back and forth into 
Canadian waters and had delivered arms, ammunition, and personnel to 
support the insurgency. It was targetable under the law of self-defense, but 
the U.S. and Britain disagreed whether the actual targeting was necessary 
under the circumstances. The British sent two teams into the U.S. and 
destroyed the Caroline. They did it at night, and as it was burning, it went 
over Niagara Falls. There were two deaths—one dead for sure and one 
missing. We complained that the British were using military force in our 
country without our consent. We recognized that Britain (on behalf of 
Canada) had the right of self-defense. The whole debate was about the 
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propriety of actual measures of self-defense that the British used. Self-
defense against non-state actors—the insurgents—was not a problem, but 
we claimed that the method and means used had to meet a test that we 
preferred, although the British disagreed with the test. Under our fairly 
restrictive test at the time, there had to be an instant, overwhelming 
necessity tied to the actual method that they chose and, in context, they 
could have waited in those days until that U.S. ship entered Canadian 
waters. It would have been rather easy to grab the ship at that point as 
opposed to entering U.S. territory. 
During the debate, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster addressed 
sovereignty. He stated that sovereignty is an important or major principle 
that is related to equality, but we recognized that another major principle 
also exists: the right of self-defense, and in context, the right to engage in 
self-defense against non-state actor attacks without the consent of the 
territorial state. Nonetheless, Webster claimed that the British method and 
means violated relevant principles of necessity and proportionality. Later, 
one of the British participants wrote that there was no doubt that if there had 
been an artillery emplacement in the United States and it was firing across 
the river, the British would have had the right to take out that artillery 
emplacement. It is my point that such a claim would be correct today, that 
you can target the artillery emplacement without the consent of the 
territorial state. 
One point needs to be emphasized because some text-writers have 
claimed that if you are not under the law of war paradigm, you have to meet 
the standards for law enforcement measures and you have to get consent 
from the territorial state. There is a stricter test of necessity in a law 
enforcement setting as such, and such claimants sometimes point to a 
restrictive view expressed by the European Court of Human Rights. 
However, the European Court has also recognized, for example, that Russia, 
with respect to the Chechnya conflict, was not simplistically involved 
merely in a law enforcement paradigm and necessity gave way to the type 
of reasonable necessity that is tolerated in the law of war context. From my 
perspective, when the right of self-defense against non-state actor armed 
attacks is claimed, we do not need the consent of the territorial state and we 
do not have to be at war with the state from whose territory the non-state 
actor attacks emanate. The United States and Britain did not think they were 
at war during the Caroline incident, and they were not. When Bill Clinton 
sent 75 cruise missiles into Afghanistan to take out al Qaeda, we did not 
think we were at war with Afghanistan and the international community did 
not think that there was an armed conflict between the United States and 
Afghanistan. Yet, after 9/11 occurred we did participate in an international 
armed conflict—in part because we did not merely go after al Qaeda, we 
also went after the Taliban. 
Some raise another paradigm—a human rights paradigm. When one 
considers actual trends in decision over time and the many evidences of 
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patterns of legal expectation, at least from the 1860s, it is obvious that 
human rights apply during war. The critical questions are: what human 
rights apply, to what person, and in what context? One such human right is 
the right to life. What is the human right to life? I have read claims that the 
use of drones to target people in Pakistan may be a violation of the victims’ 
or the targets’ human right to life. Is that true? The human right to life, as 
phrased in various documents, is recognized as a freedom from “arbitrary” 
deprivation of life. But what is an “arbitrary” deprivation of life in the 
context of permissible self-defense or war? Moreover, human rights law 
does not reach certain persons unless they are within a state’s jurisdiction or 
effective control. Was the top Taliban leader in Pakistan who was targeted 
by a drone within the jurisdiction of the United States? Not under 
international law. Was that person in our effective control when the drone 
might have been at 10,000 feet? Not in my opinion, and I think not in terms 
of common sense. If so, human rights law did not provide relevant 
protection to such a person. Moreover, if it had applied, the freedom with 
respect to the right to life would have been a freedom from arbitrary 
deprivation of life. You are lawyers, or going to be lawyers. You know that 
that word is malleable. It is the kind of word that you can drive trucks 
through. It is not self-operative. It has to be applied in context. It’s a lower 
standard than that under the laws of war or the law of self-defense—much 
looser than reasonable necessity and proportionality in terms of targeting. In 
a given case, it may not be necessary to target someone, but it also may not 
be arbitrary to do so.  
So human rights law does apply, but who does it apply to, and where, 
and who is in your jurisdiction or effective control? What exactly are the 
human rights that are at stake? When a state controls a detainee, of course, 
the detainee is in the effective control of the state, even if the detainee is 
outside the jurisdiction of the state and, of course, the state cannot lawfully 
engage in torture, cruel treatment, inhuman treatment, or degrading 
treatment. As we now know, such was part of an admitted policy and 
program of George Bush. He stated in October 2006 that he had a program 
of secret detention (which involves admitted crimes against humanity) and 
enhanced interrogation which included waterboarding—which the world 
knows amounts to torture and, if not, at least to cruel and inhuman 
treatment. Mistreatment of a detainee violates human rights law in time of 
peace or war, as well as the laws of war during war. 
Finally, there have been some interesting aspects about who is targetable 
during war that were raised by the Colonel, concerning who is a DPH and, 
therefore, who is targetable during war. I would like you to also think about 
persons who are DPAA when using the self-defense paradigm. What 
restraints on the use of force would you recommend, and why? If you think 
we should change the law, if we should change it in a certain direction, what 
would you recommend and why? 
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INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen a tremendous increase in the growth and 
vigor of legal protection for intellectual property on a global scale. This is 
primarily due to the unprecedented inclusion of intellectual property 
protection in global trade negotiations and the resulting TRIPS Agreement.2
As a result, through the World Trade Organization, intellectual property 
protection has transformed from a statutory rule that nations established at 
their discretion into an international legal regime that each country must 
adhere to if they wish to be accepted (or remain) as part of the global 
economy.  
Some of the major beneficiaries of the TRIPS Agreement are the holders 
of global brands that are marketed throughout the world. Most local brand 
names are protected on a country-by-country basis through individual 
trademark registrations under a principle known as “territoriality,” which 
provides that a trademark has a separate existence in each sovereign 
territory where it is registered (or otherwise legally recognized).3 Under the 
territoriality principle, the use or registration of a mark in one country 
would have no bearing on the ability, or inability, of the trademark owner to 
protect the same trademark in another country. However, many global brand 
names are entitled to a much broader scope of protection under TRIPS, 
which expanded the international application and substance of an exception 
to the territoriality principle for marks that are considered well known. 
Under the well-known marks doctrine a trademark is protected in a country 
even if the mark is not used or registered in that country.4 This doctrine was 
included in the TRIPS Agreement, with the result that all WTO members 
acknowledged that well-known marks are entitled to protection as an 
exception to the territoriality principle. Additionally, TRIPS included 
provisions for determining when a well-known mark exists and expanded 
the protection of well-known marks to help the trademark owner prevent the 
unauthorized use of the trademark on goods and services that are different 
from the goods and services provided by the owner of the well-known 
trademark.  
This paper reviews the application of the well-known marks doctrine. 
First, it will present a hypothetical story to help frame the legal issues in real 
terms that are faced by consumers and trademark holders around the world 
when third parties sell products bearing famous brands without the 
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].  
3. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 29:1 (4th ed. 2011).
 4. Id. § 29:61. 
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authorization of the owner of the well-known mark. Second, it will review 
two of the significant international agreements that deal with well-known 
marks. Finally, it will review cases in several jurisdictions that have applied 
the well-known marks doctrine. 
I. A CAUTIONARY TALE OF UNAUTHORIZED USE OF WELL-KNOWN 
 TRADEMARKS 
Imagine that you are finishing up an exhausting trip in a foreign country 
that we will call EestLandzing. You have a four hour drive back to the 
airport and need continuous jolts of caffeine to make sure you will stay 
awake during the drive. As you walk down the street to your car, you see a 
CATERPILLAR® outlet store, where they sell thermoses. You happen to 
have shopped at a CATERPILLAR store in the United States and noticed 
that the U.S. store sold a similar thermos. The EestLandzing store looks 
remarkably similar to the U.S. store. You buy a thermos and walk across the 
street to a STARBUCKS® coffee shop, fill the thermos up to the brim, and 
drink coffee all the way to the airport. There’s a little bit of coffee left in the 
thermos, so you seal it up and throw it in your suitcase. About halfway 
through the flight home you start to feel sick. You manage to get home, but 
still feel quite ill. As you unpack, you find that thermos, and out of curiosity 
you send it to a friend at the local university food sciences lab and ask for it 
to be analyzed. A few days later, the friend calls back and tells you that they 
have bad news and worse news. The bad news is that the coating inside the 
thermos has trace elements of lead. The worse news is that there was 
Giardia in coffee, which is a parasite that must have been in the water used 
for the coffee. You need to go to the doctor and get treated right away.  
As you are sitting in the doctor’s office waiting area experiencing waves 
of stomach cramps, you recall meeting the trademark attorneys for 
Caterpillar and Starbucks at a recent International Trademark Association 
(INTA) conference.5 You write them both nasty emails, describing in great 
detail your experience and your discomfort that has been caused by their 
products. A few days later and ten pounds lighter, but assured by blood tests 
that your lead levels are still within a safe range and the Giardia are no 
longer running amok in your intestinal tract, you get notes back from both 
attorneys. The Starbucks attorney expresses sorrow at your discomfort, but 
informs you that they do not have any stores in EestLandzing, and, in fact, 
 5. INTA is an association of trademark owners, trademark attorneys and academics 
dedicated to the support and advancement of trademarks and other intellectual property. 
INTA’s membership consists of 5,700 trademark owners, professionals and academics from 
more than 190 countries. See the INTA website at http://www.inta.org. INTA has been 
described as the largest organization of trademark owners worldwide. See Xuan-Thao 
Nguyen, The Other Famous Marks Doctrine, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 757, 
772 (2008). 
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that they do not own the STARBUCKS trademark in EestLandzing. The 
Caterpillar attorney writes back, indicating that although they own the 
CATERPILLAR trademark for the tractors and farm equipment they sell in 
the country, they do not operate or authorize outlet stores there and do not 
sell, or own a trademark for, thermoses in EestLandzing. Upon further 
inquiries that you make through your friends in EestLandzing, you discover 
that both the STARBUCKS store and the CATERPILLAR store are run by 
third parties who are not related to, or authorized by, the global corporations 
that you know as Starbucks and Caterpillar.6  Both the Starbucks attorney 
and the Caterpillar attorney indicate that they aggressively protect their 
trademark rights around the world and try to protect consumers from the 
problems you experienced; however, a few countries still do not recognize 
the right of holders of well-known trademarks to prevent unauthorized local 
third parties from using these globally recognized brands in the manner that 
you just experienced. They each finally conclude their notes by informing 
you that the United States is one of those countries that has failed to amend 
its trademark law to recognize well-known trademarks (that foreign 
companies that have a globally recognized brand that is not used in the 
United States do not have a clear right under the federal statute know as the 
Lanham Act to protect against unauthorized third parties from using the 
global brand).  
You have just painfully discovered why well-known trademarks need to 
be protected. Trademarks often serve as a measure of consumer protection. 
Because the CATERPILLAR and STARBUCKS trademark were not 
protected in EestLandzing, and were actually being used by a third party, 
you did not receive the quality you expected from the products bearing the 
trademark. 
The historical policy reasons for protecting trademarks are quite different 
from most other types of intellectual property. Where patents and copyrights 
grew out of a desire to provide an economic incentive for creativity and 
innovation, trademarks originated from the need to protect consumers from 
goods that did not originate from the trademark owner. Patents and 
copyrights are intended to provide a direct economic benefit to the creator 
of a copyrightable work or invention. The policy basis for protection of 
trademarks, on the other hand, is focused on protecting the consumer. The 
purpose of a trademark is to indicate to the consumer the source or origin of 
the goods. It assures consumers that quality of goods are the same as they 
have come to expect from products and services bearing that mark.7 This 
 6. For a real life example of fake stores, see Louise Watt, iFraud: Entire Apple 
Stores Being Faked in China, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 21, 2011, available at
http://news.yahoo.com/ifraud-entire-apple-stores-being-faked-china-165243322.html. 
 7. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 3:1-3:10. Trademarks also protect the goodwill 
that the owner of the mark has created in the brand. So, for example, goodwill allows 
Starbucks to charge US $4.00 for a cup of STARBUCKS brand coffee that might be less for 
a similar beverage at a different coffee shop. This concept of trademark protection being 
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policy is one of the reasons that well-known trademarks have, over the past 
several years, received an expanded scope of protection.  
II. THE GENERAL RULE OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION – LIMITED TO 
CLASS AND SPECIFIC COUNTRY
In order obtain trademark protection, the trademark owner must file an 
application to register the trademark with the trademark office in each 
particular country. In general, trademark protection is limited to each 
particular country where the trademark is registered and the particular class 
of goods for which the trademark has been registered.8
There are 45 classes of goods and services for which a trademark may be 
registered.9 For a variety of reasons, trademark owners often are only able to 
register their trademark in the specific classes that match the goods and 
services on which the trademark is used. So, for example, the 
CATERPILLAR trademark may be registered and protected in Class 7 for 
machinery and farm implements, but the owner of the mark in that class 
may not have a registration for Class 21, which covers such goods as 
housewares and glass.10
Additionally, trademark rights are territorial – the protection of the 
trademark only applies in the particular country where the registration has 
been granted. So, normally when you file a trademark in a particular 
country, you are only getting territorial protection in that specific country in 
a specific class.  
III. THE ISSUES FOR WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS
Two problems exist with the territorial and class approach of protecting 
trademarks. First, a trademark might be famous around the world (such as 
COCA COLA®), but if it is not registered and/or used in a country, the 
based on the economic investment of the trademark owner has grown over the past few 
decades, but the original policy basis for trademarks was based on consumer protection and 
not on an economic policy to protect the investment of brand owners to create goodwill in 
the brand. See id. at § 2:4.  
 8. Many common law countries will also protect trademarks based on use without 
registration. However, the same limited protection applies for these “common law 
trademarks” – the scope of protection only applies to particular goods or services on which 
the trademark as been used and the protection is limited to the extent to which the trademark 
has been used in that particular country (no recognition in one country is given based on use 
in another country).  
 9. See WIPO, International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of 
the Registration of Marks Under the Nice Agreement, v, vi (9th ed. 2006),) available at
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nice/en/classifications.html. 
 10. The result of separate class registrations is that two completely different entities 
may have registration for the same word.  For example, Dove is a registered U.S. trademark 
of Mars, Incorporated for chocolates. DOVE, Registration No. 2,012,056. Dove is also a 
registered U.S. trademark of Unilever for soap. DOVE, Registration No. 2,534,236. 
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trademark owner may have no right to prevent third parties from using the 
trademark in that country despite the fact that local consumers are well 
aware of the mark and may expect the products bearing the mark to be 
authorized by the owner of the well-known-mark. This problem is 
illustrated in the hypothetical: STARBUCKS may have been well-known in 
EestLandzing by a certain sector of the public, but it was not protected 
there.  
The second problem is that even if a well-known trademark is registered 
in a particular country, the trademark owner will have difficulty in 
preventing a third party from using the trademark on products in a different 
class of goods. In the hypothetical, Caterpillar had a registration for farm 
implements, but not for thermoses. How do we make sure that consumers 
are not misled? 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROTECTING 
WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS
The answers to these questions first began to be addressed in the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.11 The original version 
of the Paris Convention set forth in Article 6 the general principle of 
territoriality for the protection of trademarks, which is that a trademark has 
a separate existence in each country. In essence, the territoriality principle is 
the idea that ownership of a trademark in one country does not confer to the 
owner the right to the use and protection of the mark in another country. 
Once the registration of a mark is obtained in a contracting state, it is 
independent of its possible registration in any other country, including the 
country of origin.12
In 1925, the members of the convention agreed to an exception to the 
territoriality principle for trademarks. The members agreed to add Article 
6bis to the convention, which provided for member countries to cancel 
 11. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention], http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/. The first version of the Paris 
Convention became effective in July 7, 1884. By the end of the 19th century the Paris 
Convention only had 19 signatories, which included Belgium, Brazil, El Salvador, Ecuador, 
France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Tunisia, Serbia, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United States. After World War II membership in the Paris Convention 
increased significantly. A current list of members to the convention can be found at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_y
ear=ANY.  
 12. See WIPO, Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (1883), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2011). 
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registrations and prohibit the use by third parties of marks that are already 
well-known in that country.13 Article 6bis provides as follows: 
The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so 
permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the 
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a 
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a 
mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration 
or use to be well-known in that country as being already the mark of a 
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or 
similar goods.14
Article 6bis provides an exception to the territoriality principle for well-
known marks: if a trademark is well-known in a member country, it is 
entitled to protection even though the mark is not registered or used in that 
country. The protection of the well-known trademark results not from the 
registration or use in the country in question, but from the mere fact of its 
reputation.15 The rationale for protection of well-known trademarks is based 
on the idea that the use of a trademark that is the same or similar to a well-
known trademark would amount to an act of unfair competition and be 
prejudicial to the interests of the public, who would be misled by the use of 
a conflicting trademark.16
Under the Paris Convention, what constitutes a well-known mark, and 
the degree of proof required to show that the mark has achieved sufficient 
notoriety, is up to the trademark office and the courts of each member 
country according to their domestic laws and regulations. Additionally, the 
question of protecting a well-known mark outside its class of goods was not 
addressed in the Paris Convention.  
Then came the TRIPS Agreement which imposed the rules of the Paris 
Convention on all WTO member states, established a principle for the 
determination of when a trademark has become well-known, and required 
members to provide further protection for well-known marks outside the 
class of goods for which the well-know mark is registered. 
 13. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:62 (referring to Article 6bis as “the 
cornerstone of on international protection of “well-known” marks”). 
14. Id.
 15. WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE § 5.82 (2d 
ed. 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ 
ch5.pdf#paris/ [hereinafter WIPO HANDBOOK]. 
16. Id. § 5.83.  
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V. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT EXPANDED PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN
 MARKS
TRIPS created a set of global principles for the protection of well-known 
marks. Unlike previous international instruments for IP protection, TRIPS is 
linked to the global trading system. As a result, countries that might 
otherwise have chosen to continue with the general rule of territoriality for 
trademarks without the exception for well-known marks were coerced into 
accepting the rules for the protection of well-known marks or risked losing 
access to essential markets for goods and services that they export. 
Furthermore, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement have real teeth: a 
Member that fails to comply will be subject to the enforcement provisions 
of the WTO agreement.17
So what did TRIPS do? First, it forced all WTO members to comply with 
the Paris Convention, including Article 6 for the protection of trademarks 
and Article 6bis for the protection of well-known trademarks.18 TRIPS then 
went further and significantly expanded the protection of well-known 
trademarks under Article 16 of the Agreement, which reads as follows: 
Rights Conferred 
1. The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to 
prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the 
course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are 
identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered 
where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use 
of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of 
confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall not 
prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the possibility of 
Members making rights available on the basis of use. 
2. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to services. In determining whether a trademark is well-known, 
Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the 
relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member 
concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the 
trademark. 
 17. See Brian Manning &Srividhya Ragavan, The Dispute Settlement Process Of The 
WTO: A Normative Structure To Achieve Utilitarian Objectives, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1, 3 n.12 
(2010) (citing J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L L.LAW 345 (1995) 
(discussing how, taken together, the enforcement and dispute-settlement provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement put teeth into the pre-existing intellectual property conventions)). 
 18. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 2. 
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3. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of 
which a trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in 
relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection between 
those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and 
provided that the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are 
likely to be damaged by such use.19
Section 2 of Article 16 establishes a basic standard under which a 
Member States must determine a well-known mark. Importantly, the mark 
is not required to be known by all members of the public in the member 
state, but only by “the relevant sector of the public,” and Member States 
must consider the extent to which the mark has been promoted to such 
members of the public.  
Section 3 of Article 16 expanded the Paris Convention rules on well-
known marks to dissimilar goods. Where the Paris convention protected 
well-known trademarks from other parties who wanted to use the mark on 
“the same or similar goods,” TRIPs now protects well-known trademarks 
from a third party’s use of the well-known mark on other classes of goods if 
(1) the third party’s use of that trademark on dissimilar goods would 
indicate a connection between those goods or services, and (2) the interests 
of the owner of the well-known trademark are likely to be damaged by such 
use. Note, however, that section 3 of Article 16 refers to trademarks that are 
registered in the country in question. So, in our hypothetical,
CATERPILLAR was a registered trademark for tractors in the country of 
EestLandzing. If the mark was deemed well-known by relevant consumers, 
the owner of the mark under TRIPS might be able to prevent a third party 
from using CATERPILLAR on thermoses since you, as a consumer, were 
confused and thought the thermos was made or authorized by the well-
known mark owner, and the owner’s interest in maintaining the well-known 
mark as a symbol of quality was damaged by the third party’s use. 
TRIPS had the effect of moving the protection of intellectual property, 
including the protection of well-known marks, out of the rarified 
atmosphere of normal treaty law and pushing it aggressively into the global 
trading system.20 Countries that want to join, or remain, as members of the 
 19. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 16. 
 20. The Paris Convention is administered by WIPO, which had not been very 
successful in achieving a harmonized standard for intellectual property protection. See
Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179 (2002) (discussing the difficulty of creating 
harmonized rules for intellectual property through the WIPO process of negotiating 
international treaties). The author states that, “[i]nternational intellectual property regulation 
and oversight requires a system of norm-creation that is flexible enough to adapt to a 
dynamic, fast-paced, and technologically driven area of law. This fundamentally conflicts 
with the primary historical structure and means of rulemaking in international law – the 
multilateral treaty-making process. WIPO has traditionally used the multilateral treaty-
20 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:1
WTO are required to recognize the intellectual property rules established by 
TRIPS. As a result, significant case law has developed around the world 
that has established protection of well-known trademarks. 
VI. INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW PROTECTING WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS 
THAT ARE NOT REGISTERED
TRIPS has had a profound influence on the international trademark 
community. The principles set forth in TRIPS for the protection of well-
known trademarks have steadily taken hold in the courts of many nations 
around the world.  
A. The MCDONALD’S Case – South Africa 
One of the first major cases decided after TRIPS became effective was in 
South Africa for the MCDONALD’S trademark.21 Beginning in 1968, the 
McDonald’s corporation had obtained registrations for twenty seven 
trademarks that incorporated the word “McDonald” or “McDonald’s.” 
However, due to the international boycott of South Africa, they had not 
used the brand in South Africa.22 As a result, under South African trademark 
law the marks were subject to possible cancellation for non-use. In 1992, a 
third party known as Joburgers Drive-Inn began using the name 
MCDONALD’S, BIG MAC, and the golden arches design on fast food 
outlets and restaurants.23 Joburgers then applied to register these marks 
while also applying to expunge the McDonald’s Corporation’s trademarks 
from the register.24 The parties brought suit against each other. The trial 
court ruled in favor of Joburgers based on a finding that McDonald’s 
Corporation had failed to use its trademark and that the trademark was not 
eligible for protection as a well-known trademark because there was not 
sufficient knowledge of the mark through all levels of South African 
society.25 On appeal, the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme 
making process to create rules under its auspices.” Id. at 181. See also Christopher M. Gacek, 
U.S. Goals for Patent Protection in the Gatt Trade Talks, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
October 31, 1991, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1991/10/bg863-us-goals-for-
patent-protection-in-the-gatt-trade-talks (criticizing the WIPO as “a feckless United Nations 
body” and stating that “WIPO’s value is in settling technical issues such as the definition of 
what can be patented. It is not an instrument, however, for protecting intellectual property”). 
It was this type of ardent criticism in industrialized nations during the 1980s and early 1990s 
that pushed for the protection of intellectual property through the global trading system and 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
 21. McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty.) Ltd. 1997 (1) SA 1 
(SCA) (S. Afr.).
 22. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:62. 
 23. McDonald’s Corp., 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA) at 4 (S. Afr.). 
 24. Id. at 4-5. 
 25. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:62. 
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Court disagreed with the trial court and, in so doing, extensively reviewed a 
new provision of the South African trademarks act, known as Section 35, 
that provided for the protection of well-known trademarks. Although the 
appellate court did not refer to Article 16(2) of the TRIPS agreement, it 
disagreed with the trial court that a well-known mark must be known 
throughout the general public. 
Section 35 of the new act was intended to provide a practical solution to 
the problems of foreign businessmen whose marks were known in South 
Africa but who did not have a business here. The South African population 
is a diverse one in many respects. There are wide differences in income, 
education, cultural values, interests, tastes, personal life styles, recreational 
activities, etc. This was obviously known to the legislature when it passed 
the new act. If protection is granted only to marks which are known (not to 
say well-known) to every segment of the population (or even to most 
segments of the population) there must be very few marks, if any, which 
could pass the test. The legislation would therefore not achieve its desired 
purpose. Moreover, there would not appear to be any point in imposing 
such a rigorous requirement. In argument we were referred as an example 
to a mark which might be very well-known to all persons interested in 
golf. Why should it be relevant, when deciding whether or not to protect 
such a mark, that non-golfers might never have heard of it? I consider 
therefore that a mark is well-known in the Republic if it is well-known to 
persons interested in the goods or services to which the mark relates.26
The court then reviewed the evidence that established MCDONALD’S 
as a well-known trademark to the relevant public.  
I turn now to the evidence concerning the extent to which the McDonald’s 
trade marks are known in the Republic. As I have stated earlier, 
McDonald’s is one of the largest, if not the largest, franchiser of fast food 
restaurants in the world. At the end of 1993 there were 13 993 
McDonald’s restaurants spread over 70 countries. The annual turnover of 
McDonald’s restaurants amounts to some $23 587 million. McDonald’s 
trade marks are used extensively in relation to its own restaurants as well 
as to those that are franchised. The level of advertising and promotion 
which has been carried out by McDonald’s, its subsidiaries, affiliates and 
franchisees in relation to McDonald’s restaurants exceeds the sum of $900 
million annually. Their international marketing campaigns have included 
sponsorship of the 1984 Los Angeles and 1992 Barcelona Olympics. 
McDonald’s has also been a sponsor of the 1990 soccer World Cup 
Tournament in Italy and the 1994 World Cup Soccer Tournament in the 
United States of America. Mr Paul R Duncan, the vice president and 
general counsel of McDonald’s, stated on affidavit that, in view of the vast 
scale of his organisation’s operations, the McDonald’s trade marks are in 
all probability some of the best known trade marks in the world. This was 
 26. McDonald’s Corp., 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA) at 35-37 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
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not denied. Although there was no evidence on the extent to which the 
advertising outside South Africa spilled over into this country through 
printed publications and television, it must, in all probability, be quite 
extensive. In addition the McDonald’s trade marks would be known to 
many South Africans who have travelled abroad. This again would not be 
an insignificant number. [ . . . The court then referred to survey evidence 
of the relevant public showing upwards of 77% of the relevant population 
were aware of the name MCDONALD’S, and/or the MCDONALD’S 
logos/trademarks] 
. . . . 
The evidence adduced by McDonald’s leads, in my view, to the inference 
that its marks, and particularly the mark MCDONALD’S, are well-known 
amongst the more affluent people in the country. People who travel, watch 
television, and who read local and foreign publications, are likely to know 
about it. They would have seen McDonald’s outlets in other countries, and 
seen or heard its advertisements there or its spillover here in foreign 
journals, television shows, etc.  
. . . . 
I consider therefore that at least a substantial portion of persons who 
would be interested in the goods or services provided by McDonald’s 
know its name, which is also its principal trade mark. . . . [T]his mark is in 
my view well-known for the purposes of sec 35 of the new Act. 27
As a result of this case, the South African courts not only implemented 
the new law protecting well-known marks that are not used in the country, 
but also embraced the standard of proof set forth in TRIPS for well-known 
marks based on the knowledge of the mark in the relevant sector of the 
public rather than the entire population of the country. 
B. The WHIRLPOOL Case – India 
About the same time as the South African decision, the courts in India 
were reviewing a well-known trademark case in which the largest appliance 
manufacturer in the world, U.S. based Whirlpool Corporation, had filed suit 
against an Indian company that was using WHIRLPOOL for washing 
machines. Whirlpool Corporation had originally registered the 
WHIRLPOOL mark in India in the late 1950s but had not renewed the 
registration since 1977. In 1986, a company known as known as Chinar 
Trust filed an application to register the trademark WHIRLPOOL in India, 
and eventually such application was granted despite Whirlpool 
Corporation’s opposition. Whirlpool Corporation then brought an action in 
 27. Id. at 44-65. 
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the Delhi High Court, seeking an injunction to prevent Chinar Trust from 
using the WHIRLPOOL name. At that time, Whirlpool Corporation was 
selling its appliances in a large number of countries around the world but 
not directly in India.28 However, Whirlpool Corporation was able to show 
extensive global sales and advertising of the WHIRLPOOL trademark. 
Whirlpool Corporation produced significant amounts of evidence to support 
its claim of a well-known trademark, including market share data for a large 
number of countries around the world, registration of the WHIRLPOOL 
trademark in 65 jurisdictions, successful enforcement actions in a number of 
countries of its WHIRLPOOL trademark, consumer surveys, advertisements 
going back decades, and sales data going back decades. In addition, the 
plaintiff was able to provide evidence that it had advertised its 
WHIRLPOOL brand appliances in magazines having international 
circulation, including in India. The Delhi High Court found for Whirlpool 
Corporation and gave the following statement as part of its rationale: 
It is not necessary in the context of present day circumstances the free 
exchange of information and advertising through newspapers, magazines, 
video television, movies, freedom of travel between various parts of the 
world to insist that a particular plaintiff must carry on business in a 
jurisdiction before improper use of its name or mark can be restrained by 
the court. . . . [T]he main consideration is the likelihood of confusion and 
consequential injury to the plaintiff and the need to protect the public from 
deception, where such confusion is prima facie shown to exist, protection 
should be given by courts to the name or mark.29
On appeal, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the ruling in favor of 
Whirlpool Corporation.30 As a result, the courts in India have provided 
further support for the principle that well-known trademarks can be 
protected in countries where the mark has not been registered and goods 
bearing the mark have not been sold. The case is particularly known for 
establishing the concept that significant supporting evidence for a 
establishing a mark as well-known (and eligible for protection despite the 
lack of registration and non-use) can be established by showing that 
advertisements by the trademark owner have reached the relevant public in 
the country.  
C. WIPO Helps Establish Evidentiary Requirements 
As the case law on well-known trademarks began to develop, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1999 provided further 
 28. Whirlpool Corporation was able to show some sales to the U.S. embassy and US 
AID in India.  
 29. Whirlpool Corp. v. N.R. Dongre (1994) 56DLT 304; 1995 (32) DRJ 318 (India).
 30. N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., 1996 PTC (16) 583 SC (India). 
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guidance on the evidentiary requirements for well-known marks in a Joint 
Recommendation concerning the Provisions on the Protection of Well-
Known Marks.31 The Provisions provided that the following factors should 
be considered in determining whether a trademark is well-known: 
1. the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant 
sector of the public; 
2. the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the mark; 
3. the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the mark, 
including advertising or publicity and the presentation, at fairs or 
exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which the mark applies; 
4. the duration and geographical area of any registrations, and/or any 
applications for registration, of the mark, to the extent that they reflect use 
or recognition of the mark; 
5. the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in particular, 
the extent to which the mark was recognized as well known by competent 
authorities; 
6. the value associated with the mark.32
D. The STARBUCKS Case – Russia 
One additional case of interest relating to the protection of well-known 
marks that are not used in a country involves the STARBUCKS mark in 
Russia. Russia is seeking admission to the WTO. As part of its efforts to 
join the international trading community, it has begun implementing laws to 
ensure TRIPS compliance. In 2002, the Russian Federation amended their 
trademark law to include protection for well-known trademarks.33
The Seattle-based Starbucks Corporation registered its STARBUCKS 
trademark in Russia in 1997.34 However, because of the poor economy in 
Russia at that time, the company did not open any STARBUCKS coffee 
 31. WIPO & Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks WIPO 
Doc. 833(E) (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/development_iplaw/pub833.htm. 
 32. Id.
 33. Law of Russian Federation # 3520-1 On Trademarks, Service Marks and 
Appellations of Origin of Goods of September 23, 1992 with changes and amendments 
introduced by Federal Law No. 166-FL on December 11, 2002, and entering into force on 
December 27, 2002, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No.3520-1. 
 34. Andrew E. Kramer, Starbucks Opens its First Shop in Russia, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 7, 2007, at 10. 
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shops in Russia, and several years passed after the registration of the mark.35
In 2002, a third party, Sergei A. Zuykov, filed for the cancellation of the 
Starbucks Corporation’s trademark for non-use.36 Upon successfully 
cancelling the marks, Mr. Zuykov then applied for the STARBUCKS 
trademark in the name of his company and announced plans to establish a 
chain of STARBUCKS coffee shops.37 Mr. Zuykov’s company then offered 
to sell his rights in the STARBUCKS mark to Starbucks Corporation for 
US$600,000.38 Mr. Zuykov’s approach was a common approach for 
trademark “pirates” in Russia. These pirates had a lucrative business model 
of registering famous trademarks that were not used in Russia and then 
selling the rights back to the multinational owner of the mark. However, 
Starbucks Corporation refused the offer and brought an action in the 
Russian trademark office to cancel Mr. Zuykov’s registration. The 
trademark office ruled in favor of Starbucks Corporation.39 The decision was 
upheld on appeal, which allowed Starbucks Corporation to register the 
STARBUCKS trademarks in its own name and begin opening genuine 
STARBUCKS coffee shops in Russia.40
As the Russian trademark office and the Russian courts have continued 
to enforce the rights of well-known trademarks, the trademark piracy 
business that was once flourishing in Russia has dwindled, and it appears to 
be more difficult for third parties to register well-known marks owned by 
multinationals.41
E. The GRUPO GIGANTE and BUKHARA Cases – Split Circuits in 
the United States  
Perhaps the most significant controversy over application of the well-
known marks doctrine has occurred in the United States. The 9th Circuit has 
recognized the protection of well-known marks. However, the 2nd Circuit 
has refused to acknowledge well-known marks of foreign trademark holders 
because the TRIPS Agreement is not self-executing, and therefore, 
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Id.
 38. Id.
 39. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:61. 
 40. Kramer, supra note 34. 
 41. Telephone Interview with Eugene Arievich, Partner, Baker & McKenzie (Feb. 
2011). Mr. Arievich is Co-Counsel to the Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) 
and co-author of CIPR monographs on Well-Known Marks in countries of the former Soviet 
Union. He is also the co-author of the Russian Federation section of a publication analyzing 
national and international laws protecting well-known trademarks published by the 
International trademark association. See Eugene A. Arievich & Janet L. Hoffman, Russian 
Federation, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 4-293, 4-
293 n.* (Frederick W. Mostert ed., INTA 2d ed. Aug. 2009) (2004). 
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according to the 2nd Circuit, the well-known marks doctrine has not been 
incorporated into federal trademark law.  
In the 9th Circuit case, a Mexican company, Grupo Gigante, operated a 
chain of grocery stores under the GIGANTE trademark.42 Grupo Gigante 
registered the mark in Mexico in 1963.43 By 1991, the chain had almost 100 
stores in Mexico, including two in Tijuana, a city on the Mexican border 
only a few miles south of San Diego.44 In the 1990s, two brothers, Michael 
and Chris Dallo, opened two stores in San Diego under the name 
“GIGANTE MARKET.”45 When Grupo Gigante expanded into the United 
States by opening GIGANTE stores in Los Angeles, the Dallo brothers sent 
Grupo Gigante a cease and desist letter, and litigation ensued.46  A number 
of issues, including laches, affected the ultimate outcome of the case.47
However, with respect to the issue of well-known marks, both the federal 
district court, and on appeal the 9th Circuit, recognized the well-known mark 
exception (which the court referred to as the “famous mark exception”) to 
the territoriality principle.48 The 9th Circuit decision included the following 
analysis: 
A fundamental principle of trademark law is first in time equals first in 
right. . . . . 
Under the principle of first in time equals first in right, priority ordinarily 
comes with earlier use of a mark in commerce. . . . . If the first-in-time 
principle were all that mattered, this case would end there. It is undisputed 
that Grupo Gigante used the mark in commerce for decades before the 
Dallos did. But the facts of this case implicate another well-established 
principle of trademark law, the “territoriality principle.” The territoriality 
principle, as stated in a treatise, says that “[p]riority of trademark rights in 
the United States depends solely upon priority of use in the United States, 
not on priority of use anywhere in the world.” Earlier use in another 
country usually just does not count. Although we have not had occasion to 
address this principle, it has been described by our sister circuits as “basic 
to trademark law,” in large part because “trademark rights exist in each 
country solely according to that country’s statutory scheme.” While Grupo 
Gigante used the mark for decades before the Dallos used it, Grupo 
Gigante’s use was in Mexico, not in the United States. Within the San 
Diego area, on the northern side of the border, the Dallos were the first 
users of the “Gigante” mark. Thus, according to the territoriality principle, 
the Dallos’ rights to use the mark would trump Grupo Gigante’s. 
 42. Grupo Gigante v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 43. Id.
 44. Id.
 45. Id.
 46. Id. at 1092. 
 47. Id.
 48. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1092. 
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Grupo Gigante does not contest the existence of the territoriality principle. 
But like the first-in-time, first-in-right principle, it is not absolute. The 
exception, as Grupo Gigante presents it, is that when foreign use of a mark 
achieves a certain level of fame for that mark within the United States, the 
territoriality principle no longer serves to deny priority to the earlier 
foreign user. 
There is no circuit-court authority--from this or any other circuit-- 
applying a famous-mark exception to the territoriality principle. We hold, 
however, that there is a famous mark exception to the territoriality 
principle. While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important 
doctrine within trademark law, it cannot be absolute. An absolute 
territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would promote 
consumer confusion and fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this nation 
of immigrants, so do people. Trademark is, at its core, about protecting 
against consumer confusion and “palming off.” There can be no 
justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into thinking that 
they are buying from the store they liked back home.49
The 2nd Circuit reached the opposite decision in the 2007 case of ITC 
Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.50 The plaintiff ITC owns and operates the five star 
ITC Maurya hotel in New Delhi, India.51 The BUKHARA restaurant inside 
the hotel is claimed by ITC to be rated among the best 50 restaurants in the 
world.52 ITC has operated the New Delhi restaurant since 1977 and at 
various times has operated other BUKHARA restaurants in cities such as 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangkok, Bahrain, Kathmandu, Ajman, Chicago,
and New York.53 However, the New York restaurant only remained open for 
five years from 1986-91, and the Chicago restaurant closed after ten years 
of operation from 1987-97.54
A few years after the Chicago restaurant closed, several previous 
employees of the BUKHARA restaurant in New Delhi formed Punchgini, 
Inc. for the purpose of opening restaurants in New York, which were named 
BUKHARA GRILL.55 When asked how the name was chosen, one of the 
Punchgini shareholders admitted that there was at the time “no restaurant 
Bukhara in New York and we just thought we will take the name.”56 In 
addition to the name, the BUKHARA GRILL restaurants mimicked the ITC 
BUKHARA’s logos, décor, staff uniforms, wood slab menus, and red 
49. Id. at 1093-94 (emphasis added).
 50. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 51. Id. at 142-43. 
52. See ITC Hotels web site, http://www.itcportal.com/itc-business/hotels.aspx (last
visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 53. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 143. 
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 144. 
56. Id.
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checkered customer bibs.57 One Punchgini shareholder was quoted as saying 
that the BUKHARA GRILL “is quite like Delhi’s Bukhara.”58
When ITC sued Punchgini, the district court was not convinced that ITC 
could bring a claim under the well-known marks doctrine and dismissed the 
case on summary judgment.59 On appeal, the 2nd Circuit considered this issue 
in depth and concluded that the well-known marks doctrine is not a part of 
federal law.60 The court noted that Congress has amended federal trademark 
law, the Lanham Act, numerous times and has failed to incorporate the well-
known marks doctrine into the statute.61 The court also stated that, “TRIPS is 
plainly not a self executing treaty” and “the Paris Convention creates no 
substantive United States rights beyond those independently provided in the 
Lanham Act.” 62 As a result, the 2nd Circuit held that the well-known marks 
doctrine is not an exception to the territoriality principle under current 
federal law, which the court stated in no uncertain terms, requires a 
trademark holder to use the mark in the United States.63
The principle of territoriality is basic to American trademark law. . . . .  
Precisely because a trademark has a separate legal existence under each 
country’s laws, ownership of a mark in one country does not automatically 
confer upon the owner the exclusive right to use that mark in another 
country. Rather, a mark owner must take the proper steps to ensure that its 
rights to that mark are recognized in any country in which it seeks to assert 
them. . . . . 
The territoriality principle requires the use to be in the United States for 
the owner to assert priority rights to the mark under the Lanham Act.64    
The Second Circuit’s blunt assertion that Congress has failed to 
incorporate the substantive aspect of the well-know marks doctrine into 
federal law has caused concern in the U.S. trademark community. 
 57. Id.
 58. Id.
 59. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 145. 
 60. Id. at 159. 
 61. Id. at 162.  
62. Id. at 161-62. 
 63. The court left open the issue of whether the plaintiff’s could claim that New 
York state common law included a well-known marks doctrine. The 2nd Circuit certified this 
question to the New York Court of Appeals. The New York Court of Appeals held that there 
was no such specific doctrine under New York laws, but a well-known mark holder could 
make a claim of common law unfair competition. In considering this issue of unfair 
competition, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of ITC’s claim on the 
grounds that the BUKHARA restaurant was not sufficiently well-known in New York to 
sustain such a claim.  See Kenny A. Plevan & Anthony J. Dreyer, State Common Law 
Overtakes Famous Marks Doctrine, 241 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009). 
 64. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 155. 
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Congress’s failure to comply with the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement 
could be seen by officials in other countries as one of the great hypocrisies 
in international intellectual property law. For most of the 1980s and into the 
1990s, the United States Trade Representative aggressively pushed the 
United States principles of intellectual property protection upon lesser 
developed countries.65 The United States then used TRIPS and the global 
trading regime of the WTO to finally force lesser developed countries to 
incorporate the protection of well-known trademarks into their law and 
surrender their sovereign right to strictly follow the territoriality principle. 
Now, after all the cajoling and posturing by the United States to push 
through the adoption of TRIPS, it is U.S. federal law that fails to be TRIPS 
compliant. The leading scholar on U.S. trademark law, professor Thomas 
McCarthy, has referred to the BUKHARA decision “as a great 
embarrassment for the U.S.” that may affect our future trade negotiations.66
“This decision can be used as a club to beat our trade negotiators, with 
foreign governments saying, ‘Who are you to criticize us? You are not 
living up to your treaty obligations.’“67 In an attempt to resolve the issue, 
the International Trademark Association (INTA) formed a task force to 
review the state of federal law relating to well-known trademarks.68 The task 
force has recommended to the INTA Executive Committee that U.S. 
trademark law should be amended in order to be “consistent with U.S. 
obligations under various treaties and international agreements.”69 INTA is 
now working with other U.S. intellectual property organizations to draft a 
proposed amendment to U.S. trademark law.70
VII. PROTECTING WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS OUTSIDE THEIR CLASS OF 
REGISTRATION
As previously mentioned, Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides for protection of well-known marks on dissimilar goods if the 
well-known mark has been registered. The owner of a registered well-
known trademark that wishes to prevent its use on dissimilar goods must 
prove that use of that trademark in relation to such goods would indicate a 
connection between those goods or services and the owner of the registered 
 65. See Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past 
or a Small Step Forward, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 199-200 (2007) (describing the 
superior bargaining power of the industrialized nations and the economic coercion used to 
push for the acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 66. Steve Seidenberg, Trademark Wars: Court’s Failure to Uphold Famous Marks 
Doctrine Jeopardizes U.S. Interests Overseas, INSIDECOUNSEL, July 2007, at 26.  
 67. Id.
68. INTA Board Backs Proposal for U.S. Statute on Well-Known Trademarks, INTA
BULLETIN (May 1, 2011), http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/INTABoardBacks 
ProposalforUSStatuteonWell-KnownMarks.aspx.  
 69. Id.
70. Id.
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trademark and that the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are 
likely to be damaged by such use. The implementation of Article 16(3) 
coincides with a number of principles that already exist in each individual 
countries’ domestic trademark law that are intended to protect registered 
trademarks in one class from newcomers who may be attempting to trade 
off the goodwill of the established mark by applying for a registration for 
the same name in a different class of goods. These principles include 
likelihood of confusion, passing off, parasitism, and dilution. As a result, 
the implementation of Article 16(3), which deals with trademarks that are 
already registered in the country, has been less controversial than the 
implementation of Article 16(2), which had significant implications on the 
sovereignty of each country because it contained an exception to the 
sovereign principle of the territoriality of trademarks. Therefore, an in-depth 
review of cases involving Article 16(3) will not be undertaken in this paper. 
However, provided below are some brief examples of successful actions 
brought by the holders of well-known trademarks against third parties 
attempting to use or register the trademark in a different class of goods. 
In Chile, Danjaq LLC, the owner of the trademark 007, related to the 
James Bond character, was able to prevent an operator of telephone services 
from registering the name 007 PUBLIGUIAS INFORMACION 
TELEFONICA.71  The Chilean trademark office initially rejected Danjaq 
LLC’s opposition.72 However, the Chilean Industrial Property Court, and on 
appeal the Supreme Court, sided with Danjaq LLC.73 The decision is 
reported as significant for trademark law in Chile “because the highest court 
has recognized that a very well-known trademark may prevent the 
registration of a similar trademark even for a different and unconnected 
scope of protection, provided that a risk of confusion may be provoked.”74
In France, Louis Vuitton (LVM) owned a well-known trademark for a 
monogram canvas design that was used in connection with leather goods. 
Louis Vuitton brought an action against the music company EMI for using a 
similar design on compact disks.75 Although the French trial court found 
infringement, the Court of Appeals overruled the judgment because it felt 
that compact disks were so different from leather goods that LVM’s mark 
was not damaged.76 On further appeal, the Supreme Court held in favor of 
LVM.77 The Supreme Court’s decision is seen as support for a line of 
French cases that provide a broad scope of protection for well-known 
 71. 101 TRADEMARK REP. 906 (2011). 
 72. Id.
 73. Id.
 74. Id. at 906-07. 
 75. 100 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 503 (2010). 
 76. Id. at 503-04. 
 77. Id. at 504. 
2011]  The Coming of Age of the Global Trademark 31
marks, even in cases against third parties who attempt to use the mark on 
very different goods.78
In Syria, the Swiss watchmaker Rolex S.A. brought an action against a 
company that attempted to register the ROLEX trademark.79 Rolex S.A. 
watches are used in the trademark class 14 (jewelry and watches) while the 
Syrian company attempted to register the ROLEX mark in class 29 (meats 
and processed food).80 The Syrian court took judicial notice of the fame and 
well-known nature of the ROLEX trademark and found that Rolex S.A. was 
entitled to protection of the ROLEX trademark regardless of whether the 
products were the same or different from Rolex S.A.’s products.81 The court 
ordered the cancellation of the Syrian company’s registration.82
In Australia, the automobile company Saab was able to successfully 
oppose the attempted registration of the SAAB trademark by a third party 
for Christmas tree lights, electric fans, kettles, and toasters (“appliances”).83
The Trademark office hearings officer found that Saab Automobile AB had 
a well established reputation in Australia through the use of the SAAB 
trademark since the 1970s based on its volume of sales and extensive 
promotions in the country.84 Because of the “substantial reputation” of the 
SAAB trademark for automobiles, the hearings officer ruled that there was a 
danger consumers would be confused or deceived by the use of the 
trademark on appliances. 85
CONCLUSION
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a number of countries agreed 
upon the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which 
provided a certain basic level of protection for trademarks owned by 
citizens of Member States. The convention was revised several times, 
including a revision that introduced the concept of a well-known mark and 
provided for its protection as an exception to the normal territoriality 
principle.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the global trading system known as the GATT 
(the predecessor to the more formal structure of the WTO) turned its 
attention to intellectual property. Advocates of stronger intellectual property 
protection felt that the lack of reliable world-wide intellectual property 
78. Id. at 504. 
 79. 100 TRADEMARK REP. 641 (2010). 
 80. Id. at 641. 
 81. Id. at 642. 
82. Id.
 83. Re: Opposition by Saab Automobile AB to Registration of Trade Mark 
Application 826676(11) – SAAB APPLIANCES, Decision of Delegate of the Registrar of 
Trade Marks with Reasons (2005). 
84. Id. at 2, 9. 
 85. Id.
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protection was becoming an important issue as the growth of trade 
liberalization began causing intense competition among manufacturers and 
developers of goods that could be sold around the word. Multinational 
manufacturers needed to be sure that the goods they were selling would 
have adequate patent, trademark, and copyright protection and not be 
undercut in large parts of the world by patent and copyright infringement 
and copycat producers of counterfeit goods. As a result, the industrialized 
countries included intellectual property protection in the negotiations for the 
new global trading system that would create the WTO.86 These negotiations 
produced the TRIPS Agreement. 
The TRIPS Agreement became effective on January 1, 1995. It is 
considered the most comprehensive global agreement on intellectual 
property ever implemented and covers, among others, the areas of 
copyright, patent, industrial design, trade secret, and trademark law.87 One 
small part of that agreement incorporated the Paris Convention rules on 
well-known trademarks and then expanded those rules to provided further 
protection for such marks. As a result, the protection of famous global 
brands is relatively assured.  
Some criticism of the TRIPS Agreement may be warranted, particularly 
in the heavy handed way in which the industrialized nations used the global 
trading system to force developing countries to accept the loss of 
sovereignty over determining domestic intellectual property rights, such as 
the extent to which they would provide exceptions to the trademark 
territoriality principle.88 However, the TRIPS Agreement has been a 
powerful force in protecting well-known trademarks and, as a result, in 
protecting consumers from the confusion and deceit of purchasing low 
quality goods bearing the unauthorized brand of a well-known trademark. 
86. See Harris, supra note 65. 
87. See Donald P. Harris, Trips’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis Of How The Trips 
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against The United States, 25 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 104 
(2004) (citing several sources hailing TRIPS as the most important and comprehensive 
international agreement ever concluded). 
88. See Harris, supra note 65. 
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay encapsulates and expands on my comments at the February 
2011 Symposium “Sovereignty in Today’s World” organized by the 
Michigan State International Law Review. 
As explored by my fellow speakers, economic globalization is 
challenging for the large economies of the world. It is even more 
challenging for the smaller economies of the world, such as those in the 
Caribbean. I will discuss some illustrative challenges to economic 
sovereignty, how the Caribbean has responded to these challenges—what 
have been the effects—and offer some analysis of the implications to the 
economic sovereignty of Caribbean states and territories.  
∗ Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis. The Author 
is grateful to the editors of the International Law Review of the Michigan State University 
College of Law for the opportunity to participate in its 2011 symposium, Sovereignty in 
Today’s World. Research work by Steve Jorgenson, JD expected 2012, Indiana University 
School of Law—Indianapolis (expected 2011) provided valuable contributions to this 
project. Ruth Lilly Law Library Research Librarian Debra Denslaw and the reference staff of 
the Ruth Lilly Law Library were an invaluable resource.  
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My remarks will explore the following subjects:  
1. The meaning of sovereignty in the context of small 
and micro states in the current iteration of 
globalization 
2. Economic globalization presents strong challenges 
to the economic sovereignty of Caribbean states 
and territories. 
3. The challenges, and their impact on the Caribbean, 
offer a narrative perspective and an analytical path 
that is relevant to larger states and economies. 
My remarks are organized as follow: Part I offers a working definition of 
economic sovereignty; Part II consists of an illustrative list of challenges to 
Caribbean economic sovereignty, and descriptions of Caribbean states’ and 
territories’ responses to those challenges; Part III provides an analysis of 
implications for Caribbean economic sovereignty and contemporary 
economic sovereignty of states in general; and my concluding statements 
are in Part IV. 
I. WHAT IS ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY?
As so well articulated by Professor Dunoff earlier in the symposium, 
there is a great deal of discussion and debate regarding the definition and 
implications of sovereignty, and I am not going to create a new definition: 
The working definition that I have used for my remarks is: The power of an 
individual state to act independently—to choose and craft economic tools to 
serve the best interests of the state’s domestic economy (as such interests 
are perceived by and/or pursuant to the vision and judgment of the people 
and government of that state).  
I also thought that it would be meaningful to specify what I mean when I 
refer to “the Caribbean.” Some potential for ambiguity is present since the 
Caribbean Sea is bordered by several countries located in mainland North, 
South, and Central America, including Mexico, Venezuela, and the United 
States. In my remarks I am referring to islands that are both independent 
states and overseas dependent territories in the Caribbean Basin.1 The nation 
states include Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, and the Dominican Republic. 
The overseas dependent territories include entities affiliated with the United 
Kingdom (for example, the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and the Cayman Islands); France (Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
and St. Barthelemy); The Netherlands (St. Eustatius and Saba); and the 
United States (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands). 
1. See, e.g., Peter Clegg, Governing the UK Caribbean Overseas Territories: A 
Two-Way Perspective, in GOVERNANCE IN THE NON-INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Peter Clegg & Emilio Pantojas-Garcia 
eds., 2009). 
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Like other island chains colonized by European powers (the island 
chains of the Pacific offer another such example), the Caribbean provides a 
wonderful experimental and experiential laboratory of the different types or 
models of sovereignty and quasi-sovereignty extant in the contemporary 
world. Looking at a map of the Caribbean, one might see a depiction of the 
history of the New World as it was discovered and colonized by European 
powers. It is due to that history that, today, the Caribbean has these varied 
languages. For example, the United Kingdom has the British Virgin Islands, 
Montserrat, and Anguilla.2 You also see French departements: That is, when 
you step on the shores of Martinique and Guadalupe, you are in France. The 
same is true in St. Barts because, according to the French conception of 
France, the departements are essential parts of France—they’re all French. 
In another example, St. Maarten recently attained the status of an 
independent country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands; and Anguilla, 
the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands are overseas 
dependent territories of the United Kingdom, with particular levels of 
independence and autonomy. Then we have the Dutch Islands: St. Maartens, 
St. Eustasius, Curacao, Aruba.  You will think of some Caribbean states and 
territories as vacation spots, great for Spring break which is coming up 
within the next month. And, of course, the United States also is present with 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  
As there are several varieties of sovereignty and different stages of self-
determination in the overseas dependent territories, states, departements, in 
the Caribbean, no individual territory finds its situation replicated in 
another. Each has its own deal with its former colonizer—that is, former 
mother country. In addition, however, we have islands, such as Jamaica, 
such as Trinidad, such as Barbados, and so on, that are independent states 
and are attempting to make their way in this new era of globalization, of 193 
countries, or 192 until Southern Sudan becomes independent. So, in the 
Caribbean, you will see that there are states, nation states—members of the 
UN—such as Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Antigua, as well as other 
entities, overseas dependent territories.  
What does it mean: “Overseas dependent territories?”  In the context of 
the Caribbean, the descriptor includes the islands which are not sovereign 
states, as they have not secured independence from their colonizers.  As 
 2. And I have an illustrative story with respect to Anguilla. That is, in the 1970s or 
80s, the British wanted to get rid of Anguilla, so they put forward the proposition that 
Anguilla should be governed from St. Kitts and Nevis. Now, the Anguillans—and if you’ve 
been to Anguilla, it’s a sandbar basically, beautiful colored beaches and all that—they 
revolted and asked to be put back under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. So they 
continued to be an overseas dependent territory of the United Kingdom, instead of joining St. 
Kitts and Nevis, a twin island nation state. 
36 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:1
such, they “have surrendered aspects of their political, economic and 
cultural identities to external centres of power.”3
Now, these jurisdictions, to the extent that they are independent, are 
members of the World Trade Organization. In addition, there is a primarily 
Anglophone community, a regional grouping called CARICOM: the 
community of Caribbean states. This was supposed to be a regional pooling 
of sovereignty to create a counterbalance to economic pressures coming 
from outside the region.4
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the potential limits 
of my perspective and to admit that I am an Anglophone in the context of 
the Caribbean because, as you may know, in the Caribbean you will speak 
of the Anglophone, Francophone, Spanish and Dutch speaking islands and 
territories. My interests and analysis have focused mostly on the 
Anglophone Caribbean, with some references to the Francophone and 
Spanish speaking entities. 
Within these definitional and affinity constraints, I will now address 
some particular examples of challenges to Caribbean economic sovereignty 
and my analysis of their broader implications.  
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CHALLENGES TO CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
My remarks will focus on the recent illustrative challenges listed below: 
A. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) anti-tax haven initiative; 
B. The OECD-Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
anti-money laundering initiative; 
C. The United States-European Union (EU) World 
Trade Organization (WTO) banana dispute; 
D. The termination of European Union sugar subsidies 
pursuant to WTO rules; 
E. The Antigua-United States WTO internet gambling 
dispute; and 
F. The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
 3. Peter Clegg and Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Preface, in GOVERNANCE IN THE NON-
INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
supra note 3, at xvii.  The authors describe the territories’ dissatisfaction with the status quo,
despite, or perhaps because, independence does not appear to be a viable option for these 
small islands and island chains.  Id.
 4. See Karen E. Bravo, CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty, and Aspirational 
Economic Integration, 31 N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 145, 155-60 (2005) [hereinafter 
Bravo, CARICOM]. 
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A. OECD Anti-Tax Haven Initiative 
Beginning in 2001, the OECD initiated negotiations with countries it 
considered to be tax havens, meaning that the tax regulations and structures 
of those economies were unfair and illegal according to the criteria 
introduced by the OECD.5 The organization also began an initiative to list 
and target states, which it claimed, or which, according to its standards, 
were tax havens. The OECD used leverage and threats to try to get countries 
to make significant tax reforms and essentially bullied countries into 
making such changes.6 The designation of a jurisdiction as a “tax haven” 
depended on the OECD’s determination that the favorable tax treatment 
offered by the jurisdiction in question was luring money and taxpayers from 
other, “more honest” jurisdictions. It is noteworthy that the “other, more 
honest” jurisdictions that suffered the allegedly negative effects were 
Western-oriented, wealthier countries. That is, more favorable tax treatment 
was given to taxpayers leaving the United States, the European Union, and 
other jurisdictions to invest their money in the alleged tax havens. 
In this regard, we must now scrutinize the OECD. Now what is the 
OECD? It is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Who are the member states of that organization? They are the states with the 
largest economies in the world. 
The organization is an exclusive club, composed of the 34 states with the 
world’s largest economies.7 The membership is almost exclusively Western 
 5. The OECD considers countries that, in their opinion, offer tax rates that are low 
enough to be considered nominal to be tax havens, which allow taxpayers  to evade their 
domestic tax authorities. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE
32 (1998). In fact, the OECD labels a country a tax haven if: (1) it imposes no or only 
nominal taxes; (2) it offers a lack of transparency about the application of tax laws and about 
underlying documentation; (3) it has laws or administrative practices that prevent the 
effective exchange of information for tax purposes with other governments about taxpayers 
who benefit from zero or nominal taxation; (4) the absence of a requirement that the 
taxpayer’s activity within the country’s jurisdiction be substantial. Samantha H. Scavron, 
Note, In Pursuit of Offshore Tax Evaders: The Increased Importance of International 
Cooperation in Tax Treaty Negotiations after United States v. UBS AG, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 157, 165-66 (2010). 
 6. Taylor Morgan Hoffman, Development, The Future of Offshore Tax Havens, 2 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 512 (2001). The actions taken by the OECD have been characterized as 
“economic imperialism” whereby large, powerful states exert their will over small offshore 
jurisdictions that threaten the financial dominance of the world powers. Richard K. Gordon, 
On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore Financial 
Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 534-35 (2010). Gordon contends that there has been a shift 
from state actors directly implementing their global governance agendas to international 
bodies controlled by the world powers essentially serving as a proxy to direct and implement 
the agendas and restrict the growth of developing economies. Id. at 506-08.  
 7. For a complete list of the OECD’s membership, see OECD, List of OECD 
Member Countries-Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited October 31, 2011). 
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and European, with the exception of Chile, Japan, Korea, Turkey, Mexico, 
and Israel. No African, Pacific, or Caribbean states are represented. The 
organization excludes the voices of the world’s other 160 states. The 
composition and authority of the OECD is not representative. That is, it is 
not a universal membership body; instead, its membership is limited to 
economies of a certain size. There was no democratic participation in 
standard-setting by the territories and countries listed as tax havens.8 The 
OECD listed a number of Caribbean entities in its offshore tax haven 
report.9 Among the Caribbean states and territories included in the list were: 
Antigua, Barbados, The Bahamas, The Cayman Islands, The Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and the twin island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis. The list 
included overseas dependent territories as well as nation states. Each of 
these entities had begun the process of successfully diversifying their 
economies from agriculture into financial and other service sectors. 
There was great uproar. The response in the Caribbean was to 
characterize the listing and resulting economic pressures as discriminatory 
economic blackmail.10 The effect of the blacklist was severe:11 Immediate 
results were that multinationals—banking and financial entities—
 8. One author critiques the OECD for trying to impose its will on states that are not 
even OECD members and for encroaching on the sovereignty of nations. See Alexander 
Townsend Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
215, 215 (2001). Townsend asserts that telling states how they must form and implement 
their tax policies is a serious threat to the sovereignty of nations. Id. at 220-21. He also notes 
that the OECD is telling these sovereign nations how they need to decide their fiscal needs, 
and how they are to decide their fiscal needs. Id. at 219-20. 
9. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING 
AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICE 17 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf. 
10. See OECD Tax List Called “Economic Blackmail,” ALLBUSINESS.COM, (Aug. 1, 
2000), http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/581057-1.html [hereinafter Economic 
Blackmail]. 
 11. The OECD has clearly impacted the financial sectors of Caribbean nations and 
territories. Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International 
Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 649, 710-
11 (2010). In addition, the United States has unilaterally set its sights on Caribbean nations 
with growing financial sectors as well. The United States has strayed from the OECD’s 
model for addressing such issues and employed a number of tactics to discourage the use of 
Caribbean banks, including subjecting people and organizations to audits for simply 
transacting with offshore Caribbean financial institutions. Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural 
Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No 
Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 331, 336 (2003). As the United States continues to 
see greater deficits in the budget, it is increasingly likely that it will put even more pressures 
on anyone that uses Caribbean banking facilities. Id. at 390. The events of September 11, 
2001 is used as a justification for the necessity of preventing countries from having 
preferential taxing and banking practices. See Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to 
Combating the Financing of Crime, 50 VILL. L. REV. 509, 511 (2005). See generally Elwood 
Sanders Jr. & George Sanders, The Effect of the USA Patriot Act on the Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Laws, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 47 (2004). 
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announced that they would exit these countries and territories and the 
targeted states and territories feared negative reputational effects would take 
place. In addition, there was uncertainty regarding the enforcement action 
that the member states of the OECD might take if their multinational 
corporations (MNC’s)  did not exit the Caribbean states.  
So, as I said, that initiative began in 2000, and by 2009 most or actually 
all countries and territories were off the blacklist.12 We still have now a gray 
list.13 The gray list is a group of countries that said “yes, we will accede to 
your demands.” But, the OECD says: “Well, you’re not carrying it out in as 
quick a fashion, you’re not implementing these commitments as we would 
like.” So now several Caribbean countries are on the gray list of potential 
tax havens.14
B. OECD/FATF: Anti-Money Laundering Initiative 
In 2003, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued a new revision of its 
Forty Recommendations, which had been first issued in 1990 and which 
form the baseline standards for the international prevention of and fight 
against money laundering by banking and financial systems and institutions. 
That same year, the FATF issued a list of Non-Cooperating Territories and 
Countries (the NCCT list), naming countries whose banking and financial 
laws and regulations did not meet the standards set forth in the updated 
Forty Recommendations.  
The purpose of the Financial Action Tax Force is anti-money laundering 
activities: that is, the perception that monies were being transferred around 
the world in a sub rosa fashion by drug traffickers, corrupt governments, 
and corrupt private parties, and were being facilitated by the banking system 
in particular countries.15 Prior to the issuance of the NCCT list in 2003, in 
 12. At the G-7 meeting in July of 2007, the world powers’ Finance Ministers agreed 
that sanctions they called “defensive measures” would be placed upon uncooperative tax 
havens. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 512. The Caribbean countries were originally encouraged 
by the British in the 1960s to diversify their economies by creating financial sectors; the 
sectors have since grown to the point that they made up as much as a quarter of some 
countries’ economies. Id. at 512-13. The United States’ stance is that the offshore accounts 
were accounting for $70 billion a year in lost tax revenue. Id. at 513. 
13. See Ulrich Eder, The Caribbean, The OECD and The Empty Black List,
31CARIBBEAN PROPERTY MAGAZINE (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.caribpro.com/Caribbean_Property_Magazine/index.php?pageid=717. 
 14. These include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Cayman Islands, among 
others. Id.
 15. For a thorough discussion of the initiative, see Karen E. Bravo, Follow the 
Money? Does the International Fight Against Money Laundering Provide A Model for 
International Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts?, 6 ST. THOMAS L.J. 138, 160-66, 173-79 
(2008). Those considered to be countries that support or allow money laundering are often 
depicted as countries run by greedy, selfish bureaucrats who simply want money and do not 
care whether they are giving terrorist organizations and criminals a place to carry out their 
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February 2000, the FATF had published the Report on Non-Cooperative 
Countries and Territories (the Initial 2000 NCCT Report) and, in three 
subsequent reports, identified countries and territories that it would 
investigate and review in order to determine NCCT designation. The list 
included 15 countries and territories. Similarly to the anti-tax haven 
initiative, several Caribbean states and territories were included on the list. 
By late 2007, when the FATF issued the 2006/2007 list of Non-Cooperating 
Territories and Countries, no jurisdictions remained on the list—all the 
formerly non-compliant states and territories are now compliant or their 
compliance was in the process of being confirmed. That is, within eight 
years, all the territories identified as an NCCT, or potential NCCT, had 
taken steps comply with the standards of the Forty Recommendations, had 
been investigated and/or monitored, and were de-listed.16
The non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs) initiative was 
created to ensure that all countries adopt anti-money laundering measures.17
Once again, the non-representative nature of the membership of the 
international organization that is the source of the rule making, monitoring, 
and sanctioning is striking. The FATF is an independent inter-governmental 
organization created by the G-7/OECD in 1989. As with the tax haven 
initiative, the standards were formulated by a non-representative body—that 
is, no input from the countries that would be subject to those standards. The 
project was intended to force non-member states and jurisdictions with 
deficient anti-money laundering systems to create new legislation by 
adopting a “name-and-shame” device—in the form of the published list of 
non-compliant jurisdictions—and by encouraging FATF members to take 
actions to convince NCCTs of the importance of adopting such legislation.  
The criteria for identifying NCCTs consist of a range of detrimental rules 
and practices in and by a country or territory that obstruct international 
cooperation against money laundering. These detrimental rules can be found 
in a NCCT’s financial and other regulatory requirements (especially those 
related to identification), their rules regarding international administrative 
and judicial cooperation, and the resources the country has made available 
illegal activities on an international scale. See William F. Wechsler, Follow the Money, 80 
FOREIGN AFF. 41, 41-43 (2001). Countries that choose to respect the privacy of their 
investors are seen as safe havens for those wishing to conduct illegal money laundering 
activities, despite the reality that such privacy is likely to be just as appreciated by those that 
do not have any illegal intentions. Id. at 42. The inherent assumption that the alleged money 
laundering havens merely intend to service criminals fails to take into account that many of 
the states with laws favorable to investors are created to give them some sort of a general 
competitive advantage in the financial sector that they would not otherwise have with 
uniform laws. Shawn Turner, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic 
Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1389, 1399-1400 (2004).   
16. See Bravo, supra note 15, at 160-66. 
 17. Jared Wessel, The Financial Action Task Force: A Study in Balancing 
Sovereignty with Equality in Global Administrative Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 169, 174
(2006).  
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for preventing, detecting, and repressing money laundering.18 There is no 
specific criterion that can serve as a litmus test; rather, a jurisdiction should 
be judged based on the entirety of its efforts to combat money laundering.  
Also noteworthy is the intrusive and very effective nature of the 
monitoring imposed, under threat of sanctions, on non-FATF and non-
OECD states.19 For the most part, Caribbean countries have complied with 
the regulations established regarding money laundering, but they have had 
to do so because if they did not, economic disaster would result—their 
economies simply are not strong enough to survive for long while under 
siege from the world powers.20 What does it mean? Sovereign states are 
subject to intrusive monitoring by the FATF and have changed their internal 
regulations in order to comply with the standards issued from above, 
without their participation, that is, from the OECD.21
C. WTO: United States-European Union Banana Dispute 
Let us address now challenges with respect to the trade in goods. None 
of the Caribbean states or territories are members of the OECD or of the 
FATF. This non-membership contrasts with their status in the World Trade 
Organization. The Caribbean states are members of the WTO; in fact, they 
are founding members because they had been members of the GATT.22
18. Id.
 19. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) was 
established in 1996 and received a great deal of criticism from both sides of the issue. PETER 
REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY 
LAUNDERING 84 (2004). One of the primary problems with the CFATF is that it exercises 
peer review of members and does some global supervision, but has little to no power to 
require compliance with sanctions. Id. at 85. After 9/11, the United States has tried to correct 
these flaws in implementation. Id.
 20. G. Scott Dowling, Comment, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean 
Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 292
(2004).The broad wording of the PATRIOT Act gives the U.S. a number of weapons in its 
arsenal to change the financial practices of Caribbean countries indefinitely. Id. at 292-93. 
The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have been two of the more “cooperative” Caribbean 
jurisdictions, and foreign states often make requests for information regarding certain clients; 
more often than not, the requests are honored. Evan Metaxatos, Thunder in Paradise: The 
Interplay of Broadening United States Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and 
Jurisprudence with the Caribbean Law Governing Offshore Asset Preservation Trusts, 40 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 169, 188-89 (2008). 
 21. Critics have argued that the FATF’s actions are a form of interference and an 
impingement on the sovereignty of the nations targeted by the FATF, and that sanctions, if 
imposed, would be a violation of the UN Charter because such measures are supposed to be 
addressed by the UN Security Council. Todd Doyle, Note, Cleaning up Anti-Money 
Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 279, 300-301 (2001-2002).  
22. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
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The long-running banana dispute between the United States and the 
European Union resulted in the loss of preferential access that the European 
Union had extended to banana exports from African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
countries that are former colonies of EU member states. Brought by the 
United States, and making claims with respect to bananas produced in South 
America, the dispute is one of the longest-running (spanning 1993 to 
2010)23 and most seemingly intractable in the history of the World Trade 
Organization.  
The question was whether the preferential access given by EU member 
states to their former colonies violated the EU member states’ GATT 
obligations. And I guess I should give some background: These English-
speaking, Spanish-speaking, and French-speaking territories and countries 
were colonies of EU member states. Once they were given independence, 
part of the deal was: “we will continue to subsidize you, some might even 
argue compensate you or make reparations to you,   by giving your 
agricultural products preferential access to our markets.”   
The preferential arrangement between EU member states and their 
former colonies, between the European Union and those decolonized states, 
was found to be illegal. With respect to compliance, the European Union 
dragged its feet for a considerable period of time and, in May 2010, finally 
consented to comply with the panel report and the compliance panel. 
Some interesting facts with respect to the dispute include: (i) Bananas are 
a major agricultural crop in the Caribbean;24 (ii) the United States does not 
produce bananas; instead, the United States’ position represented the 
interests of large MNCs (i.e., Dole and Chiquita) who had interests in 
banana-producing South American countries (i.e., today’s banana 
republics); (iii) pursuant to WTO procedural rules and as a result of the 
procedural posture of the dispute, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states 
and territories, whose market access and economic futures would be 
determined by the dispute, were limited to the role of third party observers.  
The case was brought by the United States against the European Union, 
not because the United States grows bananas, but because it was 
representing the interests of the multinational corporations—Dole and 
Chiquita for instance—which do have banana growing enterprises in Latin 
American countries. The problem, according to their point of view, was 
“our bananas are being disadvantaged in the European markets, they’re 
getting discriminatory treatment because the Caribbean, Pacific and African 
bananas are getting in at a lower rate and so are more attractive to 
consumers.” 
 23. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). 
 24. According to then-Prime Minister of Jamaica Percival J. Patterson, “Bananas are 
to us what cars are to Detroit.” WARREN J. KEEGAN & MARK C. GREEN, GLOBAL MARKETING
125 (2d ed. 2000). 
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As I have stated, the Caribbean states are members of the WTO. 
However, with respect to this decision which has enormous impact on a 
substantial part of their economy, these Caribbean states were reduced to 
the role of third party observers. That is, they were able to submit 
documents and relevant information, but they were not parties, they were 
not participants, they were not there as primary actors with respect to their 
economic future. Fifty-six of the seventy-eight nations in the ACP that were 
to be impacted by the banana settlement are members of the WTO, but were 
given no ability to make an impact on the WTO proceedings.25 The WTO 
dispute settlement procedures appear to present a threat to the sovereignty 
of member states—their ability to take necessary government actions on 
behalf of citizens.26 The WTO system as it stands leaves developing 
countries in a position where their participation is marginalized and they are 
not often a part of proceedings.27
D. WTO: European Union Sugar Subsidies Dispute 
In 2003, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand requested the establishment of a 
WTO panel to examine the legality of subsidies applied to European 
Communities’ (EC) sugar.28 As had occurred, with respect to bananas, the 
European Union’s sugar subsidies, challenged by Australia, Brazil, and 
Thailand, were found to be illegal. The Dispute Settlement Body’s 2004 
report, which found that the European Union’s sugar regime breached the 
European Union’s WTO obligations, had a detrimental impact on another 
major cash crop of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states and territories.29
As I stated earlier, the agricultural background of the islands means that 
sugar and bananas were crucial to their agricultural economy. I should also 
add, however, that the Caribbean sugar industry is extremely inefficient and 
25. Id.
 26. Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade 
Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance 
from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 167 (2001). 
 27. HAIDER A. KHAN & YIBEI LIU, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: MAKING A RULES-BASED TRADING REGIME WORK, 23-24 (2008), 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7613/1/WTO.PDF. The dispute was supposed to be just 
limited to bananas, but the European Union has insisted on expanding the package to 
encompass other concessions included in the Doha Round. GIOVANNI ANANIA, HOW WOULD 
THE WTO AGREEMENT ON BANANAS AFFECT EXPORTING AND IMPORTING COUNTRIES? 5
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Programme on Agricultural 
Trade and Sustainable Development June 2009), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/web_bananas.pdf. 
 28. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocum
ents/t/WT/DS/283ABR.doc. 
 29. In those countries, sugar and bananas are huge agricultural products and in fact a 
substantial part of their economy. 
44 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:1
unproductive  and later in this Essay I will address issues of comparative 
advantage as well. The fact that Caribbean states and territories would no 
longer get access to this market had a huge impact on the day-to-day life 
and domestic economies of those countries and on their economic 
sovereignty. The changes to the EU sugar regime have been described as 
drastic changes that will affect developing and least developed countries 
that depend on the preferential treatment received from the European 
Union.30
The new agreement for tariff-free sugar imports into the EU market did 
not fully come into effect until 2009, and the European Union seems to 
suggest that it will be beneficial for LDCs and the European Union alike.31
The new sugar regime stands to leave ACP countries as losers in the new 
market system if they are unable to compete with the comparative 
advantages other countries enjoy.32 The new regime changes the positions of 
those that are the winners and those that are the losers and threatens the 
already fragile economies of the losers.33 Although the new sugar regime 
has an impact on all ACP countries, the Caribbean countries stand out as 
greater losers in the newly competitive sugar market than other countries.34
E. WTO: Antigua-United States Gambling Dispute 
The internet gambling dispute between the United States and Antigua is 
historic in scope. It began with Antigua’s35 March 21, 2003 request for 
consultation under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding about 
United States barriers to the provision of transborder gambling services.36
 30. Piero Conforti & George Rapsomanikis, The Impact of the European Union 
Sugar Policy Reform on Developing and Least Developed Countries, in FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UN, COMMODITY MARKET REVIEW 89, 90-93 (2005), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0334e/a0334e0f.htm. The author found through 
his research that it is not likely that the quantity of sugar exported from the Caribbean should 
decrease all that much but, rather, the revenues would be significantly different. The 
Caribbean has in fact decreased in both production and revenue from sugar. Id. at 103. 
 31. LEENA KERKELA & ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI, TRADE PREFERENCES IN THE EU SUGAR 
SECTOR: WINNERS AND LOSERS 8 (Purdue Univ. Seminar on Agric. 2005), available at
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2005/papers/kerkela.pdf. 
 32. ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI & LEENA KERKELA, REFORM IN THE EU SUGAR REGIME:
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL SUGAR MARKETS, 4-6 (2005), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/24733/1/cp05hu02.pdf. 
33. Id. at 14. 
 34. Michael Bruntup, Discussion Paper, Everything But Arms (EBA) and the EU-
Sugar Market Reform—Development Gift or Trojan Horse? 7 (German Development 
Institute Oct. 2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/ 
Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=27650. 
 35. And I challenge you to find Antigua on your map—Antigua, it’s on the right 
hand side, it’s a very tiny twin-island state—Antigua and Barbuda . . .  
36. See Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services—Request for 
Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/1 (Mar. 27, 2003), available at
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In light of the disparity in power in the WTO,37 I was very, very 
surprised in 2003 to learn that Antigua had challenged the United States 
about its internet gambling laws. That is, the United States had forbidden 
internet gambling, but Antigua had become a huge offshore internet 
gambling center—a huge business, with lots of companies going there to 
invest and locate their internet gambling sites in that country.  
In view of the conflict, Antigua challenged the United States, claiming 
that the prohibition violated the United States’ WTO obligations under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) because it was possible to 
gamble in the United States in person via casinos, race tracks,  and various 
other state and private entity sponsored gambling. 
The dispute resulted in partial wins for Antigua under both the 
November 10, 2004 Panel Report and the April 7, 2005 Appellate Body 
report.38 However, the United States’ refusal to comply with the findings 
resulted in further proceedings to ensure compliance.39 Although the WTO 
can impose “special and different treatment” provisions to protect the 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocum
ents/t/S/L/110.doc. 
 37. Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 9 CHI. KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 130, 131 (2009). The reasons smaller states, like 
those in the Caribbean, have trouble with access to the system often include a lack of 
resources, small trade volumes, a lack of institutional capacity or a lack of political will. Id.
at 132. 
 38. Report of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen_searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q1=%28
%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS285%FCR%2A+and+not+RW%2A%29&language=1; 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen_searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q1=%28
%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS285%FCAB%FCR%2A+and+not+RW%2A%29&langua
ge=1. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) was passed as a 
result of the United States losing in its WTO dispute against Antigua and Barbuda. Peter 
Shaker, America’s Bad Bet: How the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 
Will Hurt the House, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1183, 1198 (2007).  
 39. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewer 
window.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/285RW-00.doc. The 
initial reaction by Antigua to the favorable ruling was that the win was a great victory, 
especially for such a little country. Daniel Pruzin, Antigua-Barbuda Wins WTO Interim 
Ruling Against U.S. Internet Gambling Restrictions, 21 Int’l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 13, 14 (Mar. 
25, 2004). However, some scholars still feel that the victory was hollow because the case 
“highlights the ineffectiveness of the provisions intended to ensure that developing countries 
are able to use and prevail during the WTO dispute settlement process.” Id. at 28. The fact of 
the matter is that the Antigua has very little it can do to impose sanctions against the United 
States Daniel B. Pimlott, WTO Rules Against U.S. in Internet Gambling Case, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/317e9e48-ad61-11db-
8709-0000779e2340.html#axzz1dBYdeTQQ. 
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interests of developing countries from developed countries, the measures 
have been critiqued for rarely being implemented and even more rarely 
being to the benefit of developing countries.40 Even when measures are 
taken, the WTO does not have any teeth to make the United States adhere to 
rulings against developing countries: even after two adverse WTO rulings, 
the United States still refused to change its position on Antigua and internet 
gambling and continued to try to make internet gambling illegal.41
As a result of the compliance proceedings, on December 23, 2007 the 
WTO arbitrator authorized Antigua to assert $21 million nullification of 
benefits against U.S. intellectual property that was protected pursuant to the 
TRIPS Agreement.42 That is, Antigua was given permission to violate the 
TRIPs with respect to U.S. intellectual property up to the amount of $21 
million without violating its obligations under the WTO Agreement.43 The 
United States’ response was to announce that it was withdrawing from its 
GATS obligations as they pertained to internet gambling.44
 40. Amin Alavi, On the (Non)-Effectiveness of the World Trade Organization’s 
Special and Different Treatments in the Dispute Settlement Process, 41 J. WORLD TRADE
319, 320 (Apr. 2007). 
41. See Andrea Ewart, Small Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural Approach 
to Special and Differential Treatment through Reforms to Dispute Settlement, 35 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 27, 55 (2007). 
 42. The WTO ruling was a potentially significant move by the WTO in favor of 
small countries because Antigua was permitted to suspend $21 million annually in IP rights 
held by firms from the United States See Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online 
Gambling Dispute, 4 J. INT’L COMM. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (2009). This remedy was chosen by the 
WTO because a remedy allowing suspension of obligations to the US would have almost no 
effect in a developed country such as the United States Clint Bodien, Cross-Retaliation in the 
WTO: Antigua and Barbuda’s Proposed Remedy against the United States in an Online 
Gambling, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 847, 853 (2008). The ruling gives small countries the 
potential to create leverage in future disputes. Wohl, supra, at 16. The decision was 
especially notable because it was an instance where the 15th smallest country in the world 
went head to head with the world’s economic superpower and left the WTO with a sound 
victory. Ewart, supra note 41, at 27. 
 43. The suspension of IP rights of U.S. firms was notable because the WTO DSB 
recognized that traditional remedies would not likely be enforceable because of the disparity 
in size of the countries. Bodien, supra note 42, at 855. However, Antigua could also lose its 
MFN status with the United States via the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) because the CBI 
includes a requirement of recognition and enforcement of U.S. IP rights as one of the 
requirements for the MFN status. Id. at 855. The bottom line is that the DSB’s decision could 
have ended up being more detrimental than beneficial for Antigua. Id.
 44. Yevgeniya Roysen, Taking Chances: The United States’ Policy on Internet 
Gambling and Its International Implications, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 873, 875 (2008-
2009). On April 15th, 2011, the FBI indicted 11 of the founders from the three largest online 
poker websites and shut down the websites. Michael McCarthy, FBI Busts Three Biggest 
Online Poker Hhouses, USA TODAY, (Apr. 16, 2011), available at
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2011/04/fbi-cracks-down-on-3-
biggest-online-poker-houses-poker-stars-full-tilt-poker-absolute-poker/1. The indictees were 
charged with bank fraud, money laundering, and illegal gambling offenses. Id. The 
prosecutors cited the UIGEA as the grounds for the indictments. Id. Until the very recent 
indictments, the WTO decision had left the operators of the online gambling websites unsure 
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I would ask you to think about the effect or the benefit of this $21
million of IP nullification to Antigua. That is, I am able to violate your 
intellectual property rights up to the amount of $21 million versus having an 
economy or an industry that actually functions and employs Antiguan 
citizens and brings in tax revenue to the state. Furthermore, the fact that a 
small nation won against an economic superpower, yet ultimately still lost, 
only emphasizes the flaws in the WTO system: Developed countries 
essentially do what they like, regardless of their commitments to the 
WTO.45
F. EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the premier Caribbean 
regional integration organization.46 Founded in 1973, the organization first 
consisted of Anglophone former colonies of the United Kingdom. 
Membership has expanded to include Haiti. CARIFORUM is a broader 
organization that includes the Dominican Republic. 
Following the WTO proceedings in the banana wars, in view of the need 
to re-arrange the economic and trade relationship between the EU member 
states and their former ACP colonies, the European Union entered into 
economic partnership agreements with different regional groupings of 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific former colonies. Broadly, pursuant to the 
terms of the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), access 
to the EU markets is no longer unconditional: Products of the 
CARIFORUM states will receive duty-free and quota-free access to the 
markets of EU member states. In return, products from EU member states 
will face decreasing barriers to the markets of the Dominican Republic and 
CARICOM member states. CARIFORUM states have agreed to liberalize 
80 percent of imports over 15 years and will liberalize the remaining 20 
percent over 20 to 25 years.47
of the legality of their activities. Tom Newnham, Note, WTO Case Study: United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 7 ASPER 
REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 77, 81 (2007). The constitutionality of UIGEA was challenged 
in 2008 by a non-profit advocacy group, but the case was dismissed in an unpublished 
opinion. Kristina L. Perry, Note, Current State of the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act and Recently Adopted Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet 
Gambling, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 29, 31 (2008-2009). The court did not state whether 
the dismissal was based on a lack of standing or for failure to state a claim. Id.
 45. Michael Grunfeld, Note, Don’t Bet on the United States’s Internet Gambling 
Laws: The Tension between Internet Gambling Legislation and World Trade Organization 
Commitments, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 501-03 (2007). 
 46. For a thorough discussion of CARICOM, see Bravo, CARICOM, supra note 4, at 
167-89. 
47. See Anthony Gomes, Phasing of Tariff Liberalization on European Union 
Goods, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Jan. 26, 2011, available at
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Phasing-of-tariff-liberalisation-on-European-
Union-goods_8315707#ixzz1DrRgSCn3. 
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What does it mean? What are the terms of the deal? Access to the EU 
markets is no longer unconditional. So, the good deal that the former 
colonies had was that their preferential access to EU markets was not 
reciprocal. That is, the Caribbean states and territories got preferential 
access but could still keep their tariffs and get revenue from the European 
Union’s products coming in. Now it’s no longer unconditional, so the 
products of the CARIFORUM states will get duty free and quota free access 
to the EU markets but, in return, tariffs must be removed with respect to 80 
percent of imports over 15 years and the remaining 20 percent over a 20 to 
25 year period.  
Arrived at following four years of negotiation, the treaty is 
controversial48 and has stimulated much debate in the region regarding 
whether the economic effects will be beneficial for the Caribbean. For 
example, the loss of tariff revenues will be substantial: Based on data for the 
2005/06 fiscal period, at the end of the liberalization period Jamaica is 
estimated to lose approximately $1.34 billion in both tariff and non-tariff 
revenues, or 96 percent of tariff revenues previously collected from EU 
imports.49
So, having finally acceded to the banana dispute resolution, the European 
Union negotiates with its former colonies to come into compliance with its 
WTO obligations. Through the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement, the European Union is attempting to rearrange its relationship 
with those colonies so that it comes into compliance. However, freed finally 
by its decision to comply with the banana decision, the European Union’s 
negotiations are no longer premised on the idea of giving unconditional aid 
to its colonies. Now we can bargain hard because we have been told that 
this preferential access violates our WTO obligations, right? 
Despite the agreement, the Caribbean continues to resist implementation. 
There’s the promising and then the complying.50  So, the agreement was 
 48. I can’t tell you how many editorials were published in the papers in the 
Caribbean Islands in which dire predictions have been made regarding what will be the effect 
of this agreement, or whether the CARICOM and Dominican Republic should have held out 
for a better deal or some other kind of deal with the European Union because this, they said, 
would be the end of the region. See, e.g., Rickey Singh, ‘EPA Nightmare,’ JAMAICA 
OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/139937_-EPA-nightmare-. 
49. See Gomes, supra note 47. 
 50. In response to the lack of implementation of the EPA by Caribbean countries, 
CARIFORUM has agreed that it will establish an “EPA Implementation Unit” by July of 
2011. Dixie-Ann Dickson, EPA Implementation Unit Coming in July Says Cadiz, TRINIDAD 
GUARDIAN (Trinidad & Tobago), Apr. 4, 2011, http://guardian.co.tt/business/2011/04/04/epa-
implementation-unit-coming-july-says-cadiz. It seems like one of the biggest obstacles to 
implementing this for Caribbean countries has been getting local business to be comfortable 
with the changes. Id. Cariforum is using information seminars aimed at local business 
owners and the European Union’s offer of aid for trade and the promise to offer technologies 
as an incentive for local businesses that are reluctant to get on board with the EPA. Id. The 
stresses from the outside to adjust their economies have caused stresses within. Although the 
countries within the region have many similarities, there are rivalries and social differences 
2011]    Challenges to Caribbean Economic Sovereignty 49
signed at the end of 2008 and was supposed to come in effect on January 1, 
of this year—2011. As of late February 2011, only Guyana51 had 
implemented the agreement. Further, it took two years before the regional 
body, CARICOM, set up an implementation body to ensure member state 
compliance with the treaty.   
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
What do these series of events reveal about the economic sovereignty of 
the states and territories of the Caribbean? Individually and collectively, 
they demonstrate that Caribbean states and territories lack economic 
sovereignty and are thus unable to chart their own economic destiny. I 
would say that their situation is very similar to the situation of other small 
and micro states that do not have economic heft. Their market is not that 
attractive, they do not have enough population or economic activity to bring 
in investors and investments from abroad, so they are left to react rather 
than to create their own initiatives. The effects of these challenges will be 
adverse impacts on their major agricultural industries, which as I noted 
before, are quite inefficient. As a result of the OECD’s anti-tax haven and 
anti-money laundering initiatives, their provision of financial and 
recreational services has now been adversely impacted as well. 
It is not hyperbole to state that the economic sovereignty challenges call 
into question the viability of fundamental tenets of international trade law. 
The challenges that I have described have adversely impacted the region’s 
major agricultural industries. The region’s rather successful turn toward the 
provision of financial and recreational services was negatively impacted by 
the OECD’s anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering efforts. The 
provision of the more “innocuous” recreational services (gambling) by some 
states and territories has been stymied. The region must now continue its 
search for the next comparative advantage. But will that comparative 
advantage be deemed acceptable by the international community’s 
regulatory organizations? 
which make integrating further more difficult. David Jessop, Op-Ed., Caricom’s Problems 
Create Doubts for Partners, DOMINICAN TODAY (Dominican Republic), Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2011/4/8/39188/Caricoms-problems-create-
doubts-for-partners. The rivalries between islands may not be overcome quickly enough to 
implement effective coalitions for economic growth.  
 51. And I also meant to say I apologize because my map does not show Guyana. 
Guyana is actually on the South American continent but is considered to be in the Caribbean 
by Anglophones in the Caribbean based on historical ties. Caribbean countries are well 
behind in implementing their EPA obligations on tariff dismantlement; the deadline was the 
beginning of the year, and thus far only Guyana and St. Kitts Nevis have met their 
obligations. Id. The lack of uniformity and agreement between Caribbean countries seems 
likely to lead to greater questions being raised about the purpose of such regional 
organizations. Id.
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In the context of evaluating the impact of these challenges, let’s think 
about comparative advantage now. What is “comparative advantage?” 
Pursuant to the theory of comparative advantage, a state should produce and 
trade in the products and services in which it has a comparative advantage 
in comparison to the other products and services that it could produce. That 
is, you should do what you’re best at, right? And trade what you’re best at 
producing.  
Comparative advantage is impermanent. Each trading partner must be 
endlessly flexible and must continuously engage in formulating and 
exploring new sources or formats of its comparative advantage. The 
Caribbean region’s transition from the provision of agricultural products to 
the provision of varied services—tourism, financial, recreational (i.e., 
gambling)—demonstrates the impermanence of comparative advantage. At 
one point, they were the best, or at least good, at banana and sugar 
production; now they are very good at tourism services, right?52 But also 
several are very good at financial services and banking. Think of 
transitioning from the purely agricultural model to the financial services and 
banking model and even to the more or less innocuous internet gambling 
model.  
The transition to their next comparative advantage would be facilitated 
by their exercise of economic sovereignty by creating a regulatory regime 
attractive to those who want to park their money here, escape taxes there, or 
play and gamble on the internet. However, this process of transition has 
been foreclosed or substantially restricted by the top-down imposition of 
regulations by a non-representative—I would claim a non-representative—
international body—the OECD. That is, the region’s search for a new 
comparative advantage has been undermined to a great extent so that the 
movement away from agriculture to another kind of paradigm—searching 
for the services industry that these countries would be very suited for—has 
not been completed at this point, or is being stultified.  
According to the theory of comparative advantage, the WTO trading 
partners or parties need to be very flexible in finding what their comparative 
advantage is going to be. The Caribbean may also demonstrate that 
sovereignty itself—the power to create regulatory regimes within a territory 
or state—may be a source of comparative advantage. They seem to have 
found a comparative advantage that consists of using sovereignty itself to 
create regulatory regimes that would facilitate economic activity and 
economic access for their citizens. 
Yet sovereignty itself is an uncertain source of comparative advantage 
since it is constricted and shrinking in scope due to multilateral treaties, 
geopolitical realities, and other commitments.  
What is the impact of large-country policies, which may stem from anti-
competitive intent and have anti-competitive impact, in undermining the 
 52. Thus, the Caribbean as a favored destination for Spring Break. 
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search for comparative advantage by the less powerful? Will comparative 
advantage of weaker states only be explored at the discretion of and 
pursuant to the terms agreed to by larger economies? 
Yet that reality—a top-down imposition of rules of indeterminate 
legitimacy—is detrimental to both the United States and the Caribbean. For 
example, the decrease in banana production in the region has led to an 
increase in production of marijuana and an increased role in provision of 
illicit transborder services. Drug trafficking is now the most viable and 
productive economic activity for the dislocated banana or sugar farmer and 
for others dependent on the banana industry. 
What might be the region’s comparative advantage—proximity to the 
United States or the possession of Anglophone populations in a world where 
English is predominant? Anything else? Do these small countries and 
territories actually have anything to offer in a globalized world? Anything 
other than white or golden powdery beaches, tropical climates, and endless 
sunshine?  
Further analysis of the meaning of these challenges to Caribbean 
sovereignty can be organized under several banners: (1) the interaction of 
sovereignty and membership; (2) sovereignty and legitimacy; (3) 
sovereignty and illicit trade; and (4) sovereignty, size, and power 
imbalances. 
A. Sovereignty and Membership 
Does membership in multilateral organizations confer sovereignty 
enhancing benefits? The circumstances of the affected Caribbean states and 
territories starkly demonstrate an inability to effectively participate in 
situations of both membership and non-membership: Contrast the 
challenges presented by the OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money 
laundering initiatives with the challenges arising from the results of the 
sugar, banana, and gambling disputes under the auspices of the WTO. That 
is, Caribbean state membership in the WTO does not appear to have 
conferred any significant benefit to the Caribbean states with respect to 
resolution of these disputes. The states and territories were subjected to the 
OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering initiatives despite non-
membership in either the OECD or the FATF. Yet, as members of the 
WTO, in the sugar and banana disputes, they were limited to 3rd party 
observer status despite the fundamental importance of the outcomes of both 
of those disputes to their economic health and futures. With respect to the 
gambling dispute, the small size and lack of economic and political power 
of Antigua was not overcome by its membership in the WTO. Instead, the 
United States was able to ignore and/or refuse compliance with the panel 
and Appellate Body reports, with no adverse economic or other effects on 
the United States. In contrast, the Antigua offshore gambling industry was 
virtually destroyed.  
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The result is the same. As a member with a voice in the WTO, a 
Caribbean state or territory is foreclosed with respect to the dispute central 
to its economy just as they were foreclosed from participation due to the 
membership requirements with respect to the OECD. Once the more 
powerful economies have identified a threat to their own regulatory 
regime—that is, here are our own tax dollars fleeing elsewhere or here are 
potential havens for money laundering—they determine that reform is 
needed. Their influence means that they are able to force these targeted 
countries to change their internal domestic regulations. So there was no 
difference. Whether there was membership or not, the outcome was the 
same: loss of market, loss of control, and demonstration of powerlessness 
against larger economic powers. 
However, note that with respect to Caribbean states’ membership in 
CARICOM, those states have manifested great skittishness with respect to 
their membership obligations, and a general reluctance to pool membership, 
leading to a largely ineffective organization.53 Note, as well, other 
manifestation of sovereign prerogative: lack of implementation with respect 
to the CARIFORUM-EU Partnership Agreement.54
My question is, if there is no value, or little value, to sovereignty, what is 
the point of participation, of voice, of access, of whether you are a member 
or a nonmember in these international institutions? Contrasting the impact 
of the OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering regime and the 
effects of the WTO bananas, sugar, and internet gambling dispute, it seems 
to me that having membership in those international organizations was 
virtually meaningless for these countries. What will sovereignty become for 
these little places, these micro places? These places, these micro states, may 
seem to be inconsequential, to be far away, or great for a Spring Break 
vacation, but we are globalized and interlinked; there is a deep 
interrelationship. Accessing drugs or accessing the drug market in the 
United States coming through the Caribbean is much more possible now 
when legitimate economic activity is foreclosed for the individual citizens 
in Jamaica. 
B. Sovereignty and Illicit Trade  
I also want to think about the larger, detrimental impact when the search 
for comparative advantage is undermined in this way. I have thought a great 
deal about the comparative advantage of Caribbean countries; that is, the 
movement away from agriculture to tourism. I think it is clear that tourism 
is going to employ a certain number of people but not everyone or even a 
majority of the population. So, self-sustaining agriculture would seem to be 
53. See generally, Bravo, CARICOM, supra note 4. 
54. See discussion supra, Part II.6. 
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a good project. But now, bananas are no longer profitable; it makes no sense 
to grow bananas. It makes no sense to grow sugar.  
Does anyone know what the number one cash crop is now in the 
Caribbean? Marijuana. That is, if I can’t grow bananas and find a market for 
it, and I can’t get a job at the resort, and I can’t be involved in a licit 
economic industry, I may then explore the relationship between the 
legitimate trade links and the illicit or illegitimate trade links. The choice to 
that banana farmer is to find the next comparative advantage. Proximity to 
the United States is a source of comparative advantage, and the felicity of 
being English-speaking in a world where English is the dominant world 
language of business and economics is also another source of comparative 
advantage. The reality of being shut out from legitimate international 
markets—sugar, bananas—has resulted in a huge spike in the production of 
marijuana, and provision of illicit services—the transborder shipment is 
drugs—services that are not covered under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services or other WTO agreements or instruments. 
What is the effect of that move to illicit business on the sovereignty of 
these states? The last time that Jamaica actually hit the news in the United 
States in a big way was the embarrassing scenario last year where a certain 
drug don called Dudus faced an extradition request from the United States. 
Curiously enough, the drug don lived in the constituency of the Prime 
Minister of Jamaica. Curiously enough, someone in the government of 
Jamaica contacted a high flying and high priced law firm in Washington, 
D.C. to fight the extradition on the basis of sovereignty—the sovereignty of 
the Jamaican state, the nation state. When this news broke in Jamaica, there 
was outrage that Jamaican laws were being used to defend the alleged drug 
king pin, but there was also great denial on the part of the government: 
denial of involvement. The governmental systems appeared to be corrupted, 
with some participation of the Prime Minister, Bruce Golding.55 In fact, as 
we meet and speak here in Lansing, Michigan, the Manatt Commission of 
Inquiry is underway in Kingston, Jamaica, attempting to identify the 
existence and source of corruption in the system and the reasons why 
Jamaica first refused to extradite Mr. Christopher Coke (or Dudus), the 
infamous drug lord.56
55. See Paul Henry, Golding Maintains that Manatt Did not work for Government,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/-Golding-
maintains-that-Manatt-did-not-work-for-Gov-t; Marc Lacey, U.S. Extradition Effort Strains 
Relationship with Jamaica, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 25, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/americas/26jamaica.html?ref=christophercoke. 
56. See Tanesha Mundle, Nelson Denies Saying Coke Extradition Could Topple 
Government, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/I-
never-uttered-such-words_8388676. Joseph Goldstein, Jamaican Kingpin Pleads Guilty in 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/nyregion/christopher-coke-pleads-guilty-in-new-
york.html?_r=1&ref=christophercoke. 
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Sovereignty then was being used as a banner, as a protective shield, for 
an accused drug trafficker. That was the argument, we’re not going to 
extradite because it violates our sovereignty that the United States wants us 
to extradite this person, used as a shield for illicit activities, right? So, 
Jamaica experienced an island-wide manhunt for this individual57 at the 
same time that the government was trying to fight his extradition based on 
notions of the sovereignty of the Jamaican state.  
C. Sovereignty and Legitimacy 
I also want to think about sovereignty and legitimacy, to question the 
legitimacy of the top-down creation and implementation of standards by the 
OECD. The United Nations is like sausage making: everyone goes in and 
speaks, and no one can come to a decision. With the FATF, in contrast, you 
have a single purpose, exclusive membership organization. You can actually 
create rules. But to what extent are these rules then being used to facilitate 
the economic development of one set of countries versus the domination of 
smaller, less powerful states?  
What is the source, if any, of the legitimacy of the anti-money laundering 
and anti-tax haven initiatives of the OECD and the FATF, both of which are 
limited—even exclusive—membership and limited-purpose economic 
institutions? That is, what is the source of the standards deployed? What is 
the nature of the participation of the “subjects” of these rules? Did the 
subjects—”sovereign states”—participate in crafting them? Despite the 
doubts regarding legitimacy of the power exercised by the organizations, 
there is no doubt regarding the effectiveness of their strategies supported, as 
they are, by the power of the largest trading economies.  
D. Sovereignty, Size, and Power Imbalances: More about Legitimacy  
Caribbean states and territories are small in size and lack resources. As a 
result, their ability to participate effectively in multilateral organizations is 
negatively impacted.58    
In addition, the Caribbean states’ and territories’ responses to the 
economic challenges manifest an inability to withstand reputational 
pressures. Despite protestations about the legitimacy—both with respect to 
the source of the standards and the discriminatory application—and 
purposes of the OECD anti-tax haven and OECD/FATF anti-money 
laundering initiatives, all the Caribbean states and territories capitulated to 
 57. Kareem Fahim, Gang Leader Still Eludes Police as Death Rate Rises, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/world/americas/28jamaica.html?ref=christophercoke. 
 58. Note, however, that members of CARICOM have devised an institutional 
mechanism for pooling negotiation strategies—the CARICOM Regional Negotiation 
Machinery. 
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the pressures, as did all other targets of the FATF. Their capitulation must 
be contrasted to the reactions of the United States and the European Union 
to the outcomes of the beef hormones and gambling disputes.59 Economic 
and other sources of power allowed both of these players to avoid effective 
implementation of ostensibly neutral rules. 
And then there is the question of sovereignty and size. Should we have 
small states? Does it make sense? What does sovereignty entail if there will 
be an inability to actually carve a path in the increasingly interdependent 
world? What function does sovereignty provide for these entities? It is nice 
to have the flag and the athletes at the Olympic Games and various cultural 
things, but does it really provide for the economic benefit, the political 
benefit of the citizens of that territory or geographic space?  
CONCLUSIONS
The recent challenges to Caribbean economic sovereignty give rise to a 
number of questions. These are: Does membership in multilateral 
organizations confer benefits to small states? Or does the membership of 
such states help to facilitate paralysis in decision-making? For example, the 
WTO’s Doha Round paralysis stems from the attempt to give voice to “too 
many” points of view, while at the same time illustrating the limits of 
participatory democracy. Does the contrast between the “effectiveness” of 
the FATF’s standard-setting and implementation with the WTO’s decision-
making and standard-setting challenges demonstrate the need for the raw 
exercise of political power in international relations and law? 
Secondly, the challenges demonstrate the effects of power disparities—
both with respect to geographic and population size as well as to economic 
size and influence.  
Thirdly, this examination of those challenges calls into question the 
legitimacy and impact of limited member international organizations. Do 
they merely manifest the existing power disparities such that they are tools 
and exemplars of the disparities in power? And what is the impact when 
power disparities and the exercise of power by the powerful shut out the 
smaller states from legitimate trade? Jamaica, and the Caribbean in general, 
appears to illustrate the assumption of the reins of state power by illicit 
transborder networks.  
In those cases, the fiction of the juridical equality of states becomes, 
itself, a source of comparative advantage for the pursuit of illicit and illegal 
activities. That is, as the illegal and illicit take over the economy, the state’s 
sovereign status becomes a shield against scrutiny and the implementation 
of an internationally-based rule of law. 
 59. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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A further question arises whether the pooling of sovereignty continues to 
be a good choice. Membership of multilateral organizations may hold out 
the benefits of access to previously negotiated bargains and voice within an 
organization, even if the strength and influence of that voice is hindered by 
the reality of limited resources. However, decentralization and a refusal to 
join and to pool sovereignty may facilitate heterogeneity—that is, by 
serving to limit the spread and implementation of economic theories and 
projects that enjoy core/fundamental support in the West, but which may 
not serve the interests of smaller, weaker, more peripheral regions and 
economies. 
  
 
THE EFFECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS ON 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE NATIVE AMERICAN CONTEXT 
Michael Lawrence* 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 57 
I.    RADICALS IN THEIR OWN TIME ............................................................ 57 
II.   VINE DELORIA JR. AND INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY .................................... 59 
III. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................ 62 
IV. COMMUNITY .......................................................................................... 64 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to be here; thanks to the Michigan State University 
Journal of International Law for the opportunity. It is timely for me to 
participate in this Symposium panel on “The Effects of Human Rights 
Norms on Sovereignty,” since my book, Radicals in Their Own Time: Four 
Hundred Years of Struggle for Liberty and Equal Justice, was just published 
by Cambridge University Press.1 Radicals looks at the lives of five 
individuals who exemplify 400 years of struggle for liberty and equal justice 
in America. These five individuals led the way in the struggle for human 
rights in America—for what is human rights if not liberty and equal justice, 
and individual autonomy and free will?  
I. RADICALS IN THEIR OWN TIME 
The genesis for the book is epitomized by its epigraph, which quotes 
Albert Einstein in 1953: “In teaching history there should be extensive 
discussions of personalities who benefitted mankind through independence 
of character and judgment.” It was in this spirit that I undertook the 
project—that is, I wanted to look at some of the personalities throughout 
American history who did benefit mankind through their independence of 
character and judgment. 
Reading from Radicals:  
  
 * Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate and International Programs, 
Michigan State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Matthew 
Fletcher, a colleague at Michigan State University College of Law and a leading scholar and 
expert on Native American law, for his insights on the topic of this panel. 
 1. MICHAEL LAWRENCE, RADICALS IN THEIR OWN TIME: FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF 
STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND EQUAL JUSTICE (2011). 
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In the spirit of Einstein’s words in the epigraph, Radicals in Their Own 
Time discusses the personalities of five Americans who led the way in 
bursting some of America’s most inglorious chains of injustice and 
oppression. Progress toward greater freedom in America has never been 
direct or easy. Democracy is messy, and the nation has had its share of 
despotic leaders and oppressive majorities.  
But one constant throughout American history has been the recurring 
theme of individuals of superior character and judgment, who have 
courageously stood up to lead the fight for human rights, that is, freedom 
and justice, despite considerable hardships to themselves. Every 
generation has them, men and women who speak the truth to power, in the 
face of sometimes overwhelming official and unofficial resistance. People 
who rebel against stifling orthodoxy and demand governmental tolerance 
and equal treatment, even when it seems they alone are waging the fight. 
Individuals who crave freedom from arbitrary authority like the very air 
they breathe. 
The five individuals the book looks at are, first, Roger Williams (for the 
proposition of religious freedom of conscience), who lived from 1603 to 
1682. Williams, who founded the colony of Rhode Island and 
Providencetown, was ostracized and eventually banished from the Puritan 
communities of Massachusetts Bay Colony for his troublesome views on 
religious freedom.  
It looks next at Thomas Paine (for the proposition of the natural “Rights 
of Man”), who lived from 1737 to 1809. Thomas Paine, of course, was the 
author of Common Sense, the bombshell pamphlet that predated by five 
months (and in part motivated) the Declaration of Independence and other 
massive works like The Rights of Man (which was instrumental in the 
French Revolution) and The Age of Reason. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton (for the proposition of women’s rights), who 
lived during the nineteenth century from 1815 until 1902, is the next 
subject. Stanton was a fearless advocate for women’s rights who wasn’t 
content to settle for just the right to vote. She certainly did demand the vote 
and was the first to do so in the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 in the 
Declaration of Rights and Sentiments that she and her colleagues put forth, 
but she wasn’t willing to settle for the vote alone; rather, she demanded 
equality in all respects, long before that was a recognized and acceptable 
position to take.  
Next is W.E.B. Du Bois (for the proposition of black rights), who lived 
from 1868 to 1963. Du Bois was a fearless advocate for African-American 
rights throughout the many decades of the late 19th century and the first half 
of the 20th century, consistently poking and prodding a mainstream culture 
that largely denigrated and dehumanized people of color.  
And then, finally, the book profiles Vine Deloria Jr. (for the proposition 
of Native American rights and traditions), who is the character that I’d like 
to focus on today. Deloria was the intellectual voice for generations of 
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Native Americans past, present and future in calling the United States and 
state governments to task for their failures regarding Indian rights. Deloria 
burst on the scene in 1969 with his book, Custer Died for Your Sins, and 
many other publications in the following decades, until his death in 2005. 
One of the things that all of these characters argued for, and the crucial 
point they made, was that every government must recognize, or must 
tolerate, individual liberty, equal justice, and human rights. That is worth 
saying again: Government must tolerate. And so it becomes a matter of the 
government not interfering with individual free will, which thereby allows 
diverse viewpoints and practices the necessary breathing space that they 
require in a free, pluralistic society. Radicals explains: 
Roger Williams believed government should stay separate from, that it 
should tolerate, all religious practices. Paine was committed to the 
common-sense principle that government must not abridge, that it must 
tolerate the individual rights of all people. Stanton demanded that 
government replace a legal regime imposing separate, inferior status on 
women with one that recognizes, that tolerates, the equal legal status of 
women. Du Bois tirelessly challenged government to repudiate laws and 
practices that institutionalized white supremacist principles, and thereby to 
accept, to tolerate black people as equals under the law. And Deloria spent 
his lifetime exposing the practices of the U.S. government that 
systematically reneged on its solemn promises to leave alone, or tolerate, 
Indian tribes with their native lands and traditions, and pointed the way 
forward for how that government should make amends for its egregious 
breaches of faith. 
II. VINE DELORIA JR. AND INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
My take on this panel—the effects of human rights norms on 
sovereignty—is the Native American context, because Native American 
communities are sovereign. They were here first. These sovereign rights, 
however, have not been adequately recognized or respected over time by the 
United States government.  
As noted above, Vine Deloria Jr. has been instrumental in discussing, 
among many other things, the topic of Indian sovereignty. Like the other 
four individuals profiled in Radicals in Their Own Time, Deloria detested 
oppressive authority, and he spoke up passionately for broad governmental 
recognition and tolerance of Indian sovereignty, self-determination, and 
traditions. He demanded, “what we [Indians] need is a cultural leave-us-
alone agreement, in spirit and in fact.”  
Deloria sought to educate people that, under the terms of their 
historically unique political arrangement with the United States, Indian 
states are entirely separate (albeit dependent) sovereigns. As such they are 
entitled, under well-established principles of international law, to the respect 
given any other sovereign state. Early on, the U.S. Supreme Court (if not the 
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President and Congress) recognized these principles. Chief Justice John 
Marshall said in Worcester v. Georgia in the early 1830s: 
The settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence—its right to self-government—by associating 
with a stronger, and taking its protection . . . . A weak state, in order to 
provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more 
powerful without stripping itself of the right of government and ceasing to 
be a state.  
Marshall continued, quoting the Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel, perhaps 
the leading international law scholar of the day: “Tributary and feudatory 
states do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states.” In short, 
Deloria explains, the dominant society is duty-bound to leave the tribes 
alone to exercise their sovereign rights of government.  
Moreover, Deloria adds, “Indians stand apart (not more or less favored—
just apart) from other minority groups in America.” When a federal or state 
court, as opposed to a tribal court, asserts jurisdiction over people, whether 
Indian or non-Indian, on reservation land, for example, Deloria and other 
Indian law experts view the issue as involving tribal political rights as 
opposed to civil rights or racial justice. David Getches writes, for example, 
“The larger issue at stake in nearly all Indian law cases is the relationship of 
the tribe to the United States, a matter rooted in centuries-old policy created 
as part of the nation’s constitutional framework.” 
Despite the self-serving Discovery Doctrine rationale regarding property 
rights in the earlier Johnson v. MacIntosh case (familiar to all first-year 
Property students), John Marshall and the early Supreme Court in Worcester 
v. Georgia and other cases nonetheless still did believe that broad-based 
tribal sovereignty was mandated under the nation’s constitutional structure. 
In Worcester, Marshall emphatically announced that Indian communities 
are “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries within 
which their authority is exclusive . . . . Because the Constitution exclusively 
reserves the power to interact with sovereign tribes to the federal 
government, it follows that it is entirely inappropriate for states to engage in 
Indian affairs.” Marshall explained that international law principles apply to 
the United States’ tribal relations because Indian tribes are sovereign 
nations that existed before the founding of the United States. And because 
they did not participate in the framing of the Constitution, they are outside 
the Constitution’s scope. As with any other nation, the primary means to 
engage in nation-to-nation relations is through the treaty-making process.  
Following from the contemporaneous Cherokee Nation v. Georgia case, 
which recognized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” Worcester 
described the relationship between the federal government and tribes as a 
form as trust arrangement, analogous in some ways to that of a guardian to 
its ward. Deloria explains that the recognition of a degree of independence 
by the stronger to the weaker is implicit in the trust relationship.  
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Even during that first third of the 19th century, when Chief Justice 
Marshall was elucidating the Supreme Court’s deferential tribal sovereignty 
posture in Worcester, the other branches of the federal government took a 
radically different approach. In the executive branch, President Andrew 
Jackson was an unmitigated disaster for the tribes, with his views that 
Indians’ choices were either to assimilate and be subjected to state authority 
or to move west beyond the Mississippi River. What resulted, among other 
travesties, was the Trail of Tears where over 5,000 Cherokees died on the 
way west, with endless suffering along the way.  
In response to Worcester, Jackson reportedly said, “John Marshall made 
his decision, now let him enforce it.” Jackson disagreed with President 
George Washington’s early assertion that the proper manner of dealing with 
tribes was through the treaty process, stating instead that “the proper 
guardian is the legislature of the Union.” In this declaration were the seeds 
of the doctrine that survives to this day; that is, that Congress has plenary 
power over tribes.  
Well, how does Congress assert its power over Indian tribes? Congress 
asserts its power under the reasoning that the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to exercise its authority. The Commerce Clause says Congress has 
the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes.” So Congress has the power to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. Note the implicit recognition in 
the Commerce Clause by the Constitution’s framers that Indian tribes are 
themselves separate, sovereign nations: Congress has the power to regulate 
commerce not only among the states, but also with other separate sovereign 
entities, specifically foreign states and Indian tribes. 
What happened over time, however, is that the U.S. Supreme Court (and 
Congress itself) broadly interpreted the Commerce Clause to dramatically 
expand Congress’s power to not only control commerce with the Indian 
tribes but to control the commerce of the tribes. This effectively gave 
Congress the power to dominate and to control Indian tribes, not just merely 
to regulate commerce of the United States, as the text would suggest, but 
rather to control outright all aspects of the Indian tribes. This approach was 
reflected in the Court’s 1886 United States v. Kagama decision, in which 
the Court endorsed the idea that Congress’s Commerce Clause power gives 
it virtually unlimited plenary guardianship authority over Indian people and 
tribes. Ignoring Marshall’s earlier international law analysis regarding the 
sovereignty of domestic dependent nations, the Court reasoned, “Indian 
tribes are the wards of the nation; they are communities dependent on the 
United States; dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their 
political rights.” It follows, the Court reasoned, that “[f]rom their very 
weakness and helplessness, largely due to the course of dealings of the 
federal government with them, and the treaties in which it had been 
promised, there arises the duty of protection and with it the power of 
Congress.” 
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Congress’s power was then held to extend to reneging on promises that 
had been made in earlier treaty obligations. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock in 
1903, the Court held that Congress had always had the unilateral power to 
abrogate treaty obligations, an assertion Deloria characterizes as “fraudulent 
on its face.” Phrasing the holding as necessary for Indians’ own care and 
protection, the Court reasoned that to require Congress always to obtain 
Indians’ consent to take land, for example, would deprive it, “in a possible 
emergency when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal 
of the tribal lands, of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not 
be obtained.” 
Congress’s guiding principles, Deloria explains, were “considerations of 
justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant 
and dependent race . . . . It was not only a shock but a breach of common 
decency when Congress decided it had absolute power over the once-
powerful tribes,” Deloria fumes. “When the Supreme Court also decided 
that such should be the policy in Lone Wolf, the silent conquest of 
unsuspecting tribes was complete. That decision slammed the door on the 
question of morality and justice. It was like appointing a fox to guard the 
chicken coop.” 
Lone Wolf’s outrageous effect was that “Indians had no chance 
whatsoever to acquire title or rights to land which had been theirs for 
centuries.” Deloria further argues that Indian tribes never would have so 
willingly sacrificed their sovereignty, at least not without a struggle. He 
says,  
[f]ew tribes would have signed treaties with the United States had they felt 
that the U.S. would violate them. The promises of self-government found 
in a multitude of treaties, the promises of protection by the U.S. from 
wrongs committed by its citizens, the promises that the tribes would be 
respected as nations on whose behalf the U.S. acted as trustee before the 
eyes of the world, were all vital parts of the treaty rights which Indians 
believe they have received from the U.S.  
Under longstanding international law principles, Deloria further explains, 
the fact that Indian tribes elected to become dependent upon the U.S. for 
some purposes in no way diminishes their sovereignty and rights of self-
determination. “Indian tribes still have the right to be recognized among the 
nations of earth, even with domestic legal doctrines of the U.S. guaranteeing 
the validity of their titles as held under protected status by the U.S. against 
European nations.” 
III. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
So how does the issue of Indian Sovereignty play out in terms of human 
rights? Asked another way, to the extent that the Indian nations are part of 
the polity in the United States, does the Constitution—which protects 
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certain human rights—apply to Indian nations? This is an open question that 
Congress tried to settle in 1968. As Matthew Fletcher writes, “Congress 
codified the unsettled tension between American civil rights law and 
American Indian tribal law, customs, and traditions in the American Indian 
communities, by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act, the ICRA.” ICRA, in 
which “Congress chose to impose a modified form of the Bill of Rights on 
Indian governments in order to protect those under tribal jurisdiction,” was 
enacted out of the concern that Indian “individual rights were receiving 
short shrift in tribal courts and by tribal governments.” As it had done 
previously in other statutes (such as the Indian Reorganization Act), 
Congress “affirmatively sought to displace tribal law and all the attendant 
customs and traditions, as well as Indian values, with American law. 
Ironically, after the Supreme Court interpreted ICRA in 1978, this law could 
only be interpreted and enforced by tribal courts.” This, at least, is 
acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty in the sense that courts and 
Congress were recognizing the authority of tribal courts to decide cases.  
“Tribal law and American civil rights law have been at odds in many 
tribal communities ever since,” Fletcher concludes, “as tribal voters, 
legislatures and courts have struggled with how and whether to apply 
American civil rights law in Indian country.” Deloria suggests ICRA is a 
mixed bag: “In practice, ICRA radically changed the substance of tribal 
courts,” forcing them to decide disputes in ways that newly “restricted the 
powers of Indian tribes with respect to their own membership.” On the 
positive side, “it more clearly defined appeal procedures from tribal court to 
federal court,” and it lessened the problem of other laws which had ceded 
tremendous authority to states to regulate Indian affairs. Cohen’s Handbook, 
which is the authoritative source on federal Indian law, observes that ICRA 
has been an equal-opportunity target of criticism from both those “who 
believe it went too far, and those who believe it did not go far enough in 
constraining tribal actions.”  
“Although ICRA was understood by most people as a major step toward 
the fulfillment of Indian self-government,” Deloria wondered whether it 
“was . . . what Indians really wanted.” Especially after such events as the 
Indian takeover of Alcatraz and Wounded Knee in the 1970s, “when we 
compare a sacred pipe, traditional, and tribal court, modern, as two 
competing means of reconciliation and problem-solving, the two sides in the 
conflict become readily apparent.” 
Again, first principles beg the question of whether Congress even has the 
authority to enact such legislation as ICRA over sovereign, albeit 
dependent, Indian nations. Deloria notes the irony of a statute that would 
“confer upon the American Indians the fundamental Constitutional rights 
which belong by right to all Americans, when by its express terms, the 
Constitution does not apply to the American Indians and their tribal 
relations and does not protect Indian tribes.” 
So, in terms of resisting Congress (again from Matthew Fletcher):  
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A key unanswered question is whether tribal decision-makers must comply 
with the Indian Civil Rights Act at all. As a normative matter, perhaps 
Indian nations should comply with the Congressional mandate, and most 
tribes have agreed to do so. However, at least one tribal court has 
explicitly kept the question open, and it is a valid question, given the 
American Constitution’s ambiguous grant of authority to Congress over 
Indian affairs. Moreover, the fact that ICRA now means that—at least in 
civil cases—only tribal forums are available to interpret and enforce the 
substantive provisions in the statute. 
What if the tribal court, or tribal legislature, actively resists applying, 
interpreting and enforcing ICRA? What if the tribal court holds that 
Congress had no real authority to enact ICRA?  
Currently these questions are more or less irrelevant for two reasons. First, 
few if any tribes overtly resist the substantive rules that ICRA requires. 
Additionally, ICRA largely is redundant in many tribal communities. 
Tribal constitutional and statutory law, not to forget tribal common law, 
already mirror and even expand upon ICRA’s due process and equal 
protection rules, generating rules equivalent to the protections offered in 
federal and state courts. Many tribal courts invoke “fundamental fairness” 
in deciding claims. And just as in federal and state courts the rules may be 
the same, but the protections offered individuals case by case may differ.  
Second, since tribal decision makers can interpret rules required by ICRA 
and the courts with tribal law, customs and traditions [after 1978], ICRA 
itself borders on irrelevance as a substantive matter, while still retaining 
important symbolic meaning. As free speech cases demonstrate, tribal 
decision makers are free to directly apply federal and state law, apply 
modified versions of federal and state law, or even disregard federal and 
state law in favor of tribal common law.  
That said, there are certain flashpoints where tribal law and ICRA may 
collide . . . . Assuming that ICRA protections could not be massaged by a 
tribal court to avoid serious conflict, the tribal decision maker (likely a 
tribal court) may simply assert that Congress had no authority to impose 
federal constitutional rules on internal tribal matters and utterly reject 
ICRA. There are claims perhaps not yet considered that may pit tribal law 
even more directly against ICRA and federal and state civil rights norms, 
potentially placing a tribal court in this position.  
IV. COMMUNITY 
One of the big differences in tribal and Native American culture and 
white culture, or dominant culture if you will, is the emphasis on 
community. A very important point to understand in discussing human 
rights in a native context is that there is an all-encompassing emphasis on 
community in native traditions. The Indian, Harvey Cox suggested in the 
book Secular City, “does not so much live in a tribe; the tribe lives in him. 
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He is the tribe’s subjective expressions.” It follows that “it is virtually 
impossible to ‘join’ a tribal religion by agreeing to its doctrines. People 
couldn’t care less whether an outsider believes in anything.”  
Deloria explains that  
[n]o separate religious standard of behavior is imposed on followers of the 
religious tradition outside of the requirements for the ceremony: who 
should do what, who is excluded, who is needed for other parts of the 
ceremony. The customs of the tribe and the religious responsibilities to the 
group, are practically identical.  
The fact that tribal focus is on community is not to say that the individual is 
completely subsumed. “The fears that some express,” Deloria says,  
as to the lack of personal self among tribal people is unwarranted. For 
example, one of the most notable features of Indian tribal cultures is the 
custom of naming individuals. Indian names stand for certain qualities, for 
exploits, for unusual abilities, unique physical characteristics, and for the 
individual’s unusual religious experiences. Every person has a name, given 
in religious ceremonies, in which his uniqueness is recognized; 
in contrast to the largely generic names given in dominant culture. 
“Individual worth was also recognized in other ways in tribal religions,” 
Deloria continues.  
The keepers of the sacred medicine bundles, for example, were people 
who had been carefully watched for their personal characteristics, and 
were chosen to share some of the tribal mysteries and responsibilities in a 
religious sense. The priesthoods of some of the tribes were filled with 
people who had been carefully trained after they had demonstrated their 
personal integrity. In almost every way, tribal religions supported the 
individual in his or her community context. 
Tribal traditions of spirituality inform customary tribal approaches in the 
area of governance and law as well. Deloria says that “laws as such did not 
exist in tribal societies. Law was rejected as being force imposed from 
without, whereas peoplehood required fulfillment from within the 
individual. Insofar as there were external controls, Indians accepted only the 
traditions and customs which were rooted in the tribe’s distant past.” Most 
tribes had never defined power in authoritarian terms. Deloria explains:  
A man consistently successful at war or hunting was likely to attract a 
following in direct proportion to his continuing successes. Eventually, the 
man with the greatest followings composed an informal council which 
made important decisions for the group. Anyone was free to follow or not, 
depending upon his own best judgment. The people only followed a course 
of action if they were convinced it was best for them. This was as close as 
most tribes ever got to a formal government. 
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Further on the point of individual versus group rights, Fletcher adds,  
Tribal law prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act, generally speaking, was 
much more oriented towards the rights of the group, over the rights of the 
individual . . . . The kind of coercive, arbitrary and violent government 
actions generated by Euro-American governments—that is, imprisonment, 
execution, police brutality, denial of governmental benefits and services, 
eminent domain, interrogation, entrapment, surveillance, quartering of 
soldiers and so on—were rarely if ever perpetuated by Indian 
communities. A classic Supreme Court case analyzing the dark side of 
Anglo-American law is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court concluded 
that the long history and custom of police abuses of suspected criminals 
required a Constitution-based prophylactic rule prohibiting the 
interrogation of suspects, unless they were aware of their rights to silence 
and counsel. As the Navajo nation’s Supreme Court recently noted, there 
is no such tradition of law enforcement at Navajo, and likely no such 
tradition in the vast majority of American Indian communities.  
One area that we can look at in terms of how ICRA may differ among 
Indian tribes, and the protection of human rights as such, is the protection of 
speech. The Indian Bill of Rights incorporates aspects of the First 
Amendment, prohibiting Indian tribes that exercise powers of self-
government from making or enforcing any law preventing the free exercise 
of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech or the press, or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances. 
So “the freedom of speech (and of the press) is uniquely linked to 
participation of individuals in government and politics,” Fletcher explains.  
In the American constitutional structure, these political rights help to form 
the core of American governance and liberty . . . . In American Indian 
politics the right to speak also is a core aspect of government, but in ways 
that sometimes differ from American politics. In general, tribal 
communities have always presumed the right to speech, whereas speech in 
American politics is a new creature, subject to continued and varied 
restrictions, in spite of the First Amendment. “Leaders are inherently 
powerless to deprive any family of its means of subsistence. As long as 
each family stays within its ancestral lands, and retains its economic 
autonomy, the right to dissent is a practical reality.” 
We may conclude, as Fletcher asserts, that “tribal law develops daily, 
and since federal courts generally, since 1978, no longer hear civil rights 
claims being brought under the ICRA, it is appropriate to focus on modern 
tribal law relating to free speech.” Regarding speech, many tribal 
constitutions give free speech rights, some do not. And indeed, some of the 
tribal constitutions give more rights, in the sense that they are not limited 
only to “state action” (i.e., government action), but also prohibit 
abridgement of free speech rights by private individuals. And, “where no 
tribal custom or tradition has been argued or implicated, [tribal courts] will 
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look to general U.S. constitutional principles, as articulated by federal and 
[state] courts, for guidance.”  
Fletcher concludes: 
Tribal courts have no obligation to apply federal and state constitutional 
law as it relates to free speech. Sometime tribal courts will apply strict, 
intermediate or rational basis scrutiny to analyze government restrictions 
on speech in relevant contexts, while others do not. Some courts rely 
heavily on tribal customary or traditional law, while others rely less. 
However, depending on the strength or intensity of the customary or 
traditional interest in free speech restriction, tribal courts are more likely to 
invoke tribal, customary, or traditional law. If a legal dispute involving a 
uniquely tribal practice, tradition, art or custom arises, it is far more likely 
(and reasonable, if not desirable) for a tribal court to apply traditional or 
customary law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Aquinnah and Mashpee Wampanoug peoples of Massachusetts 
watch as the graves of their ancestors are transformed into an offshore wind 
farm.1 The Peruvian people watch as Spain and a commercial salvage 
operation battle in court over coins that were minted from Andean silver, 
using Andean labor, and at great cost to the Andean people.2 And the world 
watches as the British Museum persistently refuses to return the Parthenon 
Marbles, even after Greece built a state of the art museum to prove they 
could care for the objects, and even though more than half of Englishmen 
think the Marbles should go back.3  
What do the Wampanoug, the Peruvians, and the Greeks have in 
common? Each of them lacks a sufficient legal claim to protect, preserve, or 
reclaim their cultural heritage. Each of them has been marginalized by a 
cultural property protection model that has historically exalted property 
  
 * Clinical assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A., 
University of Maryland at College Park, M.A., ARCA International Art Crime Program, 
J.D., Howard University School of Law. I thank Chelsey Dahm for her assistance with this 
research. 
 1. Katharine Q. Seelye, Big Wind Farm Off Cape Cod Gets Approval, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/science/earth/29wind.html. 
 2. Odyssey Marine Exploration v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 10-10269 (11 Cir. Filed 
Jan. 21, 2010); See also Kimberly Alderman, High Seas Shipwreck Pits Treasure Hunters 
Against a Sovereign Nation: The Black Swan Case, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. CULTURAL 
HERITAGE & ARTS REV., Spring 2010, at 3. 
 3. Anthee Carassave, In Athens, Museum is an Olympian Feat, N.Y. TIMES, June 
19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/arts/design/20acropolis.html; Poll Shows 
Support for Marbles Return, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2002),  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/2330015.stm.  
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interests over moral rights.4 Each of them will benefit as that protection 
model continues its current course of evolution—away from a property 
framework and toward a human rights-based approach.  
My work suggests that three indicators demonstrate this evolution: (1) 
the recognition of a human right to culture in international law, (2) the 
changing tenor of national repatriation efforts, and (3) the birth of intangible 
cultural property. This Article focuses on the first indicator, examining how 
changes in international law demonstrate the emergence of a human right to 
culture and, consequently, a right to cultural property. 
Part II of this Article explores the origins of “cultural property” and 
shows how traditionally cultural property law has treated cultural property 
the same as any other property; moveable antiquities were personal property 
and archaeological sites were real property. Part III examines how recent 
shifts in international law demonstrate that the cultural property protection 
model is moving away from the traditional property framework and toward 
a human rights-based approach. The Article then considers the implication 
of this evolution on the sovereignty of nation states. Part IV concludes. 
I. THE ORIGIN OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
The common law cultural property protection model treated cultural 
objects and sites the same as non-cultural objects and sites. Moveable 
ancient objects were treated as personal property and immoveable ancient 
sites were treated as real property.5 Objects and sites were generally traded 
in and disposed of without special regard for any subjective cultural value.6 
National common law emphasized individual property rights, and there was 
little to no debate over whether private individuals should be permitted to 
acquire and trade in cultural property.7  
  
 4. See Kimberly Alderman, Ethical Issues in Cultural Property Law Pertaining to 
Indigenous Peoples, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 515 (2009) (discussing perceived moral rights) 
[hereinafter Ethical Issues]. 
 5. See M. June Harris, Who Owns the Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow? A 
Review of the Impact of Cultural Property on Finder and Salvage Laws, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 223, 227-33 (1997) (discussing the application of finder and salvage laws to 
antiquities at common law); See also Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: 
The Abbe Gregoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142-45 (1990) 
(explaining how, at common law, governments would not interfere with the decisions of the 
private owners of ancient sites).  
 6. Sax, supra note 5, at 1142. 
 7. See generally Patty Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed 
Conflict: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677 
(2009). Similarly, theft of art and archaeological materials was treated the same as other 
forms of plunder. Perhaps the earliest public trial for the theft of archaeological materials 
was that of Gaius Verres, prosecuted by Cicero in 70 B.C. See FRANK HEWITT COWLES, 
GAIUS VERRES: AN HISTORICAL STUDY 98-102 (1917) (describing one such theft, wherein the 
chief complaint was that the Roman magistrate had given the art owner a paltry sum to create 
a fictional purchase).  
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Moving into the 20th century, a public property model emerged. National 
governments began to claim ownership of archaeological materials by virtue 
of their sovereignty. Turkey has the oldest confirmed patrimony law, dating 
to 1906.8 Peru followed suit in 1929 and Italy in 1939.9 Source nation 
governments scrambled to appropriate the inherent value of cultural objects 
to their national treasures.10 Meanwhile, the idea had taken root that the 
common person was entitled to access cultural materials, whether in 
museums or by public access to sites.11 
In 1954, UNESCO coined the term “cultural property” in the Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (“Hague Convention”).12 Article 1 of the Hague Convention 
defines cultural property as: 
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural 
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, 
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites . . . ; works of art; 
manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or 
archaeological interest . . . ;13 
The Hague Convention was drafted in the wake of World War II, during 
which cultural property was targeted as a unique class of property and 
  
 8. Decree of Antiquities (1906) (Turk.); See Amy E. Miller, The Looting of Iraqi 
Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn Away Leisurely from the Disaster, 27 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 49, 60 (2005) (as to Turkey’s oldest patrimony law).Through patrimony statutes, 
national governments lay claim to archaeological materials unearthed within their borders. 
See NIEL BRODIE ET AL., STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL MATERIAL 8, 
31-32 (2000) [hereinafter STEALING HISTORY].  
 9. Anuario de la Legislacion Peruana, Ley No. 6634 (1929) (Peru); Peru v. Johnson, 
720 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (determining that Law No. 6634 was the oldest 
unambiguous patrimony law despite earlier laws in Peru pertaining to archaeological 
materials). L. Giu. 1939, n. 1089, Tutela delle cose di interesse artistico e storico [Protection 
of Artistic and Historic Sites] G.U. Aug. 8, 1939, n. 184 (Italy) (noting that there were export 
laws that applied specifically to archaeological materials in the late 19th century, but it was 
not until the early 20th century that countries began to enact statutes claiming government 
ownership of such materials). 
 10. See generally Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and 
a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 385 (1995) (defining source nations 
as “countries in which artifacts are principally found”). 
 11. See Robert Fulford, In the Age of Museum Building, NAT’L POST (Toronto), Dec. 
4, 2001, available at http://www.robertfulford.com/MuseumArchitecture.html (public 
museums began opening during the enlightenment, with the Louvre becoming the 
international standard in 1793). 
 12. Naomi Mezey, The Paradox of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 
2009 n.11 (2007) (citing Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or 
‘Cultural Property?’, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 312 (1992)), available at 
http://lawweb.usc.edu/centers/clhc/archives/workshops/documents/Mezey.pdf. 
 13. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, art.1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
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suffered grave damage because of its perceived vulnerability and value.14 
Signatories recognize that “damage to cultural property belonging to any 
people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, 
since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.”15 
Given the impetus, the original narrow objective of international cultural 
property law was to prevent destruction of cultural objects and sites in times 
of war.16 
Over the last five decades, the definition of “cultural property” has not 
changed significantly from that espoused by the 1954 Hague Convention. It 
has expanded somewhat to include some intangible non-objects, which, if 
not for their cultural features, would otherwise be considered intellectual 
property.17 However, the near entire body of cultural property law has 
developed over this same period, certainly the entire body of international 
cultural property law and to a large extent domestic law on the same. With 
this development, the original narrow objective of international cultural 
property law has expanded beyond mere physical preservation. International 
cultural property law now seeks to reaffirm the relationships that creator 
cultures have with materials and sites with a subjective cultural value, and 
to ensure that information about and access to those materials and sites is 
protected.18 
II. EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT TO CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In recent decades, the international community has become increasingly 
concerned with the subjective experience of groups from whom cultural 
materials and ideas originate. It has become willing to protect creator 
cultures by interpreting the text of old international agreements in a manner 
  
 14. See Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 61, 
61 (2000). 
 15. Hague Convention, supra note 13, pmbl. 
 16. See Blake, supra note 14, at 61. 
 17. Since the coining of “cultural property,” the term has expanded to include 
intangible cultural materials as well, such as weaving patterns, traditional medicine, and 
forms of cultural expression. For those that distinguish between cultural property and cultural 
heritage, see O’Keefe, supra note 12, at 6. Intangible cultural materials would most often be 
categorized as the latter. Nonetheless, intangible cultural materials are historically and 
economically valuable, and just as important to a people’s cultural development as are 
physical objects and sites. This reality is increasingly recognized in both international and, to 
a lesser extent, domestic cultural property law. See also Federico Lenzerini, Intangible 
Cultural Heritage: The Living Culture of Peoples, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L., 101, 103-08 (2011) 
(explaining the evolution of the “cultural property” definition to include intangible cultural 
heritage). 
 18. “Creator cultures” are those who created archaeological materials and sites. They 
are most often indigenous peoples who claim a moral right to benefit from or possess cultural 
materials by virtue of their ancestral origin. The term is used to distinguish the indigenous 
group from the national government within whose borders the group resides. See generally 
Alderman, Ethical Issues, supra note 4.  
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more favorable to moral claims, especially when the traditional property 
model provides no such protection. In doing so, the international 
community is supplementing the cultural property protection model by way 
of the human rights model. 
A. Expanding the Scope of Protection for Cultural Property  
In the mid-20th century, the first connection between human rights and 
cultural heritage was drawn. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“Universal Declaration”) recognized that cultural rights are 
“indispensable for [a person’s] dignity and the free development of his 
personality.”19 This was an early recognition that culture is significant to the 
experience of humanity. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts . . . . 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any . . . artistic production of which he is the 
author.20 
The concept articulated in Section (1) of Article 27 forms the basis for 
later notions that people have a human right to access cultural materials and 
sites, and that this access is necessary for meaningful participation in 
cultural life. Meanwhile, Section (2) of Article 27 suggests that authors, as 
individuals, should have the right to benefit from their artistic product. The 
concept of group authorship has recently emerged, raising the question of 
whether modern-day group members have a right to benefit from or possess 
the creations of their ancestors.21 
In 1954, both the European Cultural Convention and the Hague 
Convention recognized that losing cultural heritage damages the collective 
culture of the world.22 The European Cultural Convention was designed to 
safeguard and encourage the region’s collective cultural development, 
recognizing each party’s “national contribution to the common cultural 
heritage of Europe.”23 In Article 5, signing parties agree to “safeguard 
[objects of European cultural value] and ensure reasonable access thereto.”24  
  
 19. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 75 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration], available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm.  
 20. Id. at 76. 
 21. See generally Pammela Quin Saunders, A Sea Change off the Coast of Maine: 
Common Pool Resources as Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323 (2011). 
 22. European Cultural Convention, Dec. 19, 1954, 218 U.N.T.S. 139 [hereinafter 
ECC]; Hague Convention, supra note 13, pmbl. 
 23. ECC, supra note 22, art. 1. 
 24. Id. at art. 5. 
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Meanwhile, parties to the Hague Convention recognize “that the 
preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of 
the world,” and that cultural heritage therefore deserves international 
protection.25 Even so, the Hague Convention focused on the physical 
preservation of cultural sites and did not ensure the continued relationship 
of people in occupied territories with those sites.26 The international 
community began to recognize that local contributions were essential to the 
collective human culture. International law therefore provided for physical 
preservation of cultural materials and sites, foreshadowed a future 
protection of access to them, and acknowledged that the human right to 
participate in a cultural life implicated cultural property. 
In 1970, the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property (“UNESCO Convention”) acknowledged that the interchange of 
cultural property among nations “increases the knowledge of the civilization 
of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect 
and appreciation among nations.”27 Signing parties agree to enforce one 
another’s patrimony laws and export restrictions.28 The UNESCO 
Convention has been the most significant development toward international 
regulation of the trade in cultural property, but in order to become so it had 
to focus on the rights of national governments rather than people.29 The 
UNESCO Convention not only facilitated international cooperation for the 
preservation of cultural materials; it also globalized the concept that cultural 
property is worth protection on moral, not just economic, grounds. 
In a 1998 50-year follow-up to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the United Nations General Assembly recognized that the 
  
 25. Hague Convention, supra note 13, pmbl. 
 26. See generally Kimberly Alderman, The Designation of West Bank Mosques as 
Israeli National Heritage Sites: Using the 1954 Hague Convention to Protect Against In Situ 
Appropriation of Cultural Sites, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter West 
Bank Mosques]. 
 27. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, pmbl., Nov. 14, 1970, 823 
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. 
 28. Id. About reciprocal enforcement of patrimony statutes, Neil Brodie succinctly 
explained: 
Some countries have taken certain categories of material, most 
notably antiquities and paleontological material, into state 
ownership. Illegal export of this state property is then considered 
theft. As theft is a generally recognized criminal offence it is in the 
interests of all countries to act against it, so the police of one country 
may take action to recover material stolen from another, and expect 
their efforts to be reciprocated in return.  
BRODIE, supra note 8, at 31. 
 29. Consider, for instance, Article 13(d), which recognizes “the indefeasible right of 
each State Party to this Convention to classify and declare certain cultural property as 
inalienable . . . .” UNESCO Convention, supra note 27. 
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enjoyment of cultural rights is necessary to the full enjoyment of the right of 
self-determination.30 In the following year, the Second Protocol to the 1954 
Hague Convention expanded on what was considered respect and 
safeguarding of such sites, adding protection of the use of cultural sites by 
local people in occupied territories.31 These developments reflect the shift in 
focus of the international community to the subjective experience of local 
cultures regarding cultural objects and sites.  
The 2005 Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of 
Cultural Heritage for Society (“Faro Convention”) expanded on the 1948 
Universal Declaration’s human right to a cultural life.32 The first recognition 
of the Faro Convention is that “rights relating to cultural heritage are 
inherent in the right to participate in cultural life, as defined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”33 Importantly, the Faro Convention then 
recognizes cultural heritage exists “independently of ownership” and 
acknowledges that cultural resources have a special character that depends 
on how people identify with them.34 The Faro Convention goes beyond any 
earlier international agreement toward making the relationship between 
people and cultural materials and sites a human rights issue rather than a 
property issue. 
Most recently, in 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples provided that indigenous peoples should control their 
own cultural resources.35 Article 12(1) provides indigenous peoples “have 
the right to . . . maintain, protect, and have access to privacy to their 
religious and cultural sites,” the right to “use and control of their ceremonial 
objects,” and the right to repatriation of their human remains.36 In Article 
12(2), signing parties agree to “seek to enable the access and/or repatriation 
  
 30. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
53/168, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/168 (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r53.htm (expressing concern that people are still 
“deprived of the full enjoyment of their [cultural] rights and that some peoples still lack the 
full enjoyment of their right of self-determination”). 
 31. Occupying parties must work in “close-co-operation with the competent national 
authorities of the occupied territory” to make any change to use of cultural property in an 
occupied territory. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 9(2), Mar. 26, 1999, UNESCO Doc. 
HC/1999/7.  
 32. Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for 
Society, art. 2, Oct. 27, 2005, CETS no. 199 [hereinafter Faro Convention]. 
 33. Id. at art. 1. 
 34. Id. at art. 2 (“Cultural heritage is a group of resources inherited from the past 
which people identify, independently of ownership, as a reflection and expression of their 
constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions. It includes all aspects of the 
environment resulting from the interaction between people and places through time.”). 
 35. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 31, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at  
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
 36. Id. at art. 12(1). 
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of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession. . .”37 Article 
31 more broadly provides, “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, 
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage . . . .”38 The spirit of this 
Declaration undermines the way in which national governments have 
traditionally controlled the cultural resources of indigenous peoples within 
their borders.39 It emphasizes that cultural independence is imperative to the 
human right to self-determination and creates a new class of rights based on 
the relationship that indigenous peoples have with cultural objects and sites, 
recognizing this relationship exists independently of ownership concerns. 
International law demonstrates that the treatment of cultural property has 
shifted from a focus on individual ownership, to a focus on government 
ownership, to recognition of the global value of cultural heritage, to the idea 
that a right to cultural heritage exists independently from ownership 
concerns and derives from the human right to culture. 
B. Implication for Sovereignty 
Traditionally, nations have had sovereign authority over cultural property 
within their borders.40 This principle was exemplified with the Bamiyan 
Buddhas in central Afghanistan. These enormous sculptures were carved 
into the sides of sandstone cliffs along the Silk Road and had survived since 
the 6th century.41 They were considered eligible for listing on the UNESCO 
World Heritage List in 1983 due to their significance.42  
In 2001, the Taliban announced the statues were idols and would be 
destroyed.43 The Taliban denied allegations that the threatened destruction 
was retaliation for economic sanctions in connection with their sheltering of 
terrorists, or for the international community’s refusal to recognize it as the 
  
 37. Id. at art. 12(2). 
 38. Id. at art. 31. 
 39. See generally Alderman, Ethical Issues, supra note 4. 
 40. See M. Catherine Vernon, Note, Common Cultural Property: The Search for 
Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 435, 441 (1994) (“International 
laws and treaties do not prevent destruction by the host state [of cultural sites], or allow the 
other states the right to preserve the site.”). 
 41. Joshua Hammer, Searching for Buddha in Afghanistan, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, 
Dec. 2010, available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/Searching-for-
Buddha-in-Afghanistan.html. 
 42. The listing was deferred due to issues with the protection plan. Conflict then 
broke out in the region and modification of the protection plan was no longer feasible. 
Interview with Peter King, Chair of the World Heritage Committee, WORLD HERITAGE 
NEWSLETTER (UNESCO World Heritage Centre), May-June 2001, at 2, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/documents/publi_news_30_en.pdf.  
 43. See Amir Shah, Taliban: Statues Must Be Destroyed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 
26, 2001, available at http://stderr.org/pipermail/tariqas/2001-February/000317.html (noting 
there is no longer a Buddhist population in the region). 
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legitimate government of Afghanistan.44 Foreign groups and governments 
pled for reconsideration; Japan, for instance, offered to remove the statues 
piece by piece and reassemble them abroad.45 
Within weeks of their announcement, the Taliban used dynamite to 
demolish the sculptures.46 When the face on one of the Buddhas stubbornly 
clung to the cliffside despite the explosions, they used a rocket launcher.47 
The international response was severe, and the attack on the Bamiyan 
Buddhas was viewed as an attack on the international community.48 Terms 
used to describe the destruction include “moral depravity,” “cultural 
vandalism,” and “crime against culture.”49 The tenor of the response 
indicated that the Taliban had done something worse than mere property 
destruction and, despite the sovereignty Afghanistan enjoyed with respect to 
their cultural property, the Taliban had done something inherently wrong. 
In February 2010, Israel announced the designation of sites in the 
occupied Palestinian territories as national heritage sites.50 Of particular 
relevance was their designation of the Ibrahimi Mosque as such a site.51 The 
Ibrahimi Mosque is also known as the Cave of Machpelah, and it is where 
the Biblical and Koranic patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the 
matriarchs Sarah, Rebekah, and Leah, are buried.52 Both Jews and Muslims 
  
 44. Rohini Hensman, Religious Sentiment and National Sovereignty, 36 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 2031, Jun. 9-15, 2001 (quoting the Taliban Foreign Minister, Wakil Ahmed 
Mutawakel, as saying he would meet with a UN official in order to “tell him that what we are 
doing is an internal religious issue”). 
 45. Japan Made Bamiyan Buddhas Offer: Taliban Memoir, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 26, 
2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/169773/japan-mamoir. 
 46. Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 625-26 (Sept. 2003). 
 47. PETER BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNOW 271 (2006).  
 48. Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 46, at 620 ( “To the knowledge of the authors, 
this episode is the first planned and deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great 
importance as act of defiance of the United Nations and of the international community.”).  
 49. Id. at 621 (referring to the international community’s “great concern for the 
moral depravity shown by the perpetrators of such acts”). Peter Bergen, Taliban-Destroyed 
Buddhas May Never be Restored, CNN.COM (May 10, 2007), http://articles.cnn.com/2007-
05-10/world/afghan.buddhas_1_giant-statues-kabul-museum-habiba-sarabi?_s=PM:WORLD 
(calling the destruction an “act of cultural vandalism”). U.N. Confirms Destruction of Afghan 
Buddhas, ABC NEWS, (Mar. 12, 2011),  
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=81406&page=1 (quoting UNESCO’s Director 
General as describing the destruction as a “crime against culture”). 
 50. Gil Ronen, More Hevron Riots Follow Cave of Machpelah Decision, ARUTZ 
SHEVA (Israel) (Feb. 23, 2010, 6:11 PM),  
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/136163. 
 51. Anna Willard, UNESCO Worried About Israel Heritage Plan in West Bank, 
REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2010, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/02/26/idINIndia-
46510020100226.  
 52. Id. It is believed that the fourth Matriarch, Rachel, is buried in the Bilal Bin 
Rabah Mosque in Bethlehem (also called Rachel’s Tomb), now on the Israeli side of the 
West Bank barrier. See Matthew Price, The Changing Face of Jerusalem, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
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have long-established historical ties to this site, although it has been used 
almost exclusively as a mosque since the 7th century.53 
The Palestinians and Israeli left viewed the designation as an attempt by 
Israel to annex or appropriate the site, while Israel’s prime minister 
explained that it was just a “line budget to maintain the places.”54 There was 
an immediate, concerted response from the international community.55 The 
designation was called “provocative,” a “hijacking” of a Palestinian cultural 
site, and an illegal “annexation.”56 
The international community viewed Israel’s act as a violation of 
international law and the UNESCO Conventions, including those pertaining 
to human rights.57 Few of the criticisms charged something was legally 
wrong with the designation, however. Instead, some argued the designation 
was tantamount to a cultural appropriation because it threatened to interrupt 
the Palestinians’ cultural connection with the mosque.58 Hanan Ashrawi of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization said that the designation was a step in 
  
28, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4490671.stm (describing what many have 
called an annexation of Rachel’s Tomb). 
 53. The exceptions being from the 12th to 14th centuries and since the Six Day War 
in 1967. THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: AN INTERNATIONAL WORK OF REFERENCE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, DOCTRINE DISCIPLINE, AND HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 184-86 
(Herbermann, et al. eds., 1913). 
 54. Tensions Escalate over West Bank Holy Sites, VOICE OF AM. NEWS (Mar. 10, 
2010), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Tensions-Escalate-Over-West-Bank-Holy-
Sites---87250932.html. 
 55. See Hensman, supra note 44 (“A UN General Assembly resolution sponsored by 
over 100 nations and approved by consensus on March 9 urged Taliban to take immediate 
action to prevent further destruction of these and other monuments.”). 
 56. US Slams Israel’s ‘Provocative’ Holy Sites Plan, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Feb. 
25, 2010), available at http://hello.news352.lu/edito-24947-us-slams-israel-s-provocative-
holy-sites-plan.html (reporting the Obama administration called the designations 
“provocative”). Omar Karmi, Anger over Israeli Plan to Hijack Muslim Holy Sites, THE 
NATIONAL (United Arab Emirates), Feb. 25, 2010,  
http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/anger-over-israeli-plan-to-hijack-
muslim-holy-sites [hereinafter Karmi]. Concerns over Israel heritage list, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 
27, 2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/02/2010226201512998938.html 
(quoting Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad as saying Israel was “annexing” Ibrahimi 
mosque, US State Department spokesman Mark Toner as saying the designation was a 
“provocation,” and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference representative as calling the 
designation illegal and illegitimate). 
 57. Press release, UNESCO, Executive Board Today Adopted Five Decisions 
Concerning UNESCO’s Work in the Occupied Palestinian and Arab Territories, (Oct. 21, 
2010), available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/executive_board_adopts_five_decisions_concerning_unescos_work_in_the_occu
pied_palestinian_and_arab_territories/ (“[UNESCO’S Executive] Board voted 44 to one (12 
abstentions) to reaffirm that the [Ibrahimi Mosque is] an integral part of the occupied 
Palestinian Territories and that any unilateral action by the Israeli authorities is to be 
considered a violation of international law, the UNESCO Conventions and the United 
Nations and Security Council resolutions”); see generally Alderman, West Bank Mosques, 
supra note 26. 
 58. See generally id. 
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the direction where Palestinian culture would be “distorted or obliterated by 
the force of occupation.”59 
The international community is increasingly willing to comment on and 
criticize legally valid decisions pertaining to cultural property when those 
decisions have a subjectively immoral component. Nations no longer have 
carte blanche to address cultural property concerns within their own 
borders. Instead, they are subject to the scrutiny of the international 
community.60 
Similarly, the more that cultural property is treated as a human rights 
issue, as opposed to a property issue, the broader obligations that nations 
have with respect to it. There has already been an increase in the 
international monitoring of cultural property preservation and disposition.61 
Even mere monitoring could be considered an erosion of the sovereignty 
that nations have traditionally enjoyed with respect to cultural property.62 
Through UNESCO’s World Heritage List system, nations submit periodic 
reports to an international committee of experts, the same way as they do 
for other human rights issues.63 
Consistent with international monitoring, cultural property decisions by 
national governments are subject to increasing formal scrutiny. One such 
example is the manner in which UNESCO addressed in-session Israel’s 
designation of the Ibrahimi Mosque as national cultural heritage.64 
Correspondingly, national governments increasingly perceive cultural 
property issues as those pertaining to foreign, rather than domestic, policy.65  
  
 59. Karmi, supra note 56. 
 60. Hensman, supra note 44 (“Evidently the international community is very much 
concerned about what happens on Afghan soil, and the implicit message is that the Taliban 
clerics do not have the right to destroy these statues which happen to be located in their 
country.”). 
 61. See Patty Gerstenblith, International Art and Cultural Heritage, 45 INT’L L. 395, 
395-97 (2011). 
 62. Some argue that international monitoring of elections, for example, infringes on 
sovereignty. Arturo Santa-Cruz, Redefining Sovereignty, Consolidating a Network: 
Monitoring the 1990 Nicaraguan Elections, 24 REVISTA DE CIECIA POLÍTICA 189 (2004), 
available at http://www.scielo.cl/pdf/revcipol/v24n1/art08.pdf (“By inviting international 
monitoring missions the Nicaraguan government was ‘crossing [the] Rubicon of sovereignty 
. . . . With the official invitations [to the OAS, the UN, and the Carter Center], the 
Nicaraguans transcended conventional definitions of sovereignty.’” (quoting Robert Pastor)). 
 63. Periodic Reporting, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/periodicreporting/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
 64. UNESCO, Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board, 185th Sess., Oct. 5-21, 
2010,185 EX/Decision 15 (Nov. 19, 2010), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/ 
001899/189993e.pdf (following up on UNESCO , Decision on the Two Palestinian Sites of 
Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Al-Khalil/Hebron and The Bilal bin Rabah 
Mosque/Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, 184th Sess., 184 EX/Decision 37 (Mar. 19, 2010), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001873/187356e.pdf).  
 65. The U.S. Department of State administers the 1970 UNESCO Convention via 
The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006). 
The Department of State is responsible for making agreements with foreign nations for 
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The more interest the international community shows in cultural property 
preservation and disposition, the more nations must monitor and report on 
cultural property issues to one another. There has certainly been an increase 
in the information available internationally on domestic cultural property 
regulation and preservation.66 The challenge stemming from this increase in 
available information is in turning the statistics and records into useful data, 
so that the effectiveness of varying cultural property regulatory schemes can 
be compared both among nations and, over the course of time, for the same 
nation.  
As the notion gains support that cultural property is a human rights issue, 
not just a property issue, cultural rights advocacy efforts enjoy more support 
from the international community in terms of cooperation and financing. 
Recent decades have seen the birth of non-profits and non-governmental 
organizations dedicated exclusively to advocating for the preservation of 
cultural property.67 
With the increase in the number and activity of heritage advocacy 
groups, there have been increasing calls for humanitarian intervention with 
respect to cultural property issues. Some have asked whether the 
international community could or should have prevented the destruction of 
the Bamiyan Buddhas.68 Some have asked whether the international 
community should interfere with the alleged annexation of the Ibrahimi 
Mosque.69 As cultural property is increasingly conceptualized as a human 
rights issue, these kinds of inquiries become more pressing. They also beg 
the question of whether international norms about cultural property are 
  
import restrictions on cultural materials. But cf. Brian Baxter, As Assange Indictment Looms, 
WikiLeaks Cables Tie Two Treasure Cases Together, AMLAW DAILY, Dec. 10, 2010, 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/12/wikileaks-treasure.html (alleging the 
U.S. Department of State offered support to Spain in pending U.S.-based litigation in 
exchange for assistance with retrieving a Camille Pissaro painting that had been stolen by 
Nazis during World War II, and that U.S. diplomats offered to illegally share confidential 
customs documents as part of this support). 
 66. Domestic laws pertaining to cultural property have become more widely 
available in no small part due to the internet. UNESCO’s National Cultural Heritage Laws 
database contains national legislation from each member state pertaining to cultural heritage 
and contact information for each nation’s cultural heritage authorities. Legislation comes in 
both original format and with an English translation. See UNESCO, Database of National 
Cultural Heritage Laws, http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2011). 
 67. The International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) was established 
early on in 1965 while the Lawyers’ Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation (LCCHP) 
and Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE) were founded in 2003. ICOMOS International 
Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, (Venice Charter), 
approved May 31, 1964, available at http://www.icomos.org/venice_charter.html; 
YEARBOOK OF CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW 8 (Sherry Hutt ed. 2006); Press release, 
Archaeological Institute of America, Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE) Launches 
New Website (Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://www.archaeological.org/news/ 
pressrelease/267. 
 68. See generally Hensman, supra note 44. 
 69. See generally Alderman, West Bank Mosques, supra note 26. 
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becoming more authoritative in nature, requiring certain behaviors and 
prohibiting others.  
CONCLUSION 
International law indicates that a “right to culture” has developed as a 
fundamental human right and that control of cultural property is an inherent 
part of that right. Correspondingly, the cultural property protection model is 
evolving from a property framework toward a human rights framework. 
While implementation and enforcement of cultural property policies remain 
the responsibility of nation states, it is under the increasing scrutiny of the 
international community. 
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RENUNCIATION OF WAR 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.1
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 1.  NIHONKOKU KENPF [KENPF] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 
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On its face, the above declaration, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, 
seems quixotic and vague. How can a people “forever” renounce war? Were 
there not at least some Japanese people who refused to renounce war, who 
still believed in the validity of force as a means of settling international 
disputes? How can one generation speak for and bind future generations 
with such an extreme provision? Can a people truly believe that armed 
forces or war potential will never be maintained? In light of these questions, 
which imply their answers, Article 9 would seem to have been set up for 
failure. An ideal, however noble, is still an ideal: an imagined state of 
unrealizable perfection. But what to do with an ideal that is codified in law? 
And not just any law, but the constitution itself: a document that provides 
the skeleton for all other laws? What to do, in other words, with formative 
law that is impossible to sustain? 
Politicians and other commentators have been chipping away at Article 9 
for years.2 In the wake of the American-led War in Iraq, however, Article 9 
underwent heightened and unremitting challenge.3 With the exception of 
current prime minister Naoto Kan, all of Japan’s prime ministers since the 
Iraq War—Junichiro Koizumi,4 Shinzo Abe,5 Yasuo Fukuda,6 Taro Aso,7
and Yukio Hatoyama8—have at some time called for the revision, if not the 
 2. See Kendrick F. Royer, The Demise of the World’s First Pacifist Constitution: 
Japanese Constitutional Interpretation and the Growth of Executive Power to Make War, 26 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 749, 770-97 (1993); see also Akio Sugeno, The Japanese Pacifist 
Constitution is in Danger, 64 GUILD PRAC. 184 (2007). 
 3. See generally Tomohito Shinoda, Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch 
the SDF to Iraq, 7 JAPANESE J. OF POL. SCI. 71, 71-91 (2006).  
 4. Koizumi Calls for Article 9 Revision, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 14, 2003, at 
1; Peter Alford, Koizumi Selects Allies to Back Military Push, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 
9, 2004, at 16; Reiji Yoshida, Koizumi Urges LDP-DPJ Effort to Revise Constitution, JAPAN 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20040115a3.html. 
 5. Abe Calls for a ‘Bold Review’ of Japanese Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/asia/03iht-japan.1.5546774.html. 
 6. Shinichi Murao & Shozo Nakayama, Debates on Constitution May Intensify,
DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), May 4, 2006, at 3. 
 7. Japan Says it Could Build a Nuclear Bomb, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/29/AR2006112901641.html; see also Officials Stay Calm over 
Aso’s ‘Collective Self Defense’ Remark, JAPAN TODAY, Oct. 3, 2008, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/officials-stay-calm-over-asos-collective-
self-defense-remark; see also Craig Martin, The Fatal Flaw in Trying to Impose a New 
Interpretation on Article 9, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/eo20081005a2.html. 
 8. Opposition Leader Says Constitution Should Include Right to Wage War, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Oct. 17, 2000), at part 3; see also Doing Battle over 
Article 9, JAPAN TIMES, May 3, 2000, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/ed20000503a1.html; see also Tetsushi Kajimoto, Hatoyama’s Proposed Amendment 
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complete overhaul, of Article 9.9 The Obama administration has fortified 
this trend in remilitarization by mounting pressure on recent Japanese 
administrations to step up the role of the Japanese military in Asian affairs.10
At the same time, the Obama administration has remained mostly 
unyielding about the maintenance of the U.S. air station known as Futenma 
on the island of Okinawa. 
This Article considers how the Obama administration’s policies toward 
Japan implicate Article 9. More specifically, it argues that the Futenma base 
dispute (as it has come to be known) jeopardizes the very existence of 
Article 9 by threatening to render it moot and by expanding the already 
expansive interpretations of Article 9. Part I provides a brief history of the 
Futenma base dispute during the Obama years, and Part II explains the 
effects of the Futenma base dispute on Article 9. More specifically, Part II 
contextualizes the Futenma issue by way of the legislative and judicial 
history of Article 9 and suggests that the intermingling of Japanese people 
and resources with the U.S. military allows Japan to circumvent Article 9 
without massive public outcry. The fact of the matter is that Japan is relying 
on American troops to perform actions (maintaining combat troops and 
weapons, conducting military exercises and operations, and establishing 
armed defensive zones) that Japan could not do on its own because of 
constitutional restraints. Japan is permitting and in some cases encouraging 
the U.S. military to carry out actions that Japan is forbidden by its 
constitution to carry out.  
One thing this article does not do is suggest that Japan should or should 
not amend Article 9. Issues of internal Japanese politics are not the concern 
of this piece; the concern of this piece is the U.S. military presence that 
threatens to undermine the constitution of a sovereign nation. A secondary 
concern is for the people of Okinawa who want the U.S. troops off their 
island. The obiter dictum of this article suggests that not just the Futenma 
air station but all U.S. forces on Okinawa should be withdrawn from the 
island not only because the U.S. military jeopardizes the import and impact 
of Article 9, but also because the people of Okinawa generally oppose the 
presence of U.S. troops in their territory. The recent court decision in Mori 
Acknowledges the SDF is a Military, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20050204a4.html. 
 9. Some of these calls for revision were made before these men were prime 
minister, and even, in some cases, before the Iraq War. 
 10. See Allen Mendenhall, Base Maneuvers, LIBERTY, Aug. 2010, at 11-12; Allen 
Mendenhall, Okinawa Occupied, CHRONICLES: A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE, Sept. 
2010, at 20-22, available at allenmendenhall.com/wp-content/uploads/Okinawa-
Occupied.pdf; Allen Mendenhall, Obama Out of Okinawa, ANTIWAR.COM (Dec. 22,  
2010), http://original.antiwar.com/mendenhall/2010/12/21/obama-out-of-okinawa/; Allen 
Mendenhall, The Latest Happy Face of the Ruling Class, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.counterpunch.org/mendenhall12272010.html; and Allen Mendenhall, How Long 
Must Okinawans Wait, TAKI’S MAGAZINE, (Jan. 11, 2011), http://takimag.com/article/ 
how_long_must_okinawans_wait/print.  
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v. Japan provides Okinawans with a constitutional argument for challenging 
the presence of U.S. bases like Futenma. That decision established a 
concrete “right to live in peace” that, to be actionable, must bear a “legal 
relationship” to military activity that violates Article 9.   
Despite the attention that the Futenma base dispute has generated in 
Japan, relatively little scholarship in English has addressed Futenma and its 
effects upon Article 9, perhaps because the issue remains unresolved. 
Without purporting to offer a definitive resolution to this longstanding 
conflict, this Article attempts to fill that lacuna in scholarship while 
synthesizing several English-language sources on Futenma and 
contextualizing these sources within the broader meaning and history of 
Article 9. The Futenma base dispute is far from over; it is probably just 
beginning. The irony (or paradox) of the Futenma base dispute is that 
America spearheaded the pacifist provisions of Article 9 after World War II, 
but because of Futenma and other American policies in Asia, America 
might bring about the apparent violation of the very clause that it made 
possible.    
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTENMA BASE DISPUTE
The Futenma base dispute springs out of a long and complex relationship 
between Japan and the U.S. The U.S. military officially occupied Okinawa 
from the end of World War II until 1972.11 The decision to plant U.S. troops 
on Okinawa probably had to do with Japanese discrimination against 
Okinawans in addition to joint Japanese and American efforts to modernize 
Okinawa.12 U.S. troops have remained on the island since 1972. As of 1998, 
Okinawa hosted over half of the U.S. forces in Japan.13 At that time, U.S. 
forces took up 10% of all land on Okinawa.14 In 1995, three U.S. 
serviceman gang-raped a 12 year old girl, sparking furious protests that 
caused President Bill Clinton to express national regret over the soldiers’ 
actions.15 This event brought about an enormous rift between local 
Okinawan officials and the Japanese government over the issue of U.S. 
 11. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-98-66, OVERSEAS PRESENCE: ISSUES 
INVOLVED IN REDUCING THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA 2 (1998) 
[hereinafter OVERSEAS PRESENCE]. 
 12. On this score, see Masamichi S. Inoue, We Are Okinawans But of a Different 
Kind, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 85, 92 (2004). 
 13. See OVERSEAS PRESENCE, supra note 11, at 2.  
 14. Id.
 15. Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Americans Charged With Rape Turned Over to 
Police; Japanese Indictment of Three U.S. Servicemen in Okinawa Means Conviction Likely,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1995, at A24; see also Op-Ed., Questions of Justice in Okinawa, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, § 1, at 20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/28/opinion/ 
questions-of-justice-in-okinawa.html?src=pm; see also Kevin Sullivan, 3 Servicemen Admit 
Roles in Rape of Okinawan Girl, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1995, at A1. 
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forces on the island.16 This event also transformed the U.S. troops on 
Okinawa into “an element of the utmost importance in the formulation of 
the Joint Declaration on Security toward a [sic] new era.”17
After the rape incident, the U.S. and Japan established the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa, better known by its acronym SACO. The mission 
of SACO was to “reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby 
strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.”18 At the behest of SACO, the U.S. and 
Japan established the Futenma accord in 1996. This agreement maintained 
that the U.S. military would return base and communications properties to 
private landowners and the prefecture, relocate helicopter landing zones, 
release Marine training areas, consolidate U.S. housing districts, terminate 
artillery live-fire training, relocate parachute drop trainings, implement 
noise reduction initiatives, and transfer Navy and other military aircrafts, 
among other things.19 The release of the agreement did not finalize specifics 
about the implementation of various provisions within the agreement 
because, as Hitoshi Tanaka, then Deputy Director-General of the North 
American Affairs Bureau (1996-98), explained, 
we have to formulate concrete ideas for the development and use of 
returned land, work out the costs involved and arrange for the required 
financial resources. Where facilities are to be relocated, we also need to 
get approval from local communities around relocation sites and then build 
the actual facilities.20
Tanaka stated quite presciently that “although we have taken the utmost 
care to select the least problematic relocation sites, criticism, particularly 
from residents around the sites, is still unavoidable.”21 Finally, he noted, 
“[i]t will be no easy task to persuade those people,” by which he meant the 
Okinawans.22 Tanaka was right to anticipate criticism. Shortly after the 
agreement was memorialized, a seemingly irritated Okinawa Governor 
Masahide Ota remarked, “[i]t’s painful to ask some areas in and out of 
 16. Okinawa Rape Case Brings Rift in Government, YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Japan), Oct. 
16, 1995, at 2. 
 17. HITOSHI TANAKA, ET AL., JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: CORNERSTONE OF DEMOCRACY PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR OUR FUTURE 
GENERATIONS 5 (1996). 
 18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
(SACO) Final Report (Dec. 2, 1996), available at  
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-saco_final_961202.html.  
 19. Id. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Japan-U.S. Special Action 
Committee (SACO) Interim Report (Apr. 15, 1996), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html; see also The SACO Final 
Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (Dec. 2, 1996), 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.  
 20. Tanaka, supra note 17, at 8. 
 21. Id.
 22. Id.
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Okinawa to bear the burden” because “Okinawans hate to see their own 
pain and agony passed to others.”23
After years of false starts, delays, and setbacks, the Futenma accord 
received renewed media attention in 2006 when the U.S. and Japanese 
governments agreed to relocate the Futenma air station to a less populated 
area near Camp Schwab in Nago (which is also on Okinawa) and gradually 
to redeploy 8,000 U.S. military personnel and their families to new facilities 
on Guam.24 The relocation was a major issue in the 2006 Okinawa 
gubernatorial campaigns that resulted in Hirokazu Nakaima’s victory.25
Nakaima had argued that the best option for Futenma would be “relocation 
outside the Okinawa Prefecture,” but he tempered that position over the 
course of his campaign by refocusing on economic and tourist initiatives 
rather than on the U.S. military.26 By 2010, when he faced and won 
reelection, Nakaima took a harder stance against the Futenma base, and at 
that time he referred to base relocation out of Okinawa as the “fast” 
option.27 The Futenma accord has since been called the “most problematic 
bilateral issue that has surfaced since the Hatoyama Cabinet was 
inaugurated.”28 Yukio Hatoyama was the Prime Minister of Japan from 
September 2009 to June 2010.  
Notwithstanding the rape incident in 1995, several key factors motivated 
the 2006 accord that called for a reduction in U.S. troops and a change in 
base geography. Reporting to the U.S. Congress in June 2010, Emma 
Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, and Mark E. Manyin suggested the 
following about the goals of the accord: 
 23. Kiyotaka Shibasaki, Shift in Okinawa Base Burden Causes Opposition to Mount,
DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Apr. 16, 1996, at 2. 
 24. See Hidemichi Katsumata, Futenma Issue Looms over Okinawa Poll, DAILY 
YOMIURI (Japan), Oct.31, 2006, at 4; see also Tatsuya Fukumoto & Takashi Imai, Document 
Seen as Alliance Road Map; Relocation Plan Hailed for Easing Hosting Burden on Okinawa 
Pref., DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 3, 2006, at 3; see also Okinawa Gov. OK’s Base Plan 
Inamine Expresses Broad Agreement with Futenma Shift, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 12, 
2006, at 1; see also Politics must not delay Futenma relocation, DAILY YOMIURI 4
(September 4, 2006); see also Op-Ed., Futenma Relocation Agreement, JAPAN TIMES, May 
18, 2006, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060518a1.html; see also Kiroku Hanai, 
U.S.-Dependent to What End?, JAPAN TIMES, June 16, 2006, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20060626kh.html. 
 25. Takashi Oda, Political Pulse; Voters Failed to Touch Base, DAILY YOMIURI 
(Japan), Nov. 23, 2006, at 4. 
 26. Id.
 27. See Nakaima Calls Futenma Relocation Outside of Okinawa ‘Fast’ Option,
JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 28, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/nakaima-
calls-futenma-relocation-out-of-okinawa-fast-option; see also Okinawa Governor Re-elected 
in U.S. Base Dominated Poll, BBC MONITORING ASIA-PAC.–POL (Nov. 19, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11858992.  
 28. EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33436, JAPAN-
U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2010).  
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The reduction of Marines on Okinawa seeks to quell the political 
controversy that has surrounded the presence of U.S. forces in the 
southernmost part of Japan for years. [ . . . ] Though constituting less than 
1% of Japan’s land mass, Okinawa currently hosts 65% of the total U.S. 
forces in Japan. The current controversy reflects a fundamental tension in 
the relationship between Okinawa and the central government in Tokyo: 
while the country reaps the benefit of the U.S. security guarantee, the 
Okinawans must bear the burden of hosting thousands of foreign troops. 
Although the host cities are economically dependent on the bases, 
residents’ grievances include noise, petty and occasionally violent crime, 
and environmental degradation stemming from the U.S. presence.29
I quote at length because the authors make several important points. Part of 
what makes the Okinawa issue so complicated, the authors seem to suggest, 
is the Tokyo-Washington alliance. Elsewhere I have proposed that this 
Tokyo-Washington alliance is like governmental collusion that has 
effectively disenfranchised Okinawans, who do not have the political clout 
or muscle to challenge a single massive central government, let alone two 
such governments.30 In saying this, I have echoed the criticisms of others. 
Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle explain, for example, that for Japan, 
“the ‘Okinawa problem’ is one to be solved through economic blackmail or 
heavy-handed political tactics.”31 These commentators point to “the 
continued use by the Japanese state of economic carrot-and-stick methods to 
placate Okinawans over the bases.”32 The use of these methods indicates “a 
profound lack of imagination among Japan’s political leadership and an 
unwillingness to let localities practise any meaningful form of autonomy.”33
Because the island of Okinawa is culturally, ethnically, and historically 
distinct from Japan proper, and because Okinawans continue to have their 
interests slighted or suppressed by the Japanese government in Tokyo, 
experts like Doug Bandow have remarked that the Tokyo-Washington 
alliance smacks of collusion and colonialism.34 Others have likewise called 
 29. Id. at 7. 
 30. See Mendenhall, Okinawa Occupied, supra note 10, at 20; see also Allen 
Mendenhall, Don’t Forget Okinawa, THEMENDENHALL.COM (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://themendenhall.com/2011/03/04/dont-forget-okinawa/. Asian historian and political 
activist Chalmers Johnston also refers to the Washington-Tokyo relationship as “collusion.” 
CHALMERS JOHNSTON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 57 
(Henry Holt & Co. 2004) (2000). 
 31. JAPAN AND OKINAWA: STRUCTURE AND SUBJECTIVITY 244 (Glenn D. Hook & 
Richard Siddle eds., 2003). 
 32. Id.
 33. Id.
 34. See Doug Bandow, Freeing Okinawa, KOREA HERALD, May 18, 1999 available 
at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5127; see also Doug Bandow, Okinawa and 
the Problem of Empire, HUFFINGTON POST (March 25, 2010, 2:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/okinawa-and-the-
problems_b_512610.html?bandow/okinawa-and-the-problems_b_512610.html? (“Today 
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Okinawa a “dumping ground”35 for U.S. bases and have suggested that 
Okinawans are treated as “second class” citizens in Japan.36
The Tokyo-Washington alliance was temporarily unsettled when the 
leaders of the U.S. and Japan took on new faces and personalities, first in 
Obama, who was elected in 2008, and then in Hatoyama, who was elected 
in 2009. Under Hatoyama’s leadership, the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) gained power over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had 
more or less enjoyed political supremacy for the last 60 years. The election 
results bothered Washington and the Obama administration because the 
both U.S. and Japanese government officials cheerfully conspire against Okinawans.”); see 
also DOUG BANDOW, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE 141 (2006) 
(“Washington and Tokyo continued to collude against the island.”). For further reading on 
Okinawa and colonialism, see Darrell Y. Hamamoto, ‘Soft Colonialism’: A Nikkei 
Perspective on Contemporary Okinawa, 3 OKINAWAN J. OF AM. STUD. 28 (2006) (describing 
the various incarnations of soft colonialism still present in Okinawa). 
 35. Andrew Daisuke Stewart, Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee 
Revisited: Recognition of Ryukyuans as a Cultural Minority Under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, An Alternative Paradigm for Okinawan 
Demilitarization, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 382, 384 (2003) (“Okinawa, Japan’s poorest 
and one of its smallest prefectures, has been a dumping ground for American bases since the 
end of World War II.”). 
 36. Post-war history reveals that Japan has consistently used Okinawa as a valuable 
bargaining chip in its dealings with the United States. Over the past fifty years, Japan has 
wagered the Okinawan people’s lives, lands, and future, in negotiating the terms of 
surrender, independence, and reversion. This strategy has succeeded in minimizing the 
number of U.S. bases in Japan and has kept its main islands free of nuclear weapons. The 
popular perception—the scenario that the Japanese government would most likely desire to 
perpetuate—is that Okinawa’s condition has been the result of a vanquished country being 
forced to acquiesce to the demands of a victorious foreign power. On the contrary, Japan has 
not been merely a passive bystander, but a willing participant in the process of designing 
Okinawa’s fate. While the Allies provided Japan with a level of self-determination in shaping 
its future, neither the United States nor Japan has ever consulted the Okinawan people or 
given them a voice as to what should become of them and their homeland. Little or nothing 
has been done so far to address or alleviate Okinawa’s numerous problems that stem from 
the excess proliferation of U.S. bases. Even the recent steps that have been taken through the 
formation of SACO have not brought about a difference in the everyday living conditions of 
the island’s inhabitants. 
It has been over a century since Okinawa was a Japanese colony and the Japanese 
government no longer officially designates Okinawa’s inhabitants as second-class citizens. 
Today, the people of Okinawa are citizens of the Japanese nation-state, legally entitled to the 
same protection and privileges as all other Japanese. In reality, however, the hierarchical 
power structure that has defined the relationship between the Wajin and the Ryukuans is still 
firmly in place. Whether it was the feudal era policy to separate and distinguish Ryukuans 
from the Wajin, or the Meiji government’s attempts to eliminate all traces of Ryukuan 
culture, Japan has always determined Okinawa’s path. It is in this historical framework that 
people must view the current ‘Okinawa Problem.’ The fact that a disproportionate share of 
U.S. bases in Japan are located in Okinawa is due to the Japanese government’s view of the 
Okinawan people as “different,” and the current situation builds upon the historical treatment 
rooted in this perception. Notwithstanding the government’s official position of impartiality 
and equality with regard to Okinawa, the base situation in Okinawa is nothing but partial and 
unequal. Id. at 428-29. 
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defiant Hatoyama seemed unwilling to toe the Washington policy line.37
Obama officials met with Japanese leaders on December 4, 2009 to express 
concern about Hatoyama’s policies, but the meeting was a failure.38
Japanese and American officials used the meeting to wrangle over the 2006 
accord.39 The particularly divisive issue at that meeting was not the accord 
generally but more specifically the role of the Futenma air base40 that had 
sparked recent protests by Okinawans, who preferred that the base be 
moved completely out of Okinawa, and possibly out of Japan.41
Comments by U.S. Ambassador John Roos, who claimed that the Obama 
administration expected Japan to resolve the base dispute “expeditiously,”42
set the stage for an argumentative meeting, as did similar comments by 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who, in a visit to Japan in October of that 
year,43 lectured his Japanese hosts.44 Gates informed his hosts, for instance, 
that the U.S. would not transfer 8,000 troops from Okinawa to Guam and 
would not surrender parcels of land belonging to Okinawans if Japan 
refused to honor the 2006 accord.45 Gates’s aggressive attitude toward the 
Japanese earned him the nickname “Grumpy Gates.”46
Meanwhile, Hatoyama triggered media attention for his response to 
Gates’s call for expedition: “We are not discussing this on the premise that 
it has to be decided by the end of the year.”47 Hatoyama had other political 
difficulties brewing at this time, especially with his party struggling to 
 37. See John Pomfret, U.S. Concerned About New Japanese Premier Hatoyama, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/28/AR2009122802271.html?hpid=topnews; see also John 
Pomfret & Blaine Harden, U.S. Struggles to Keep Step with Japan’s Shifting Foreign Policy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/12/04/AR2009120401033.html.  
 38. Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37 (“The meeting ended with no apparent 
agreement.”). 
 39. Id.
 40. See Eric Talmadge, Futenma Dispute Strains Ties with Japan, AIR FORCE TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/12/ap_japan_futenma_122909/; see 
also Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37.  
 41. Isabel Reynolds, Thousands of Japanese Protest U.S. Base Plan, REUTERS, Nov. 
8, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A70IG20091108.  
 42. See Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37.  
 43. Robert Lloyd Parry, Robert Gates Moves to Keep US Troops on Japan Soil,
TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6884982.ece.  
 44. Araminta Wordsworth, Obama Faces Yet Another Military Problem, This Time 
with Japan, NAT’L POST (Toronto), Nov. 12, 2009, http://network.national 
post.com/NP/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/11/12/a-lesson-in-saving-face-in-the-
inscrutable-east.aspx.  
 45. See Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37. 
 46. Peter J. Brown, Gates Gets Grumpy in Tokyo, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2009, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KJ28Dh01.html.  
 47. See Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37. 
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adjust to its new leadership responsibilities.48 In fact, the problems facing 
Hatoyama were so intense that DPJ leaders worried about losing their 
majority in the upper house.49 One Tokyo-based analyst announced with 
apparent sarcasm “Hatoyama thinks the United States should be kind 
enough to wait on the base issue until this political problem is solved.”50
The Japanese were not the only ones frustrated with the stalemate over the 
base issue or the Obama administration’s heavy-handedness in dealing with 
Hatoyama. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye took to 
the pages of The New York Times to complain that “we need a more patient 
and strategic approach to Japan. We are allowing a second-order issue to 
threaten our long-term strategy for East Asia.”51
Despite this increasing attention to the Futenma base dispute, the Obama 
administration continued to pressure Hatoyama and the Japanese leadership 
even as Hillary Clinton met with Japanese leaders to try to defuse the 
tension.52 The Obama administration, for its part, struggled to make sense of 
the messages that Hatoyama was sending about Futenma. Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada at one point told the Japanese media that the Hatoyama 
administration was suspending talks about the Futenma base relocation,53
and then, a few weeks later, Hatoyama informed Obama that he (Hatoyama) 
had postponed his decision about Futenma until 2010.54 Resolution of the 
Futenma base dispute was put off until 2011 (although at this writing 
resolution has yet to materialize). 
Rather than moving towards Obama’s stated interests in 2010, Hatoyama 
moved away from them, going so far as to announce that the Japanese navy 
would no longer support the U.S.-led Afghan War.55 In discussions with 
Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada in Hawaii,56 Hillary Clinton tried 
to alleviate the situation by talking about the longstanding “U.S.-Japanese 
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
 50. Id.
 51. Joseph S. Nye, An Alliance Larger than One Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/opinion/07nye.html. 
 52. Jacob M. Schlesinger, U.S. Seeks to Defuse Sense of ‘Crisi’ in Japan Alliance,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2010,  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126325931200925649.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.  
 53. Blaine Harden, Report: Japan Suspends Talks About U.S. Air Base, WASH. POST,
Dec. 9, 2009, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/08/AR2009120801050.html. 
 54. Pomfret, supra, note 37.  
 55. Martin Fackler, Japan: Navy Ends Mission in Support of Afghan War, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/world/asia/16briefs-
Japan.html. 
 56. See Andrew Quinn, Clinton to Talk Bases, Security on Pacific Swing, REUTERS,
Jan. 11, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60A0O320100111? 
type=politicsNews; see also John Brinsley, Clinton Urges Japan’s Okada to Resolve Air 
Base Issue, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=aauMVRsOZekc. 
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alliance”57 and the need for “stability for the region.”58 Clinton’s measured 
vocabulary and cautious rhetoric recast the Futenma base dispute to portray 
American interests as compatible with Japanese interests and as protective 
of Japan. “It is much bigger than any one particular issue,” she announced.59
After U.S. Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Thad Cochran (R-
Mississippi) met with Hatoyama in January 2010, the two countries 
reasserted their commitment to one another and downplayed the gravity of 
the Futenma dispute.60 If this event signaled progress, then Clinton’s claims 
shortly thereafter that the U.S. would “exercise influence”61 in Asia for the 
next 100 years—to say nothing of the strangeness of this prophesy—
signaled a serious setback. Commenting on the ongoing feud between the 
Obama and Hatoyama administrations, Gavan McCormack, emeritus 
professor at Australian National University and coordinator of The Asia-
Pacific Journal, used words like “paternalistic,” “colonial,” “anti-
democratic,” and “intolerant” to refer to U.S. policy.62 He mocked Obama’s 
campaign slogan by applying it to the situation in Okinawa: “Yes we can—
but you can’t.”63 Chalmers Johnson put it even more strongly: 
The U.S. has become obsessed with maintaining our empire of military 
bases, which we cannot afford and which an increasing number of so-
called host countries no longer want. I would strongly suggest that the 
United States climb off its high horse, move the Futenma Marines back to 
a base in the United States (such as Camp Pendleton, near where I live) 
and thank the Okinawans for their 65 years of forbearance.64
In April 2010, Japanese public support for Hatoyama sank to below 
30%;65 the Futenma base dispute was a key factor in the poll. During the 
same month, a Tokunoshima-based group collected 24,000 signatures for a 
 57. See Schlesinger, supra note 52; see also Clinton, Okada begin talks on disputed 
US base in Japan, FRANCE 24 (Jan. 12, 2010, 23:38), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20100112-clinton-okada-begin-talks-disputed-us-base-japan. 
 58. See Lachlan Carmichael, Clinton Starts Asia Tour Amid Concerns Over Japan 
Ties, ABS-CBN NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010, 2:16PM), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ 
world/01/11/10/clinton-starts-pacific-tour-amid-concerns-over-japan-ties. 
 59. Id.
 60. Chisa Fujioka, Japan, U.S. Vow to Expand Ties Despite Base Feud, REUTERS,
Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I14C20100119? 
type=politicsNews.  
 61. Quinn, supra note 56. 
 62. Gavan McCormack, The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs. Hatoyama, ASIA-
PAC. J., Nov, 16, 2009, at 5. 
 63. Id.
 64. Chalmers Johnson, Another Battle of Okinawa, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/06/opinion/la-oe-johnson-20100506/2.  
 65. Kyoko Hasegawa, Support for Japan Sinks Below 30%, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hHfoyr2FVZTY 
LwLGtpFdNgNFgJ0g.  
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petition opposed to the transfer of U.S. facilities to the island.66 If those 
numbers can be considered representative, then 80% of Tokunoshima 
residents opposed hosting the U.S. base on their island.67 It is not surprising, 
then, that Okinawans were upset by the DPJ stance on Futenma. 
Three mayors on the island of Tokunoshima rejected the DPJ appeal to 
host the base, citing concerns about noise and security.68 They drafted a 
letter to Obama in which they protested against the Futenma base 
relocation,69 and they scheduled a rally to make abundantly clear the extent 
of their opposition to Futenma.70 One mayor, Akira Okubo, said that he 
would send photos of the rally to the American president.71 Another mayor, 
Susumu Inamine, staged a sit-in at the Diet in Tokyo.72
Hatoyama’s stance did not translate into political success. He became 
more controversial among Japanese and Americans alike even as his 
resistance to Obama began to bring about results in the form of U.S. 
concessions, such as the returning of three significant sites to Japan: the 
bombing ranges on two nearby islands (Kumejima and Torishima) and the 
water area east of Okinawa.73 At the same time, media outlets began 
challenging the widely accepted notion that U.S. Marines were 
indispensible to the safety of the region.74 In the face of these seeming 
victories for Hatoyama, Obama undertook a publicity campaign of his own, 
questioning whether he could “trust” Hatoyama to “follow through,” a 
comment that sounded more like a challenge than a regret.75 One 
commentator called Obama’s remarks “extraordinarily harsh.”76 At any rate, 
 66. 80% of Tokunoshima Residents Oppose Hosting U.S. Base, JAPAN TIMES, May 6, 
2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100506a2.html.  
 67. Id.
 68. Japan Islanders to Reject US Base in Okinawa, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 
13, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h04HtS77a3nSqi07n6 
Bjc0bIajDA. 
 69. Id.
 70. Id.
 71. Id.
 72. See Okinawa’s Mayors, Citizens Stage Sit-in to Call for U.S. Base Relocation,
GLOBAL TIMES (China), Apr. 27, 2010, http://world.globaltimes.cn/asia-pacific/2011-
04/526537.html; see also Okinawa Mayors Stage Sit-in at Diet to Seek U.S. Base Removal,
JAPAN TODAY, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/okinawa-
mayors-stage-sit-in-at-diet-to-seek-us-base-removal. 
 73. U.S. Floats Modified Plan on Futenma, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100417a2.html. 
 74. Yutaka Yoshida, Okinawa Marines Said Dispensable: Analysts Say Force Levels 
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2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100416f4.html. 
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JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100419a2.html. 
 76. Obama Asked PM to Follow Through on Futenma Issue, JAPAN TODAY, Apr. 3, 
2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/obama-asked-pm-to-follow-
through-on-futenma-issue. 
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neither Obama nor Hatoyama seemed to gain political leverage on the issue 
of Futenma. The base was simply too controversial.  
Polls released on April 19 showed that more than half of Japanese voters 
wanted Hatoyama to step down if he could not resolve the base issue.77 On 
April 20, Hatoyama’s administration tried but failed to set up meetings with 
the three mayors on Tokunoshima;78 the mayors gave the administration the 
cold shoulder. Despite the resistance in Tokunoshima, Hatoyama reiterated 
his pledge to resolve the base dispute by the end of May,79 and 
Tokunoshima remained the Japanese government’s favorite option for the 
relocation.80 The U.S., however, rejected the proposal to relocate to 
Tokunishima.81
Katsuya Okada, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, allegedly presented 
John Roos with a proposal on April 23 that some read82 as a broad 
acceptance of the 2006 accord. Yet the proposal did not totally conform to 
U.S. designs. It called for altering a new runway in the town of Henoko, for 
instance, and for transferring parts of the Marine facility away from 
Okinawa.83 The Washington Post broke the story of these supposed 
concessions. But Okada’s proposal may not have existed. Just a day after 
The Washington Post story, Media Monitors Network (MMN) questioned 
the credibility of the Okada account,84 which Hatoyama himself denied 
outright. MMN’s Gordon Arnaut railed against The Washington Post: “It 
boggles the mind that a flagship U.S. newspaper could get a major story so 
wrong. Not just off by a little bit, but exactly opposite to the actual truth. 
And timed, cynically, to coincide with a huge demonstration against the 
 77. Poll Puts Pressure on Japan PM over U.S. Base Plan, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Apr. 18, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hcOLwYjZO8nkIY 
N2q7TePbxgU2Ow.  
 78. Tokunoshima Mayors Rebuff Base Overture: Feasibility of Hatoyama Plan 
Questioned by Kitazawa, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20100421a1.html.  
 79. Yoko Kubota, Japan PM Says End-May Remains Deadline on Base Feud,
REUTERS, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/21/us-japan-politics-
idUSTRE63K1G920100421.  
 80. Tokunoshima Still Eyed for Base Relocation, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100422a4.html.  
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ONLINE (China), Apr. 22, 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/ 
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Washington Post Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=at3bAzysLeOk.
 83. John Pomfret, Japan Moves to Settle Dispute With U.S. over Okinawa Base 
Relocation, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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base.”85 The disputed article from The Washington Post is no longer 
available online.  
Ohisa, one of the three mayors on Tokunoshima, informed Hatoyama 
that he (Hatoyama) was not welcome to visit Tokunoshima.86 Despite this 
remark, Hatoyama met with all three of the dissenting mayors, who, rather 
than capitulating, handed Hatoyama their petition signed by residents 
opposed to the Futenma base.87 Protestors numbering 5,000 marched while 
the three mayors took their stand against Hatoyama.88 The mayors’ refusal 
to consent to Hatoyama’s requests put Hatoyama in the position of having 
to go forward with the base plans despite the wishes of Tokunoshima 
residents, to leave the base where it was on Okinawa, or to split the base 
into two parts: one on Tokunoshima and one where it already existed on 
Okinawa.    
On May 8, six DPJ lawmakers traveled to Saipan, part of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, a U.S. territory, as a last-ditch effort to relocate the 
Futenma base entirely outside of their country.89 American leaders in Saipan 
had expressed interest in hosting the U.S. troops, but Obama has remained 
silent about this option.90 During the lawmakers’ trip, reports by Japanese 
news agencies suggested that Hatoyama would make his final decision in 
two days.91 “We are putting the finishing touches to a government proposal 
right now,” Hatoyama said.92 In light of the foregoing, the six Japanese 
lawmakers probably intended their Saipan visit to make a symbolic point 
about America’s insistence on occupying foreign territory despite the fact 
that a relatively nearby U.S. territory was a viable option for base 
relocation.  
On May 17, Okinawans, in their own attempt at symbolism, formed a 
17,000 person chain around the U.S. Marine air base.93 The chain was eight 
 85. Id.
 86. Japan Mayors Rebuff PM Hatoyama’s Okinawa Alternatives, BBC NEWS (May 
7, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8668705.stm.
 87. Tokunoshima Mayors Reject Futenma Relocation Plan, NIKKEI. COM (May 7, 
2010), http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20100507D07JF794.htm.
 88. Japan’s Kagoshima Stages Rally to Protest U.S. Base Relocation, XINHUA NEWS 
AGENCY (China) (May 08, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-05/08 
/c_13283079.htm. 
 89. Haidee V. Eugenio, 6 Japanese Lawmakers to Visit CNMI, SAIPAN TRIBUNE
(Northern Mariana Islands) (May 8, 2010) 
 http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=99444&cat=1. 
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 91. Yoko Kubota & Alex Richardson , Japan to Decide on U.S. Base Plan Monday: 
Report, REUTERS, May 9, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6480K 
G20100509?type=politicsNews. 
 92. Japanese PM: Decision on Futenma to be Made Soon, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 27, 
2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-04/27/content_9779739.htm. 
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miles long.94 On May 23, Hatoyama issued his final decision: the 2006 
provisions of the Futenma accord would remain in effect. Obama got his 
way. Hatoyama resigned shortly thereafter—just eight months after taking 
office. Despite Obama’s victory, the Futenma base dispute has not been 
settled. By the time this article goes to print, there will have been several 
updates on the Futenma base dispute during the tenure of the Kan 
administration. I doubt that the dispute will have been resolved. Only time 
will tell how the story of Futenma will end.  
II. EFFECTS OF THE FUTENMA BASE DISPUTE ON ARTICLE 9
Emma Chanlett-Avery says that “[a]lthough the current DPJ government 
has officially endorsed the plan to build the replacement facility in Nago, 
local opposition remains strong and the central government has limited 
political capital to push forward with implementation.”95 Like I, Avery 
seems to believe that the future of Futenma remains unclear. One point, 
however, is clear: unless U.S. bases like Futenma are removed from 
Japanese territory altogether, they will undermine the authority of Article 9 
and force Japanese politicians to cut away at the already endangered 
principle of constitutional pacifism. That is because the Futenma accord 
pushes the limits of circumscribed military power and directly and 
proximately moves Japan in the direction of remilitarization: directly
because the intermingling of Japanese people and resources with active U.S. 
military facilities allows the Japanese government to rely on another 
military to carry out activities that would implicate Article 9 if done by the 
Japanese, and proximately because the U.S. has pressured Japan to enhance 
her military size and prowess as a condition for minimizing the U.S. 
military presence in the country. Part II is organized to address first the 
recent militarization trends implicating Article 9, and second the Futenma 
base dispute that seems to have emanated from those trends.   
After the atomic bombings, the U.S., in the person of General Douglas 
MacArthur, and the Japanese, in the person of Prime Minister Kijuro 
Shidehara, constructed Article 9.96 These two leaders were instrumental to 
the passage of this provision. They met and discussed the proposed 
constitution at length; they remained mostly cordial.97 MacArthur shared 
 94. Okinawa Residents Protest at U.S. Air Base, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 16, 
2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gp7MbtOMcsGooUr1wbdDG 
YdbVugQ. 
 95. EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33740, THE U.S.-JAPAN 
ALLIANCE 8 (2011). 
 96. See generally JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF 
WORLD WAR II 346-73 (1999). For a first-person account, see DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
REMINISCENCES (1964). 
 97. See, e.g., RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY:
CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 112-13 (2002). 
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classified documents with Shidehara, expressed concern over the future role 
and office of the emperor, and gave the impression that he (MacArthur) 
understood the best interests of the Japanese and was willing to distance 
himself from positions held by the Allies.98 On one position, though, 
MacArthur was unwavering: “Japan must respect the views of foreign 
countries” when it came to renouncing war because a “constitutional 
provision permitting military forces and armaments would convince other 
countries that Japan was determined to rearm.”99
The legislative history of Article 9 is extensive and arguably hazy,100 but 
it suggests that the role of U.S. officials was dispositive to the promulgation 
of Article 9 because “the United States had to show the world that Japanese 
militarism would never revive and Japan would never be a threat to others, 
to Asia in particular.”101 Article 9 first appeared as one of two provisions 
outlined in General MacArthur’s notes before it became the hallmark of the 
Japanese constitution by explicitly renouncing the use and maintenance of 
Japanese military forces;102 the clause forbids Japan from resorting to war to 
resolve foreign conflict (see the epigraph above). According to Okubo 
Shiro, Article 9 originally appeared in the preamble and only later got 
transferred to the body of the document.103 During deliberations over the 
prospective constitution, Japanese conservatives agreed to the provisions of 
Article 9 in exchange for the preservation of the tenno system, which was a 
hierarchical ruling tradition that held up the emperor as the ultimate and 
symbolic head of the nation.104 The original meaning of Article 9 “was 
clearly intended to be a flat denial of every kind of war and of any 
development of war potential in Japan in order to prevent the possibility of 
Japanese aggression in Asia and elsewhere.”105 This meaning is based on the 
plain language of the article and agreed upon by “most mainstream Japanese 
constitutional law scholars.”106 Concerns about the breakdown of Article 9 
and the expansion of Japanese war powers have been on the rise for several 
 98. Id.
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 100. For a succinct rundown of the legislative history, see THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 695 (Malcolm D. H. Smith & Hideo 
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(Warren Hunsberger & Richard B. Finn, eds., 1996). 
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 103. See Piotrowski, supra note 100 at 1662-63 (citing KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF 
JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION (Ray A. Moore trans., 1998)). 
 104. Shiro, supra note 101, at 102. 
 105. Id. at 103. 
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years—indeed, it was not until the Cold War that Japan began to interpret 
Article 9 as allowing self-defense forces107—but such concerns gained 
traction during the Gulf War in the early 1990s.108
Although in 1990 Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu proposed a bill to allow 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in U.N. peacekeeping 
activities, the bill was overwhelmingly rejected by Japanese politicians and 
the Japanese people.109 The Gulf War, however, demonstrated that Japan 
could get around Article 9 while sending civil service members and 
eventually the SDF to the Persian Gulf,110 even if Japan refused to partake in 
that war as a coalition member. Part of the reason that Japan joined with 
Western powers had to do with its obligation to the greater U.N. 
community.111 The U.N. Charter requires member nations, as a condition of 
membership, to “accept the obligations contained in the present Charter” 
and to be “able and willing to carry out these obligations,”112 including, if 
necessary, the compliance of member states with U.N. requests for armed 
assistance in international conflicts.113 This U.N. mission and similar 
activities have made the “self-defense” mantras of the SDF seem 
misleading. Because of the apparent contradiction between SDF activities 
and the meaning of the signifier “self-defense,” one author has accused 
Japan of engaging “in semantic contortions to downplay its military 
capabilities and activities.”114
In 1997, the U.S. and Japan renegotiated their military roles for the 
region in and around Asia. The two countries established guidelines that 
marked “not only an increased level of defense burden sharing for Japan, 
but also a move toward taking greater responsibility for its own defense.”115
The guidelines called specifically for Japanese cooperation in Asian 
conflicts, search and rescue or evacuation assistance, battlefield rear area 
support, and actual implementation of the guidelines.116 Some scholars 
considered the constitutionality of the guidelines vis-à-vis the three 
 107. Mark A. Chinen, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and the Use of 
Procedural and Substantive Heuristics for Consensus, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 55, 59 (2005). 
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branches of government (judicial, executive, and legislative) that have 
interpreted Article 9 in different ways.117 Even scholars could not reach 
definitive conclusions and could not offer clear or immutable policies as 
tests for constitutional validity.  
The guidelines appear to have passed constitutional muster, but only by 
way of a liberal reading of Article 9. As one commentator put it, “Japan’s 
current situation is not consistent with the wholehearted renunciation of war 
reflected in Article 9” because the SDF, “consisting of the Ground Self 
Defense Forces, the Maritime Self Defense Forces, and the Air Self Defense 
Forces, has one of the largest budgets in the world, and its navy has more 
destroyer-sized warships than the British Navy.”118 This commentator also 
notes that “Japan’s preeminent economic status,” coupled with its “reliance 
on a stable world situation to maintain that status,” makes Japan an ideal 
military partner for other countries, which increasingly have pressured 
Japanese administrations and the Japanese Diet to relax their interpretations 
of Article 9.119 Ultimately and practically, these guidelines represented only 
a minor escalation of Japan’s military role,120 but such escalation “eroded” 
Article 9 and “further opened the door to Japanese rearmament.”121 All of 
this happened long after the U.S. had already precipitated the “destruction 
of the ideological motivations of Article 9.”122   
Some have suggested that Japan has already violated Article 9—if not 
by maintaining SDF forces, then by deploying special envoys to assist U.S. 
efforts in Afghanistan,123 dispatching naval troops to the Indian Ocean,124 or 
aiding the U.S. in the construction of a missile defense system.125
Traditionally, though, Japanese interpretations of Article 9 have not 
engaged in what American jurisprudents might refer to as “textualism” or 
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 118. Matthew J. Gilley, Japan’s Developing Military Potential within the Context of 
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“originalism” as qualified and formalist mechanisms for understanding 
constitutional meaning. Japan’s approach has been, for want of a better 
word, more pragmatic.126 The question of whether Japan has violated Article 
9 has not turned on the reduction of that provision to definite and fixed 
principles. Nevertheless, Japanese interpretation has transformed Article 9 
into what at least one legal analyst has called a paradox:  
The paradox of Article 9 is evident when comparing the aspirational 
language and the reality of Japan’s military forces. The divergence 
originated at the onset of the Korean War, and grew dramatically during 
the Cold War as the SDF continued to evolve in terms of capabilities and 
numbers. The rapid growth soon made plain that Article 9 is irreconcilable 
in its present form with the realities of today.127
As the following representative cases in Part II (Subsection A) will 
show, Japanese courts have dealt with Article 9 mostly in the domestic 
sphere and have remained generally deferential to legislative action.128
Matthew J. Gilley casts some light on this judicial penchant: “When a 
domestic decision is involved, Japanese courts operate under a high 
presumption that the government’s action is valid. Rights claimed by 
individuals under Article 9 . . . do not limit the government’s conduct in 
these domestic contexts. Instead, the courts’ standard seeks to avoid these 
questions of constitutionality and directs them to the political arena for 
resolution.”129 The result is that powers of interpretation have been left in 
the hands of the electorate and polity that use public opinion to mobilize 
politicians in one direction or another regarding Article 9.130 Post-9/11 
events and political agendas concerning terrorism and national security, 
however, took some of this power back out of the hands of the electorate or 
polity and arguably transferred that power into the hands of the American 
executive and legislative branches that have continued to pressure Japanese 
politicians into compliance with American foreign policy interests.  
 126. For a reading of Article 9 from an originalist-like perspective, see Kenneth L. 
Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
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A. Judicial History of Article 9 
Japanese courts have addressed Article 9 repeatedly. A few decisions 
bear mentioning because they serve as illustrative examples of how 
Japanese courts analyze and ultimately rule on Article 9 cases. These cases 
demonstrate the deference that Japanese courts usually allow the political 
branches regarding Article 9. These cases also raise jurisprudential 
questions about legality. For instance, if a constitution explicitly forbids a 
thing from happening, but allows that thing to happen in practice, does the 
constitutional ban have any constructive effect at all, or is the ban purely 
symbolic? If a constitution forbids the wearing of green, but a legislature 
takes actions that cause or enable people to wear green, and the courts rule 
that the legislature has acted properly, is the ban on wearing green a law or 
an ideal? Given the same hypothetical, what if the people wear just touches 
of green, or colors of off-green or almost green, and the legislature endorses 
those outfits despite the constitutional ban on green—would that make the 
wearing of green still illegal? The point is that the strict and plain language 
of Article 9 forbids, without exception, the use and maintenance of Japanese 
military force and arms, but an expansive legislative interpretation of force, 
given credence by Japanese courts, which have refused to revise or overturn 
these legislative interpretations, has led to a situation in which Article 9 
means whatever the legislature says it means—which is to say that it means 
nothing or anything at all. As Carl F. Goodman puts it:  
However one views the terms of Article 9, it appears clear that what you 
get is something other than what at first glance—and perhaps even after 
searing examination—you see. This seeming contradiction between terms 
and actual practice is a reflection of a more general approach to 
constitutional interpretation in Japan.131
From the following cases, it seems apparent that Article 9 does not serve its 
intended function to eliminate the military activities in and of Japan; nor is 
Article 9 void of all purpose or utility, however, because it continues to 
constrain Japanese foreign policy by forcing Japanese leaders to “get 
around” Article 9.     
1. Sakata v. Japan, or “The Sunakawa Case” (1959) 
The Sunakawa case was the first judicial attempt to determine the 
constitutionality of certain activities vis-à-vis Article 9. The case arose 
when the defendants (or appellants) were prosecuted for trespassing on an 
 131. CARL F. GOODMAN, 2 THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
235 (2008). 
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American military base in Sunakawa.132 The defendants argued that the very 
existence of the American base offended Article 9.133 Judge Akio Date, 
Judge Shunzo Shimizu, and Assistant Judge Ichiro Matsumoto handed 
down the decision, which reasoned principally that Japan could pursue 
military activity for self-defense purposes.134 Put another way, the court 
sidestepped the issue of the SDF’s legitimacy and instead authorized 
Japan’s abstract right to self-defense. The case inaugurated not only a 
precedent for upholding a Japanese right to self-defense, but also a 
precedent for judicial equivocating about Article 9, particularly with regard 
to the SDF. Such equivocation has come to be known as the “doctrine of 
avoidance.”135
2. The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Cases (1973) 
The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Cases refer to litigation initiated by 
Hokkaido residents against the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries and carried out at multiple levels of appeal.136 Naganuma I 
appeared before the Sapporo District Court, Naganuma II before the 
Sapporo High Court, and Naganuma III before the Supreme Court of Japan. 
The residents challenged the construction of a base site in Naganuma that 
would require the transfer, flooding, and damage of forest lands.137 The 
residents also challenged the constitutionality of the SDF. The District 
Court held that the SDF was unconstitutional because the SDF constituted 
an “armed force.”138 In addition, the District Court invalidated the land 
transfer because, according to the court, the transfer did not serve the public 
interest.139 On appeal, the Sapporo High Court reversed the District Court 
decision, which the Supreme Court of Japan affirmed on the grounds that 
the residents lacked standing to bring suit.140 The residents were deemed to 
have had no standing because they did not suffer direct harm.141 The 
constructive effect of the case was to narrow the class of people who could 
bring suit under Article 9.  
 132. SaikG Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, 1959(A) No. 710, 13 SAIKF
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHH [KEISHH] 3225 (Japan). 
 133. Id.
 134. Id.
 135. Panton, supra note 127, at 212. 
 136. [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 36 SAIKF SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHH [MINSHH] 1679 
(Japan), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW 
OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 122-23 (1996) [hereinafter Uno v. Minister of Agric., 
Forestry & Fisheries]. 
 137. See id.
 138. Id.
 139. Id.
 140. Id. at 129. 
 141. Id.
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3. Ishizuka et al. v. Japan e. al., or “The Hyakuri Air Base  
  Case” (1989) 
The Hyakuri Air Base Case involved a plot of land that the SDF sought 
to purchase to facilitate the construction of a military base.142 The Court in 
this case extended the doctrine of avoidance.143 Reasoning that under Article 
9 the use of force for self-defense purposes was constitutional, the Mito 
District Court found for the SDF and used the political question doctrine to 
avoid formative resolutions about the constitutionality of the SDF.144 The 
Tokyo High Court affirmed this decision without clarifying the role of the 
SDF vis-à-vis Article 9. This case demonstrates that the doctrine of 
avoidance has become a hallmark of judicial practice regarding Article 9 
and also that the political question doctrine repeatedly has offered other 
branches of government wide latitude to carry out projects related to self-
defense and the SDF.  
4. Mori v. Japan (2008) 
In Mori v. Japan, over 5,700 appellants and 800 attorneys challenged 
their country’s deployment of the SDF to the Middle East during the Iraq 
War.145 In 2003, during the height of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Japan 
contributed not only SDF personnel but also three transport aircrafts for 
mobilizing troops and supplies.146 The appellants argued that Japan’s 
involvement in Iraq violated their right to “live in peace.”147 They claimed 
that Article 9 granted them such a right.148 For remedies, appellants sought 
an “injunction against the deployment, a confirmation that the deployment 
was unconstitutional, and ¥10,000 each (approx. US$100) in damages.”149
Appellants contended that the right to live in peace was actionable; the 
government contended that such a right was merely abstract and therefore 
that appellants lacked standing.150 The Nagoya District Court ruled in favor 
of the government, and the Nagoya High Court affirmed.151 In effect, the 
principle handed down from this decision was that the right to live in peace 
 142. SaikG Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 20, 1989, 43 SAIKF SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHH
[MINSHH] 6, 385 (Japan) translated in Lawrence W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CASE LAW OF 
JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 132 (1996) [hereinafter Ishizuka v. Japan].  
 143. See Panton, supra note 127, at 213. 
 144. Ishizuka v. Japan, supra note 142, at 131. 
 145. See Mori v. Japan: The Nagoya High Court Recognizes the Right to Live in 
Peace, 19 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 549 (2010) (Hudson Hamilton trans.). 
 146. Id.
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
 149. Mori v. Japan, supra note 145, at 549-50. 
 150. Id. at 550. 
 151. Id.
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exists but was not implicated on these facts.152 This holding means that 
elements of the SDF forces were unconstitutional but that remedies were not 
available to these plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the “integration of the 
SDF’s air transport activities with the use of force by coalition forces in an 
international military conflict constituted the use of force by the SDF in 
violation of Article 9.”153
The Nagoya High Court’s decision was never appealed, so it remains 
binding in Nagoya and persuasive precedent elsewhere in Japan to the 
extent that it is not overruled. The court appears to have enunciated a 
standard couched in language about a “right to live in peace,” which “can be 
called a compound right that can be expressed as a freedom right, a social 
right, or a political right, depending on the circumstances.”154 The right to 
live in peace is a new human right in Japan.155 To invoke this right in a court 
of law, plaintiffs must demonstrate a “legal relationship” between the right 
and the military activity that violates Article 9.156 Okinawans could cite the 
“right to live in peace” standard and the Mori case to challenge the 
constitutionality of Futenma and other bases on Okinawa. Finding 
Okinawan plaintiffs who have suffered direct harm from the bases should 
not be difficult. Moreover, courts could interpret the Japanese support of, 
and financial contributions to, U.S. bases on Okinawa as reaching an 
actionable level of Japanese integration with military activities that use 
force.    
Unlike the three cases discussed earlier, Mori v. Japan suggests that 
Japanese courts will not always defer to other branches of government on 
matters pertaining to self-defense and the SDF. Courts usually defer to such 
branches by invoking the political question doctrine or by limiting standing 
to plaintiffs who suffered actual harm (the Mori court claimed that the 
plaintiffs could not establish a “legal relationship” between their right to 
live in peace and the war activities in question). These two elements—the 
political question doctrine and actual harm—together make up the 
cornerstone of the “doctrine of avoidance” whereby Japanese courts shy 
away from definitive conclusions about Article 9. Even though the plaintiffs 
were not eligible for a remedy in Mori v. Japan, Okinawans could rely on 
the decision in Mori to seek a constitutional remedy. Okinawans would 
have to cite the court’s standard about a “right to live in peace” and 
demonstrate how that right bears a “legal relationship” to the military 
activities taking place in and around Okinawa.    
 152. Id.
153. Id. (This language comes from a summary of the translation.). 
 154. Mori v. Japan, supra note 145, at 561. 
 155. Id. at 550. 
 156. Id. at 561. 
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B. Japan and Military Activity 
Since 9/11, Japan has stepped up her military role on a global scale. The 
Japanese Diet passed the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law in 2001,157 a 
measure that muddled the already confused commitment that Japan owed to 
both the U.N. and her national Constitution.158 The Antiterrorism Special 
Measures Law lapsed in 2007, but it lead to a similar successor law, and its 
effect was once again to water down the explicit terms of Article 9 and to 
categorically commit Japan to U.S. political and military interests abroad. 
According to the law, Japan could offer security forces in the Iraq War, but 
in principle it could do so only if the forces were limited to humanitarian 
assistance.159 Despite the apparent meaning of the law, “it is suspected that 
in reality the SDF performed war-participation acts that could be construed 
as cooperation in prosecuting the war.”160 Indeed, the law threatened the 
viability and credibility of Article 9 more than any statutory measure, 
political scheme, or partisan event up to that point. Scholars of the Japanese 
constitution have described the law in the following way: 
The intent [of the law] is to conduct “cooperation and support activities” 
including supply, repairs, servicing, medical care, and the transport of 
weapons, ammunition, and personnel, but assuming that the use of force is 
impossible without such help, this support is an essential part of military 
action, and is therefore clearly participation in war. This would be the first 
participation in the use of force by Japan’s military apparatus in the 
postwar years, and would clearly violate Article 9 of Japan’s 
Constitution.161
In spite of such objections by scholars and activists, Japan reaffirmed the 
contributory role of the SDF in 2003 with passage of the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. 
 157. Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Terotaisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Hô, Law 
No. 113 of 2001, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-
terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html (in English). 
 158. For more on this dilemma, see Craig Martin, Japan’s Antiterrorism Special 
Measures Law and Confusion over U.N. Authority, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20071008a2.html. 
 159. See id.
 160. Kenji Urata, The Universal Spirit of the Japanese Constitution: Re-Reading 
Article 9, 3 PEACE & CONFLICT REV. 1, 2 (2008). 
 161. See Southgate, supra note 128, at 1604 (citing An Urgent Appeal from Japan’s 
Constitutional Scholars, JAPAN COMPUTER ACCESS (Oct. 9, 2011), 
http://www.jca.apc.org/~kenpoweb/appeal_eng.html) (doubting the constitutionality of the 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law). 
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This law was “highly specific and strictly limited in purposes and duties” 
and aimed to “implement the measures of assistance in Iraq.”162
Scholars have labored to contextualize, synthesize, and assess the 
judicial holdings and political debates concerning the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures law in relation to Article 9.163 In brief, the law has not 
been interpreted as violating the Japanese Constitution because of the law’s 
specifications against the use of force or combat, as well as its precautionary 
stipulation entitled “Use of Weapons,” which allows the SDF to use 
weapons but only in expressly limited instances.164 According to this 
stipulation, the SDF would not be able to engage in a hostage rescue 
operation in Iraq since that might entail combat and thus exceed the scope 
and reach of Article 9.165 In this sense, Article 9 constrained the activities of 
the legislative and executive branches even though the judiciary has 
deferred judgments about Article 9 to those branches.  
The plain language of Article 9, however, is explicit about banning 
military troops and activity, and the reformulated role of the SDF flies in the 
face of the plain language of Article 9. Edward J. L. Southgate put it well 
when he said, “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law invests the SDF 
with the responsibility of carrying Japan’s burden of collective self-defense. 
Although the law was carefully tailored by the Koizumi cabinet to avoid 
deviation from Article 9, the reality is that the expanded operational 
abilities, both geographic and military, materially diverge from the spirit of 
the ‘no war’ clause.”166 It is clear, then, that whatever Article 9 signifies 
today, it is more than just the plain meaning of the plain language. 
Literalists or formalists might argue that with a historically significant and 
sensitive provision like Article 9, there is no meaning outside the plain 
language of the provision. By this logic, Japan has invalidated Article 9 
already because of its actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean, 
and especially because of its role in engineering a missile defense system in 
conjunction with the U.S. But Japan has not taken a literalist or formalist 
approach to interpreting Article 9.  
Many Japanese politicians and citizens have called for not only 
reinterpreting but also revising Article 9 so that Japan can maintain fidelity 
to the constitution as well as investment in SDF activities abroad. “There 
appears to be a consensus among segments of Japanese society,” explains 
Mark A. Chinen,  
 162. Mika Hayashi, The Japanese Law Concerning the Special Measure on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq: Translator’s Introduction, 13 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579, 581 (2004). 
 163. See, e.g., Southgate, supra note 128 at 1619-33. 
 164. Hayashi, The supra note 162, at 582 (translating the Law concerning the Special 
Measures in Iraq, Art. 2, ¶ 2, among other provisions). 
 165. Id. at 583. 
 166. Southgate, supra note 128, at 1633. 
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that a confluence of trends—Japan’s emergence as an economic power, its 
greater participation in Pacific and world affairs, its aspiration to a more 
important role in the United Nations, the severe criticism it received when 
it did not participate directly in the Persian Gulf War, pressures from the 
United States to expand its security relationship by putting SDF personnel 
in harm’s way, developments on the Korean peninsula, the emergence of 
China as an economic and military force, and 9/11—could well require 
Japan to take steps that, if it wishes to remain true to a constitutional form 
of government, might involve far more than just a reinterpretation of 
Article 9.167
But so far Japan has not revised Article 9. If anything, Japan has taken steps 
that suggest that Article 9 is an ideal, not a practical reality that substantial 
revision would definitely impact. Besides her commitment of troops for 
humanitarian purposes in Iraq, for instance, Japan has dispatched envoys to 
Afghanistan to aid the U.S. War efforts there,168 pledged to help the U.S 
develop a missile defense system,169 deployed forces to the Indian Ocean,170
and, with the exception of prominent individuals like Hatoyama, 
 167. Chinen, supra note 107, at 65. 
 168. Japan to Send Envoy to Take Part in US Review of Afghan Strategy, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Feb. 25, 2009); see also Japan Envoys to Meet USA’s 
Holbrooke on Afghanistan 9 March, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Mar. 6, 2009),
available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian Pac. Stories (noting Japan’s envoys 
to Afghanistan meet with U.S. representatives to show support for the United States’ military 
shift to Afghanistan). 
 169. Calvin Sims, U.S. and Japan Agree to Joint Research on Missile Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1999, at A4; see also Calvin Sims, U.S., Japan Join Forces on Missile 
Defence System, GAZETTE (Montreal), Aug. 17, 1999, at B1; see also Protecting Japan—
Part IV; Missile Defense to Cost 30 Tril. Yen, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Sept. 25, 2004, at 4; 
see also North Korean Institute Denounces US, Japan Theatre Missile Defence Plans, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Mar. 8, 1999), available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
bbcapp0020010901dv3800nph; see also Russian Defence Chief Restates Criticism of Japan-
US Missile Defence Plans, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Asia-Pacific (Nov. 29, 
2000), at part 3; see also Japan to work on missile defenses, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 17, 
1999, at 1A. 
 170. See Howard W. French, Threats and Responses: Japan’s Role; U.S. Applauds 
Tokyo’s Dispatch of Warship to the Indian Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at A22, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/world/threats-responses-japan-s-role-us-
applauds-tokyo-s-dispatch-warship-indian-ocean.html?src=pm; Japan to Dispatch Three 
MSDF Vessels to Indian Ocean, XINHUA (China), Nov. 8, 2001; see also Japan Dispatches 
Another Warship to Indian Ocean to Assist US Mission, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS (Nov. 26, 2004) available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian Pac. 
Stories (stating Japan has dispatched four Marine Self-Defense Force Aegis warships to the 
Indian Ocean to support U.S. operations); see also P. S. Suryanarayana, Japan to Extend 
Anti-Terror Mission in Indian Ocean, HINDU (Chennai), Apr. 24, 2005, 
http://www.hindu.com/2005/04/24/stories/2005042401730900.htm; see also Japan to Extend 
Forces Indian Ocean Support Operations, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Apr. 13, 
2005); see also Japan Extends Missions in Iraq, Indian Ocean Until 2009, BBC MONITORING 
ASIA PAC.—POL. (June 13, 2008), available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian 
Pac. Stories. 
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encouraged and sustained the maintenance of U.S bases on Okinawa. Japan 
supports these bases insofar as Japanese citizens work on and fund the 
bases. In effect, the bases allow Japan to rely on the U.S. military to do what 
Japan is forbidden to do by Article 9. The most important of these 
developments, for the purposes of this paper, is of course the Futenma base 
dispute, which represents an intermingling of Japanese and U.S. military 
powers at the expense of a small group of islanders.   
C. Intermingling of Japanese People and Resources with the U.S. 
Military 
Chinen underscores the critical role that the U.S. has played in diluting 
Article 9 of its constructive meaning. That role is magnified in the case of 
Futenma because Japan pays large sums of money to support this base and 
allows Japanese citizens to work on the base. For example, the Japanese 
government “used the politics of compensation as [a] strategy to pacify 
strong anti-base opposition,”171 and to that end it “allocated 7.5 billion yen 
to each local district hosting U.S. military bases,”172 distributed large 
endowments “to communities that accepted bases slated for relocation 
within Okinawa,”173 and “offered 100 billion yen over a seven-year period 
for projects proposed under the Informal Council on Okinawa 
Municipalities Hosting U.S. bases.”174 Add to these numbers the fact that 
Okinawans work menial jobs on the base175 and Futenma begins to look like 
an operation of the Japanese as much as of the U.S. In short, the American 
Futenma base and other American bases and troops on Okinawa offer the 
Japanese government a loophole to avoid violating Article 9. That is 
because Japan supports the bases almost as if they were its own, and the 
bases purportedly exist to service the interests of the Japanese as much as 
the interests of Americans.  
Japan has combined its interests with American military interests by 
sharing in the funding of U.S. military bases, subsidizing certain military 
base activities, discouraging Okinawan demonstrations against the military 
bases, and incentivizing the maintenance of military bases in local 
communities—in part because these bases play a role that the SDF cannot 
play without clearly violating Article 9. In effect, the Futenma base and 
bases like it remilitarize Japan notwithstanding that these bases belong to 
Americans and that Japanese workers on the bases do not participate in 
 171. ANDREW YEO, ACTIVISTS, ALLIANCES, AND ANTI-U.S. BASE PROTESTS 83 (2011). 
 172. Id.
 173. Id.
 174. Id. at 83-84. 
 175. See, e.g., Futenma Divides Okinawa’s Expats, JAPAN TIMES, June 8, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100608zg.html (statement of interviewee) (“I still 
want Futenma though, because there are a lot of people still working there. Not just Filipinos 
but Okinawans too who’d lose their jobs in the restaurants and movie theaters if it closed.”). 
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active combat. This impression is made stronger by the fact that the 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) have begun to cooperate 
with U.S. forces on and around the bases—so much so that “U.S. Navy 
officials have claimed that they have a closer daily relationship with the 
MSDF than with any other navy in the world, with over 100 joint exercises 
annually.”176
It is not necessarily the case that, by itself, a U.S. base in Japan 
constitutes the exercise of war powers in violation of Article 9; it is that 
Futenma and other bases on Okinawa are supported by Japan, both 
financially and rhetorically, and that every year the number of Japanese 
citizens employed by the bases seems to increase.177 Japan of course does 
not exert control over the bases the way the U.S. executive and upper-level 
U.S. military officials do. But, Japan has heavily influenced policy 
regarding the U.S. bases, which could not exist without Japanese support. 
As Part I of this article demonstrated, Japanese politicians and officials such 
as Hatoyama can have an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy in 
general and the U.S. bases on Okinawa in particular. Part of the reason is 
that without Japanese political and financial support, the U.S. bases on 
Okinawa probably would not remain solvent or viable.178 Japan does not 
 176. EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33740, THE U.S.-JAPAN 
ALLIANCE 12 (2011). 
 177. According to Reginald L. Fun:  
Japan pays part of the cost of the U.S. forces stationed in its country 
with annual burden-sharing payments that totaled about $4.9 billion 
in fiscal year 1997. The annual payments fall into four categories. 
First, Japan paid about $712 million for leased land on which U.S. 
bases sit. Second, Japan provided about $1.7 billion in accordance 
with the Special Measures Agreement, under which Japan pays the 
costs of (1) local national labor employed by U.S. forces in Japan, 
(2) public utilities on U.S. bases, and (3) the transfer of U.S. forces’ 
training from U.S. bases to other facilities in Japan when Japan 
requests such transfers. Third, USFJ estimated that Japan provided 
about $876 million in indirect costs, such as rents foregone at fair 
market value and tax concessions. Last, although not covered by any 
agreements, Japan provided about $1.7 billion from its facilities 
budget for facilities and new construction which included new 
facilities under the Japan [sic] under the Japan Facilities 
Improvement Program, vicinity improvements, and relocation 
construction and other costs. 
U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-66, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in 
Reducing the Impact of the U.S. 16 (1998). 
 178. I say this in light of America’s mounting debt crisis, economic downturn, and 
financial crisis, as well as the sheer costs of maintaining the bases that America would bear if 
Japan and the Okinawans did not already bear it. On this last point about America bearing 
the costs of the bases, consider the following:  
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The overall U.S.-Japan security relationship requires a U.S. basing 
presence. U.S.-Japanese defense relations are governed by a uniquely 
one-sided security treaty and also by Japan’s postwar constitution 
(put into place under heavy U.S. pressure and guidance) that 
prohibits Japan from creating a military organization with offensive 
capabilities. While provisions of the pacifist Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution have been reinterpreted over time to allow Japan to 
create well-armed self-defense forces, Japan still relies on the United 
States to come to its defense, while maintaining that it is 
constitutionally prohibited from returning this favor for the United 
States or for American allies like South Korea. Consequently, the 
United States provides Japan with a security guarantee, and in return, 
the Japanese state contributes over 57 percent of the annual direct 
stationing costs of the United States Forces Japan (USFJ). This 
means that Japan is an inexpensive place for U.S. bases to be located. 
Second, the nature of the political relationship that governs the U.S. 
bases in Okinawa is trilateral, as opposed to bilateral. The United 
States, the Japanese mainland government, and the Okinawa 
prefectural government constitute three distinct actors, each with 
separate identifiable interests. The quid pro quo arrangements in 
other U.S. basing cases are usually bilateral, between Washington 
and the host government. Here, in contrast, the key compensatory 
relationship is not between Washington and Okinawa, but between 
Tokyo and Okinawa. The Japanese government effectively 
externalizes the permanent U.S. military presence on its territory by 
foisting it onto Okinawa, which provides 75 percent of the territory 
for USFJ installations despite being only one of forty-seven Japanese 
prefectures (and despite having an overall land mass only about the 
size of metropolitan Tokyo). The main Okinawan island hosts thirty-
eight major installations covering 23,500 hectares, or about 18 
percent of Okinawa’s land mass. All four U.S military services—
including the huge facilities of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force 
and the Kadena Air Force Base—are represented on the island. The 
number of U.S. military personnel on the island at any one time is 
about 25,000 (around a quarter of the entire U.S. presence in Asia), 
and the combination of their dependents and U.S. civilian contractors 
brings the total American defense-related presence up to 50,000. 
Compounding this sense of bearing an unfair basing burden, 
Okinawa remains relatively underdeveloped compared with 
mainland Japan. Its per capita income is about 75 percent of the 
Japanese average, making it the least wealthy Japanese prefecture. 
In exchange for asking Okinawa to bear this ‘special’ or ‘unequal’ 
burden, the Japanese central government offers public works projects 
and budget subsidies to Okinawa’s prefectural and municipal 
governments and selective incentives to certain of Okinawa’s 
economic sectors. Taken together, these economic payoffs are 
sufficient to sustain Okinawan acquiescence for the U.S. military 
presence.  
Alexander Cooley & Kimberly Martin, Base Motives: The Political Economy of Okinawa’s 
Antimilitarism, 32 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 566, 571-72 (2006) (explaining in much further 
detail additional financial incentives and burdens borne by Japan and Okinawa).  
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control the U.S. bases, but itsaffects them in decisive ways and even keeps 
them operational with her financial support. Quantifying its degree of 
control over the bases is difficult and, in light of confidential military 
information, arguably impossible for the “outside” or nonmilitary observer. 
But it is safe to say that Japan’s efforts make bases like Futenma more 
sustainable than they would be if only America provided their support and 
resources.   
To preemptively counteract criticisms about the Japanese role in 
sustaining U.S. bases, or about American occupation of Okinawa in the face 
of widespread and longstanding local resistance to U.S. bases, American 
leaders, including Obama, have pushed Japanese leaders to expand Japan’s 
military role in international affairs.179 It is as if these American leaders 
have urged Japanese leaders to offend or discard Article 9 so that America 
can stop offending Article 9 on Japan’s behalf. One wonders how the U.S. 
bases on Okinawa would stand up to judicial scrutiny because Okinawans 
seem to be a narrow enough class to have standing to sue under Article 9, 
and because the U.S. bases do not make up the SDF but instead rely on 
Japanese money, people, and resources to sustain themselves.180 An Article 
9 suit might allow Okinawans to circumvent some U.S.-Japanese 
agreements that have prevented Okinawans from exercising jurisdiction 
over certain criminal actions occurring in their territory or from litigating 
matters against the U.S. military.181 Although most suits under Article 9 
have yet to yield positive results for those seeking a strict and rigid 
 179. See, e.g., Gavan McCormack, Deception and Diplomacy: The US, Japan, and 
Okinawa, 9 ASIA-PAC. J. 21 (2011), available at http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-
McCormack/3532; see also Gavan McCormack, Japan, through the US looking glass, ASIA 
TIMES ONLINE, June 26, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/JF26Dh01.html; see also
Gavan McCormack, Remilitarizing Japan, 29 NEW LEFT REV., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 29, 
available at http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2525. 
 180. The issue would seem to turn on sovereignty itself insofar as the issue would 
implicate Article 9 of the Constitution vis-à-vis Japan’s duty to the U.S. under treaties, etc. 
See Toni M. Bugni, The Continued Invasion, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 85, 110-11 
(1997): “Although Japanese and U.S. officials need to recognize these problems [of 
Okinawan safety and resistance to U.S. bases] and work toward implementing feasible 
solutions to the problems caused by the bases on the island, the United States is legally able 
to continue holding its bases on Okinawa. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security, the United States has the right to station troops in Japan; Japan has the duty to 
provide land for U.S. military facilities. This agreement has not lapsed but has been updated 
and reaffirmed several times since its initial signing. Both countries recognize the validity of 
the treaty and its related agreements.” The issue is whether the treaty itself offends Article 9 
and, if so, which authority trumps the other, or alternatively the issue might be redefined if 
the U.S. military is intermingled with the Japanese government and citizenry. Some of these 
questions might be resolved by courts if Okinawans were to bring suit under Article 9. 
 181. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai, People’s Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s 
Twin Lay Systems and the Future of American Military Bases in Japan, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 95, 117-23 (2010). See also Ian Roberts McConnel, A Re-examination of the 
United-States-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165 (2006) 
(discussing the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)). 
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interpretation of the article’s plain language, Mori v. Japan seems to have 
provided Okinawans with a plausible basis for bringing suit on the grounds 
that they have “a right to live in peace” that bears a direct legal relationship 
to the harm they have suffered from Japanese support of military activities.      
If Japan wants to amend Article 9, that is Japan’s business. America 
should not play a dispositive role in the process. If the Japanese leadership 
wants American troops to remain in Japan, as some individuals and groups 
frequently have claimed,182 then the American military and American 
leaders should take pains to disclaim any determinative influence in the 
textual adaptation or nullification of Article 9. Revising or adapting Article 
9 probably will not resolve the problems of Futenma or benefit Japan in the 
long-term; a “policy of constitutional transformation will upset the balance 
of power within Japan’s government and tarnish Japan’s legitimacy as a 
constitutional democracy,” and the “expansion of Japan’s military 
operations outside of its borders facilitated by a policy of constitutional 
transformation will further deteriorate Japan’s already tenuous relations 
with neighboring states.”183 This claim assumes that Japanese courts will 
persist in their deference to the Diet and that serious revision to Article 9 
would send a threatening message to other Asian countries.   
Okinawans should look to Mori v. Japan at least to gain political 
leverage. America should withdraw its troops from Okinawa so that Japan 
can decide the fate of Article 9 for herself. At this rate, the likely demise of 
Article 9 will be blamed on the U.S. military and U.S. leadership, and it 
may be too late to convince anyone otherwise. But by withdrawing U.S. 
troops from Okinawa, America can at least ensure that it does not finally 
decide the outcome of Article 9 for the Japanese, even if it will have played 
a causative role in draining Article 9 of meaning and practical import. The 
death of Article 9 would signify much more than the failure of one 
country’s unique and noble legal experiment; it would signify the failure of 
allegedly universal principles—jus ad bellum—to prove useful or practical 
as opposed to merely abstract and speculative.184 The impending death of 
 182. See, e.g., Japan Wants U.S. Marine Base to Stay on Okinawa,
ASIANCORRESPONDENT.COM (Oct. 23, 2009), http://asiancorrespondent.com/21557/japan-
wants-us-marine-base-to-stay-on-okinawa/. 
 183. David McArthur, Constitutional Transformation and its Implications for 
Japanese Pacifist Democracy, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (2009). 
 184. For context on this point, Craig Martin argues:  
[I]f this account is accurate, that is, if it can be shown that Article 9 
was designed to implement principles of jus ad bellum as a pre-
commitment device to prevent the use of force, and that those 
principles successfully operated to later constrain government policy 
with respect to the use of force, then the Japanese experience 
provides evidence that it is feasible to use constitutional design for 
the purposes of incorporating and implementing in the domestic legal 
system the international law norms on the use of armed force.  
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Article 9 will mean that similar articles and provisions will be unlikely to 
appear in the future constitutions of other countries.     
CONCLUSION
Some have argued that the bases on Okinawa obstruct economic growth 
on the island:  
[T]he U.S. bases in Okinawa impede economic development of the 
prefecture. U.S. military bases comprise 20% of the land area of 
Okinawa[;] consequently, they obstruct plans for roads and industrial 
development. Furthermore, although the United States agreed to return the 
wharves at Naha to Okinawan control twenty-three years ago, the U.S. 
Army still controls them. The Okinawans would like to transform those 
docks for commercial use to help bolster the local economy; they remain 
empty, however, except for the one military vessel that docks there once a 
month.185
On the other hand, many observers, including Alexander Cooley and 
Kimberly Zisk Martin, argue that the Okinawa bases boost the local 
economy, provide thousands of local jobs, keep small businesses afloat, and 
spawn rent payments and public works money.186 If Cooley and Martin 
mean that Okinawa generates more revenue with the U.S. military presence 
than without, then they are probably right. But no one can say for sure. The 
problem with hypothetical statistics is that they are hypothetical. Perhaps 
tourism would have been stronger in Okinawa without U.S. soldiers running 
around. Or perhaps Japan could have found a better use for the island. At 
the end of the day, all we have is conjecture. What we can say with some 
degree of certainty is that feelings about the base are mixed, both on and off 
the island, both in Japan and in America, and that other viable alternatives 
to Okinawa are available, as evidenced by an unanimous vote187 in the 
Senate of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to welcome 
the U.S. Marines currently stationed in Japan. One wonders why Obama 
will not transfer the Futenma troops and base to Tinian, an island that wants 
Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus 
Ad Bellum, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 267, 268 (2008). 
 185. Bugni, supra note 180, at 97-98. 
 186. Alexander Cooley & Kimberly Zisk Marten, Lessons of Okinawa, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/30/opinion/30ZISK.html?pagewanted=1. 
 187. David Allen, Tinian Island Makes a Push to Host Futenma Operations, STARS 
AND STRIPES (Apr. 21, 2010),  
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=69453. 
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the troops and base,188 rather than forcing the troops and base upon a 
population that, with a few notable exceptions, despises the American 
military.  
Lieutenant General Terry Robling, who commands the U.S. Marine 
bases in Japan, has a different argument for the presence of the U.S. military 
in Okinawa: “We provide the Japanese government with a credible 
deterrence force—a highly effective, highly trained and very mobile force 
that is very strategically located.”189 Robling adds that “the stability of the 
region has been caused by our presence here. Over 50 years now there’s 
been relative peace in the Asia region.”190 The problem with this argument 
is that it is analogous to claiming that a lack of new terror attacks on U.S. 
soil is evidence that George W. Bush’s anti-terror policies worked; the 
problem, in other words, is that there is no evidence—or, rather, that the 
evidence is in the absence of evidence. Ultimately, there is no proof. Not 
only is there no proof, but there is no way of knowing what might have been 
if circumstances were different—if Japan instead of the U.S. had maintained 
control over Okinawa.  
Robling might be correct. The U.S. probably deterred some conflict. To 
what extent, however, is unquantifiable. Also unquantifiable is the amount 
of harm that the U.S. military presence caused over time. Even if the U.S. 
military has made Japan safer from outside forces, it has endangered many 
people on the island. According to Defense Ministry data, U.S. military 
personnel were responsible for 7,277 accidents and criminal cases dating 
back five years from March 2009.191 Of these, 6,180 occurred while U.S. 
personnel were off-duty.192 Furthermore, the U.S. presence may have 
triggered a resurgence in nationalism among countries like North Korea or 
China that have unstable relations with Japan. These countries have good 
reason to be skeptical of the nearby U.S. military. The point, in any event, is 
that because we cannot know what Japan would have been like without U.S. 
forces on Okinawa, we cannot say that Japan is better or worse off because 
of Americans. True, there are no easy answers to the Futenma base 
dispute,193 but the most reasonable solution—the one that would please 
Okinawans and would have pleased the Hatoyama administration—is to 
withdraw American troops from Okinawa. Whether Okinawans bring suit 
 188. Haidee V. Eugenio, House Relocation Urges U.S., Japan to Consider Tinian as 
Futenma Relocation Site, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (Northern Mariana Islands), May 3, 2010, 
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=99294&cat=1. 
 189. Alastair Leithead, No Easy Answers in Okinawa, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2010, 
15:05GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8574208.stm. 
 190. Id.
 191. Bad Memories of U.S. Bases Linger, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100429f1.html.  
 192. Id.
 193. Leithead, supra note 187. 
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under the premises established in Mori v. Japan is outside the control of 
American leaders and activists. But troop withdrawal is another matter.  
Only by U.S. troop withdrawal will Japan be left to decide for herself 
whether the provisions of Article 9 remain viable in the rapidly developing 
and globalized world. Only by U.S. troop withdrawal will Japan retain her 
complete sovereignty and Okinawa her regional integrity. Only by total U.S. 
troop withdrawal, finally, will Okinawans be afforded the opportunity to 
produce a sustainable infrastructure and to shift resources to more socially 
and culturally beneficial uses. The Futenma base dispute has left Okinawa 
in a state of fear and uncertainty. That is not fair to Okinawans. That is not 
diplomacy. That is something else. What, exactly, is difficult to say. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What began as a six country regional governmental organization has 
become, since 1951, a dominant coalition, representing twenty-seven 
nations across almost all of Europe.2  A candidate since 1987, Turkey has 
had a long history with, and played a large role in, Europe through its 
membership in various European organizations since the late 1940s.3  
Examples of such organizations include the Organization for Economic Co-
  
 1. Michigan State University College of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Aquinas College, 
B.S. in International Business 2008. 
 2. See The History of the European Union: Animated Map, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/animated_map/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 3. See European Commission: Enlargement, EU-Turkey Relations, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter EU-Turkey Relations].   
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operation and Development (OECD), Council of Europe, Western European 
Union, and most notably, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).4  
Turkey and the EU formed a partnership in 1963 upon the signing of the 
Ankara Agreement,5  which formally allowed for the commencement of 
negotiations for full membership.6  Although accession negotiations began 
in October of 2005,7  the EU has been reluctant to admit Turkey, citing the 
need for, among other things, fulfilling the requirements of the Copenhagen 
criteria,8 enhancing human rights, resolving border disputes, recognizing the 
Armenian Genocide, and improving its citizens’ political freedoms.9  
Negotiations began six years ago, and the EU has yet to admit Turkey.10  
While there are many barriers standing in Turkey’s way, this article will 
primarily focus on the major ones.  It will argue that while Turkey has made 
substantial progress in its domestic affairs, economic policies, and some 
progress in improving relations with its neighbors, Turkey requires 
additional reforms.  The first part of this paper will provide background 
information on the EU, including its history and the accession process.  The 
second part will address major obstacles relating to Turkey’s geography, 
international disputes, and human rights issues.  The third part will analyze 
the government’s constitutional provisions in the context of its modern 
internal affairs, and demonstrate that while certain rights are explicitly 
enumerated in Turkey’s latest Constitution, they do not extend beyond the 
text of that Constitution.  In practice, few such rights exist, and in 
application, few are effective.  The final part will compare and contrast 
  
 4. See Members and Partners, OECD,  
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2011); 47 Countries, One Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last visited Oct. 12, 
2011); List of 28 Delegations, WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, http://weu.int/ (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011); NATO Member Countries, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-BAFED586-
DD86353C/natolive/nato_countries.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).   
 5. EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3.   
 6. These types of association agreements are not uncommon.  They prepare a 
candidate country for full membership and approximate the EU legislation.  “[T]hey are 
agreements with extended trade liberalization between the EU and the country associated.”  
They “entail stronger economic and political ties between the two parties.”  Email from 
Europe Direct to Yelena Archiyan (Mar. 24, 2011, 7:13:59 EST) (on file with author). 
 7. EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3; Europe in 12 Lessons, Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_3/index_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy]. 
 8. Syntheses de la legislation, Glossary: Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria), 
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_ 
en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Accession Criteria]. 
 9. See EC, Turkey 2010 Progress Report Accompanying the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 35, COM (2010) 660 (Nov. 
9, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/ 
tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Progress Report]. 
 10. EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3.   
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Turkey’s negotiation process with the processes of EU’s two newest 
members: Bulgaria and Romania.   
I. THE BASICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. Background  
Kofi Annan once said, “No nation needs to face or fight alone the threats 
which this organization was established to diffuse.”11  Even though he was 
referring to the United Nations, the European Union has a similar purpose; 
it merely accomplishes this goal on a regional level.  States with similar 
characteristics integrate to form regional coalitions so they can “better 
address world problems.”12  In 1951, six European nations integrated to 
form the European Coal and Steel Community whose purpose was to reduce 
nationalism and promote peace.13  The European Coal and Steel Community 
became the European Economic Community.14  The purpose of this 
transformation and expansion was to integrate economically and 
politically.15  Having a united Europe with similar goals also prevents any 
one European country from becoming a regional hegemon, as was the case 
before the 1950s.  Of course, the key success of the EU has been its ability 
to keep peace in Europe.16  The European Economic Community became 
the “European Union” in 1992 upon the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht.17   
It was not until 1973 that other European countries began joining the EU, 
and accession continues to this day.  While theoretically all members of the 
EU are equal, in reality the most populous member-nations have the most 
power.  This is so because they have the most votes in the Council of the 
EU, which is responsible for “defin[ing] [EU’s] general political direction 
  
 11. JOHN ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE WORLD STAGE 190 (10th ed. 
2005).   
 12. Id. at 191.   
 13. See The History of the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Not only has there been no outbreak of war in Europe since the EU’s creation, 
but for the first time in European history, there has been a transfer of sovereignty from 
individual nation-states to a collective organization.  The creation of the EU is significant for 
another reason—no longer is the modern nation-state a complete model of political 
organization.  The EU’s other accomplishments, and why they reflect Turkey’s desire to join, 
include Europe’s economic strength, the opportunity to enter new markets, the potential for 
adopting the euro, and being part of a “functioning institutional framework.” Hans N. Weiler, 
The EU at a Crossroads: The Tension Between Expansion and Integration 5-6 (2004) 
(transcribed lecture notes), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~weiler/ERT1_ 
manuscript.pdf. 
 17. History of the European Union, supra note 13. 
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and priorities.”18  Today, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy 
are the most influential in policy-making because they have the most 
votes.19   
Most recently, Bulgaria and Romania were admitted as members.  
Whereas they applied for admission in 1995, Turkey has been aspiring to 
join since 1987, and only in 1999 did the Helsinki European Council decide 
to upgrade Turkey to “candidate country status.”20  A country is granted this 
status when the EU Council officially accepts its application for 
membership.21  Official talks began at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, at 
which time the European Commission said that the EU could conclude 
negotiations with Turkey only after 2014.22   
The EU’s most current Progress Report23 revealed the enlargement 
strategies and main challenges facing Turkey’s membership for the 2010-11 
year.  The Commission stated that Turkey sufficiently satisfies the political 
criteria,24 but much work still remains with respect to human rights,25 
freedom of the press,26 and the Kurdish question.27  With respect to 
democracy and the rule of law, the Commission noted that “Turkey still 
needs to align its legislation as regards procedure and grounds for closures 
of political parties with European standards.”28  With respect to Turkey’s 
regional issues and international obligations, the Cyprus and Greek 
questions still need work.  On a positive note, the Commission noted that 
Turkey is successfully meeting the EU’s economic criteria, even though the 
nation suffered a series of financial crises beginning shortly after the turn of 
the century.29   
  
 18. The European Council-An Official Institution of the EU, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-institution.aspx?lang=en (last visited Dec. 1, 
2011). 
 19. See Council of the European Union, Voting Calculator, CONSILIUM, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/voting-calculator.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 20. PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROPE IN 12 LESSONS 13 (2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/22/en.pdf [hereinafter Fontaine]; see also 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, supra note 7.  
 21. European Commission Enlargement, Glossary, Candidate Countries, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/candidate-countries_en.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011). 
 22. Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership, EU CTR. OF N.C., EU BRIEFINGS, Mar. 2008, 
at 2, 5, available at, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business_media/mediabriefs/Brief4_ 
Turkey%27s_quest_web.pdf. 
 23. See generally 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9. 
 24. See id. at 6-16. 
 25. Id. at 17. 
 26. Id. at 21. 
 27. See id. at 35.   
 28. Id. at 7.  
 29. See generally 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9.   
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B. Accession  
Article forty-nine of the Treaty on European Union defines the process 
of accession.30  A nation is eligible for accession if it complies with the 
EU’s principles, which are enumerated in Article Two.31  Article forty-nine 
further provides that the candidate nation must submit an “application to the 
Council, which must act unanimously.”32  Before the Council takes a vote, it 
consults with the Commission and the Parliament, “which shall act by a 
majority of its component members.”33  Finally, “[t]he conditions of 
admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is 
founded . . . shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member 
States and the applicant State.”34  The contracting states must ratify this 
agreement “in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.”35   
An aspiring country must meet three qualifications known as the 
Copenhagen Criteria:  first, the country must be democratic, which means 
that there must be a presence of human rights and freedoms, respect for the 
nation’s minority population(s), and the rule of law; second, the country 
must meet the economic requirement (it must have a free market system); 
finally, the aspiring nation must be able to adhere to the entire EU law 
(acquis communautaire)36 which consists of over 80,000 pages of 
legislation.37 The acquis communautaire includes: (1) “the content, 
principles and political objectives of the treaties”; (2) “legislation adopted 
pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice”; (3) 
“declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union”; (4) “instruments under 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy”; (5) “instruments under Justice 
and Home Affairs”; and (6) “international agreements concluded by the 
Community and those entered into by the Member States among themselves 
within the sphere of the Union’s activities.”38 
Notwithstanding the above requirements, not one EU member-state that 
joined “had complied fully with the acquis at the time of . . . entry.”39  All 
entering countries were provided a transitional period.40  The EU cautions 
  
 30. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, Mar. 10, 
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 43 [hereinafter TEU].   
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Accession Criteria, supra note 8.   
 37. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 12.    
 38. European Commission Enlargement, Glossary, Acquis, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 39. HARUN ARIKAN, TURKEY AND THE EU: AN AWKWARD CANDIDATE FOR EU 
MEMBERSHIP 34 (2003). 
 40. Id. 
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nations that avoidance of compliance “cannot go against the nature and 
spirit of the acquis”; “it can only be put in place in order to guarantee that 
the ultimate principle of full applicability of the acquis communautaire to 
the new outermost regions stemming from Article 299(1) EC is 
respected.”41  While it was made clear that the enlargement of 2007 would 
require applicants to accept the acquis communautaire before accession, it 
is even clearer that was not the case.  Consider, for example, Bulgaria: upon 
its accession, the EU believed that Bulgaria had made efforts to adjust its 
legislation and administration to make them conform to the laws and rules 
of the EU.  Nevertheless, the EU said that “[s]ustained support from the 
European Union will be available for addressing the remaining issues.42  
This suggests that, in theory, Turkey need not satisfy all chapters of the 
acquis before it will be offered membership.  But the question of whether 
the EU will require Turkey to satisfy all chapters so as to delay admission 
for as long as possible, which is what it seems to have been doing since 
2005, remains to be seen.     
II. TURKEY’S NON-CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IMPEDING ACCESSION  
A. Geography  
As its name suggests, the European Union is located in Europe.  
According to the Treaty on European Union, only “European States” may 
apply for membership.43  Although the Treaty does not define what a 
“European State” is, currently all but one EU member are located on the 
European continent.44  According to the current physical structure of the 
EU, it became evident that “the line in the South was drawn to the 
Mediterranean” when the EU rejected Morocco’s application in 1987 on the 
grounds that the country is not in Europe even though it is Spain’s neighbor 
to the south.45  The defining border to the west is naturally the Atlantic 
  
 41. Dimitry Kochenov, Substantive and Procedural Issues in the Application of 
European Law in the Overseas Possessions of the European Union Member States, 17 MICH. 
ST. J. INT’L L. 195, 280 (2009). 
 42. European Commission Enlargement, Bulgaria—EU-Bulgaria Relations, 
EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/bulgaria/eu_bulgaria_relations_en.htm 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 43. TEU art. 49. 
 44. Cyprus is officially located in the Middle East. CIA, Cyprus, WORLD FACTBOOK , 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011). Malta, while situated in the Mediterranean Sea, is officially located in Southern 
Europe. CIA, Malta, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mt.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 45. EUR. COMM’N, GOOD TO KNOW ABOUT EU ENLARGEMENT 10 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/screen_mythfacts_a5_en.pdf. 
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Ocean.46  To the north, the EU’s border is between Finland and Norway.47  
The problem is stretching to the east.  While the Black Sea is a natural 
border to the east, Bulgaria and Romania, both of which border the Black 
Sea, are already members.  In theory, the EU could stretch to the 
Caucuses,48 but it was explicit that to go as far as Russia “would create 
unacceptable imbalances.”49   
Officially, Turkey is located in Southeastern Europe and Southwestern 
Asia.  Only the minuscule portion of Turkey that lies to the West of the 
Bosporus is located in Europe.  The capital of Turkey, Ankara, is located in 
Asia, and a great majority of Turkey’s population lives on the Asian 
continent.50  Its neighbor to the northwest is Bulgaria and to the south is 
Cyprus, both of which are EU members.51   
The implications associated with admitting Turkey, a mostly non-
European nation, into the EU would be significant.  What precedent will be 
set if Turkey becomes a member?  Will Syria, Lebanon, and Israel want to 
join, making the argument that they too border the Mediterranean Sea?  The 
end result is this: however far the EU decides to expand, its expansion 
endeavors must be cautious to maintain effective and democratic 
functionality.52  
B. The Cyprus Dispute 
In its latest Progress Report on Turkey, the EU Commission noted that 
Turkey needs to improve its bilateral relations with Cyprus.53  In fact, in 
2006 the EU put a hold on the opening of negotiations of eight chapters of 
the acquis because of Turkey’s restriction on the “free movement of goods 
carried by vessels and aircraft registered in Cyprus or whose last port of call 
was in Cyprus.”54  This means that in the nearly impossible event that 
Turkey meets the other chapters before it lifts its restrictions, it will be 
  
 46. Press Release, Europe’s Next Frontiers, Mr. Olli Rehn’s Lecture at the Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs (Oct. 27, 2006), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/654&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Europe’s 
Next Frontiers]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, supra note 7. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Turkey Entry ‘Would Destroy EU,’ BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2002), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm (noting former French President Valery 
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2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/world/europe/01cnd-union.html?ex=1325307600 
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 52. Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, supra note 7. 
 53. 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9, at 36. 
 54. Id. at 47; see also EU-Turkey Relations, supra note 3. 
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unable to open negotiations with the EU on these eight chapters until the 
hold is removed.   
The dispute between Turkey and Greece over the Island of Cyprus began 
shortly after Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960.55  
Guerilla warfare broke out on the island when Turks responded to the Greek 
movement called enosis (unification of Cyprus and Greece) through a 
process called takism (division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey).56  
At the end of this revolutionary movement, Turkey came to control 38% of 
Cyprus’s territory.57  The Cypriot Government claims that what provoked 
Turkey’s reaction was the Cypriot government’s attempt to make changes to 
the Constitution, which was “unworkable.”58 
Cyprus is divided into two parts.  The parts are disconnected by the 
“Green Line,” which “separates the government-controlled areas from the 
rest of the island.”59  The portion that is occupied by Turkey is called the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and is highly dependent 
upon Turkey for its agriculture, tourism, and aid.60  Turkey’s occupation is 
viewed as illegal and is unrecognized internationally.61  Greece and its 
counterpart in Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus), and Turkey and its counterpart 
(TRNC) each have mutual defense agreements.   
Although the entire island of Cyprus was admitted into the European 
Union in 2004, only the free portion of the island adheres to the acquis 
communautaire of the European Union.62  In 2002, the United Nations took 
the initiative to reunite the people of Cyprus through the Annan Plan.63  The 
Annan Plan consisted of three stages: (1) “negotiations were to be held 
  
 55. A settlement was reached in 1959, but the London-Zurich agreements were 
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http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pwks17.pdf. 
 56. Ali Kazancigil, The Cypriot Question, in TURKEY TODAY: A EUROPEAN 
COUNTRY? 173, 175 (Olivier Roy ed., 2004); see also COMM’N ON CYPRUS’ PROGRESS 
TOWARDS ACCESSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON CYPRUS’ PROGRESS 
TOWARDS ACCESSION 11 (1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ 
key_documents/1998/cyprus_en.pdf. 
 57. Kazancigil, supra note 56, at 176. 
 58. Government Web Portal, CYPRUS, http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/ 
dmlgovernment_en/dmlgovernment_en?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 59. European Commission Enlargement, Turkish Cypriot Community, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011). 
 60. WILLIAM MALLINSON, PARTITION THROUGH FOREIGN AGGRESSION: THE CASE OF 
TURKEY IN CYPRUS 8 (2010).  
 61. Id. at 1.   
 62. Id. at 3.   
 63. Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One 
More Failure?, 5 EGE ACAD. REV. 29, 35 (2005), available at http://eab.ege.edu.tr/pdf/5/C5-
S1-2-M4.pdf (Turk.). See generally The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem 
(Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf. 
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between the two Cypriot communities under UN auspices”; (2) “a 
conference was to be organized in which the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
and Greece and Turkey were to take part”; and (3) “a referendum [was to 
have been] held on the plan in both communities.”64  The Annan Plan did 
not make it past stage three because Greek Cypriots voted 75.8% against it 
in the referendum.65  Although both sides were historically resistant to any 
peaceful resolution, Turkish Cypriots surprisingly voted 64.9% in favor of 
reunification in the referendum.66  Perhaps the reason the referendum was 
not approved by the Greek Cypriots is because all of their claims in the 
European Court of Human Rights would have to be withdrawn.67  In effect, 
the Plan would have denied Greek Cypriots their legal rights.68   
Cyprus’s accession on May 1, 2004 symbolized a serious impediment for 
Turkey.  Cyprus’s former President Tasos Papadopoulos69 “made it very 
clear that Cyprus as an EU member state would block any decision 
regarding Turkey’s EU membership[] until a solution for Cyprus had been 
reached on better terms for the Greek Cypriots than the Annan Plan.”70  
Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, all member states must 
ratify the accession agreement before a country may be admitted into the 
EU.71  The chances of Cyprus ratifying Turkey’s admission are slim and 
will likely remain that way until a cooperative agreement desirable for both 
sides, especially the Greek Cypriots, is reached.72   
C. Aegean Sea Dispute  
A similar dispute between Turkey and Greece involves the status of the 
Aegean Sea.  This dispute was discussed at the 48th Meeting of the EU-
Turkey Association Council in 2010.73  The dispute revolves around the 
question of who controls the territorial waters, the airspace, and the 
  
 64. ERIC FAUCOMPRET & JOZEF KONINGS, TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EU: 
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 65. A. Marco Turk, The Negotiation Culture of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as 
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327, 330 (2009). 
 66. Id.   
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RIGHTS 17 (2008)   
 68. Id.   
 69. Tasos Papadopoulos was succeeded by Dimitris Christofias in 2008.  Christofias 
Wins Cyprus Presidential Election, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2008, 
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 70. FAUCOMPRET & KONINGS, supra note 64, at 179.  
 71. TEU art. 49. 
 72. Turk, supra note 65.  
 73. See 48th Session of the Turkey-EC Association Council, UE-TR 4806/10, at 19 
(May 12, 2010) (statement by Mr. Ahmet Davuto lu & H.E. Mr. Egemen Ba i ), available 
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continental shelf.74  Greece’s position on this issue is that it should be able 
to extend its dominion over the Aegean Sea to the limit established by the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas (LOS), which says that “[e]very 
State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with [the] Convention.”75  Currently, it only claims six nautical 
miles of the Sea.76  Furthermore, it argues that pursuant to LOS and the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, it should have the right 
to exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf up to two hundred 
nautical miles from its coastal and island baselines.77  Turkey, on the other 
hand, argues that “much of the Aegean seabed is . . . a prolongation of the 
Anatolian land mass that is part of Turkey.”78   
While actions in furtherance of normalizing  relations have been taken by 
both Greece and Turkey, including those involving international arbitration 
and cases taken to the International Court of Justice, improvements have 
been minimal.79  Several resolutions have been proposed, including a 
maritime joint development regime.  This would involve the parties 
themselves deciding the appropriate level of cooperation.  It has been 
suggested that a joint organizational structure for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources in the seabed should be established.  The 
absence of politics in the regime would also be beneficial.80  At the 2010 
meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, the Council noted that 
Turkey is “ready to continue to work with Greece towards the settlement of 
[this issue] through peaceful means in accordance with international law.”81  
1. Conclusions on Turkey’s Disputes with Greece over Cyprus  
  and the Aegean Sea 
While it is understandable that Greece is using its presence in the EU in a 
self-interested fashion to keep out Turkey, a question arises: would it not 
  
 74. ARIKAN, supra note 39, at 150.    
 75. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 3 
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 77. Law of the Sea, supra note 75, art. 76(1) & (4).   
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 80. Id. at 76.   
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Press Release 12353/09 (Presse 228), at 11, Council of the EU, 2957th Council Meeting, 
General Affairs and External Regulations (July 27, 2009), available at 
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benefit Greece to have Turkey as a member?  It is quite obvious that since 
1981 “Greece has pursued a policy, which implies that improvement in the 
EU-Turkey relations, and Turkey’s accession to the EU, should depend 
upon the settlement of disputes between Greece and Turkey.”82  But is 
Greece taking the correct approach?  Would it not make more sense for 
Greece to support Turkey’s accession and advance its policies of dispute 
resolution after Turkey becomes an EU member?  Turkey as an EU member 
would probably be an “easier neighbor to deal and live with than [one that 
is] alienated, fundamentalist and militaristic.”83  While Turkey may be 
reluctant to settle these international border disputes until all other issues are 
resolved and until it gains EU membership, there seems to be a paradox 
here—resolving these disputes amounts to a condition of membership, at 
least according to the EU’s annual progress reports on Turkey.84  On the 
other hand, Turkey has little incentive to do what the Commission 
recommends with respect to these issues because, from its perspective, the 
EU is reluctant to offer it full membership anyway, 85 so why should it 
concede first?  However, the EU has nothing to lose by not offering Turkey 
full membership.  In fact, several European leaders, most notably Nicolas 
Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, are against Turkish membership.86  Europe is 
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concerned about dealing with a country that is “too big, too poor, too 
undemocratic—as well as too Muslim and non-European.”87  So, would it 
not make the most logical sense that Turkey, rather than the EU, make 
amends in furtherance of EU membership?   
D. Denial of Armenian Genocide  
The EU Parliament has encouraged Turkey to recognize the Armenian 
Genocide.88  The Genocide took place in 1915 and resulted in the deaths of 
1,500,000 Armenians.89  While this act of genocide was committed by the 
Ottoman Turks and not the government in place today, the modern 
government still has an obligation to acknowledge what its predecessor did 
nearly a century ago.  The modern government stepped into power in the 
early 1920s when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and a modern 
Republic of Turkey was created and recognized by the Treaty of 
Lausanne.90  A major difference between the Ottoman Turkish government 
and the modern Turkish government is secularism.  The new government 
transformed the nation into a secular state and instilled in it democratic 
practices.    
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide defines genocide as:  
[A]ny of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group; killing members of 
the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.91    
The Armenian genocide meets this definition.92  In fact, many advanced, 
industrialized nations, as well as individuals, have recognized the Armenian 
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Genocide, 93 including Russia, Argentina, France, Greece, and even the 
Pope.94  Thus far, about twenty countries have recognized the 1915 
massacre as “genocide.”95  Turkey, in contrast, has historically denied and 
continues to deny what its predecessor government did ninety-six years 
ago.96  To be clear, Turkey’s primary argument is that there were no 
killings.  Alternatively, it argues that if killings occurred, they did not 
amount to genocide.97  However, there is unambiguous evidence along with 
academic scholarship proving that the massacre of more than 1,000,000 
Armenians took place.98   
On September 28, 2005, the European Parliament urged Turkey to 
recognize the Genocide.99  This took place around the time negotiations 
with Turkey began.  More recently, an amendment has been added to the 
2010 Progress Report on Turkey, which “[u]rges Turkey to ratify the 
protocols with Armenia, to open the border with this neighbor 
unconditionally and to acknowledge the genocide of Armenians, Greeks and 
Assyrians.”100  Turkey has its reasons for denying the genocide, two of 
which relate to its concern about how it will be perceived in the 
international community and to avoid giving Armenia back its territory.  
But if Turkey were to acknowledge the genocide, it is doubtful it would lose 
the respect of the international community.  Instead, recognition would most 
likely lead to cooperation between Turkey and Armenia, provide closure to 
both countries, and most importantly, bring Turkey one step closer to EU 
membership.   
E. Satisfying the Copenhagen Economic Criteria 
Under the Copenhagen standards, a candidate country must show two 
things to satisfy the economic criteria: (1) “existence of a functioning 
market economy; and (2) “capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the EU.”101  According to the 2010 Progress Report on 
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Turkey, the Commission concluded that Turkey has made adequate progress 
in this area.102   
In comparative terms, Turkey is doing no worse than Bulgaria and 
Romania when they were in the negotiation stages.103  Turkey has, however, 
along with the rest of the world, suffered from the recent economic crisis, 
which has delayed certain aspects of its economic progress.104  Turkey’s 
economic problems are addressed not by the EU, but by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.105   
To briefly summarize the EU Commission’s conclusions on the 
existence of a functioning market economy in Turkey, the 2010 Progress 
Report stated that the “consensus on economic policy essentials has been 
preserved” but “better planning, coordination and communication” would 
help boost the confidence in the “government’s economic policy.”106  In 
addition, the government’s privatization efforts have helped Turkey’s 
economy considerably.107 
With respect to the economy’s “capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union,” the Commission in 2010 
gave Turkey mixed reviews.108  It stated that while Turkey is recovering 
from the economic crisis, the opportunities for structural reforms, due to the 
strong fundamental pillars that the government has been creating since 
1980, and low interest rates are available.109  It also stated that Turkey’s 
growth is delayed due to “high inactivity and insufficiently broad-based 
productivity growth.”110  It concluded, however, that the crisis did not 
negatively affect the market mechanism functions.111   
All this is relevant to Turkey’s accession because the EU wants member 
nations to be able to adjust to the EU economy, which obviously is much 
bigger than the economy of a single nation.  In doing so, it expects 
candidates to improve and align their economic policies with the policies of 
the EU so that its populace can compete with the citizens of the EU.  There 
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is an acquis chapter on this aspect called the Freedom of Movement of 
Workers.112  It takes into account, among other things, the educational 
system in a candidate country, literacy rates, and corruption levels.113  The 
Turkish government is participating in the EU’s education and youth 
programs to better prepare its young generation for competition in the 
workforce in the EU.114  Fifteen new universities were established in a 
period of one year.115  Turkey has also taken aggressive steps to fight 
corruption.  For example, it approved the Conventions of the European 
Council towards fighting against corruption.116  It also became a member of 
the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and ratified the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption.117  In 2009, it ranked 61st out of 180 
countries on the corruption scale, scoring 61 out of 100 points.118   
Some numeric factors, including GDP, inflation rates, income inequality, 
human development, unemployment, and foreign direct investment can 
show a lot about how a country is doing economically.  Eurostat, the official 
EU statistics database, compares countries’ GDP per capita relative to one 
another and relative to the EU itself whose average (accounting for all 27 
members) is set to one hundred.  Turkey received a score of 47 in 2008, the 
latest year for which GDP information for Turkey is available.119  Romania 
also received a score of 47, while Bulgaria got 43 points.120  Turkey’s 
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inflation rate was 8.6% in 2010, while Bulgaria’s was 3% and Romania’s 
was 6.1%.121  The inflation rate in Cyprus was 2.6% in 2010.122   
Income inequality is measured by the GINI index on a scale of one to 
one hundred, with one representing no inequality and one hundred 
representing the maximum amount of inequality.  Turkey and Romania 
received a score of 39.7 and 31.2 in 2008, respectively, while Bulgaria 
received a score of 45.3 in 2007, the latest year for which information for 
Bulgaria was available.123  The human development index measures the 
“level of human development of people in a society that accounts for 
inequality.”124  The 2010 report revealed that Turkey was in 83rd place while 
Bulgaria and Romania took 58th and 50th place, respectively.125  If Turkey 
were a member of the EU, it would rank last out of all current EU members.   
Turkey’s unemployment rate in 2010 was 12%, while Bulgaria’s was 
9.5%, and Romania’s was 6.9%.126  Foreign direct investment is also a 
useful measure of how strong a country’s economy is.  It is defined as “an 
investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside 
of the economy of the investor.”127  The EU Commission believed that 
Turkey’s ability to diversify its trading had an effect on alleviating the 
impact of the economic crisis.128  The United Nations Report indicated that 
as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, Turkey’s FDI inward flow 
in 2009 was 7.3%, while its outward flow was 1.5%.129  Comparatively, as a 
percentage of gross fixed capital formation, Bulgaria’s FDI inward flow in 
2009 was 38.3%, while its outward flow was -1.2%.130  Finally, Romania’s 
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FDI inward flow in 2009 was 15.3% of gross fixed capital formation, while 
its outward flow was at 0.5%.131   
The conclusions to be drawn from these numerical indicators are that 
Turkey, for the most part, is near the bottom in almost all categories relative 
to other EU member-states.  Nonetheless, the latest Progress Report 
indicated that Turkey is relatively well aligned with EU policies in meeting 
the economic criteria.132  The Commission also found that there was “strong 
economic interdependence between the EU and Turkey.”133  While the EU 
is impressed with some aspects of Turkey’s economy, it is awaiting more 
improvements in some specific areas.  For example, the government still 
needs to implement structural reforms, including investing in human capital 
and providing social benefits.  It should implement legislation to equalize 
the playing field for women so they can compete fairly with men for jobs.134  
Turkey also needs to attract more foreign direct investment.  To do so, it 
needs to modify its judicial system, manage its corruption, and develop its 
physical infrastructure.135  It is clear, however, that Turkey is much closer to 
meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria than it is to meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria as well as satisfying the requirement to adhere 
to the entire EU law.   
F. Acquis Communautaire 
The third non-negotiable condition of EU accession is adherence to the 
acquis communautaire (the entire EU law).  The aspiring EU state must 
have the “ability to take on the obligations of full membership,” including 
the administrative, judicial, and legislative aspects of the EU law.136  The 
phrase has a broad definition and includes “all the real and potential rights 
and obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework.”137  For 
Turkey, this means supporting the “UN Secretary General’s effort to bring 
the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to 
a successful conclusion.”138  Upon accession, this 80,000 page document 
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must be adopted and translated into the applicant country’s language.139  In 
Turkey’s case, only 20% of it has been translated.140   
The process of negotiations is as follows: First, the non-problematic 
chapters, such as Science and Research, are disposed of.141  Once a country 
aligns its policies with a certain chapter, the chapter is then presented to the 
Council for its adoption by a unanimous vote.142  If a chapter poses 
problems for a country, the country has the option to ask for “transitional 
measures, opt-outs and/or derogations.”143  In response, the Commission 
“would [create] a Draft Common Position (CP) for the EU and send [it] to 
the Council.”144  The Council will then engage in a screening process during 
which it will adopt a common negotiating document.145  The CP is then 
presented to the applicant state and, if it accepts, its acceptance “would be 
decided as an Article of Accession Treaty.”146  If it does not, the 
Commission and Council will modify the CP as many times as needed 
before the applicant state accepts its provisions.147  In the 2010 Progress 
Report on Turkey, the Commission addressed Turkey’s adherence to each 
of the 33 acquis chapters.148  A summary is presented below.    
 
Acquis Chapter Turkey’s Status on Alignment 
Free movement of goods Limited progress has been made; Turkey 
has not yet incorporated the requirements 
of the acquis  
Freedom of movement for workers Alignment is at an early stage 
Right of establishment and freedom to 
provide services 
Alignment is at an early stage 
Free movement of capital Some alignment has been made 
Public procurement Some aspects are in the advanced stage of 
alignment 
Company law Limited alignment  
Intellectual property law High level of alignment  
Competition policy  High level of alignment 
Financial Services  Some alignment has been made  
Information society and media Some alignment has been made 
Agriculture  Limited alignment  
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Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary  
policy  
Progress has been made, but further 
efforts are necessary  
Fisheries  Some alignment has been made 
Transport policy  Some alignment has been made with the 
exception of the railway sector 
Energy High level of alignment  
Taxation Some alignment has been made 
Economic and monetary union Some alignment has been made 
Statistics  High level of alignment  
Social policy and employment Some alignment has been made 
Enterprise and industrial policy  Sufficient level of alignment  
Trans-European networks  Sufficient to high level of alignment 
Regional policy and coordination of 
structural instruments  
Some alignment has been made 
Judiciary and fundamental rights  Alignment in certain areas of the judiciary 
have been made  
Justice, freedom, and security  Alignment is at an early stage with regard 
to migration; further efforts are needed 
with regard to external borders & 
Schengen; alignment is at an early stage 
with regard to judicial cooperation in 
criminal and civil matters; further efforts 
are needed with regard to police 
cooperation, customs cooperation, and the 
fight against drugs 
Science and research High, but incomplete level of alignment  
Education and culture  Good progress on education and culture, 
but lacking legislative alignment 
Environment  Limited alignment on horizontal 
legislation; limited alignment on air 
quality; high level of alignment on waste 
management; little alignment on water 
quality; no alignment on nature 
protection; limited alignment on industrial 
pollution control and risk management; 
limited alignment on chemicals and 
climate change; high level of alignment 
on noise;  
Consumer and health protection  Low alignment in the area of consumer 
protection; some alignment in the  area of 
public health  
Customs union High level of alignment in certain aspects  
External relations High, but incomplete level of alignment  
Foreign, security, and defense policy  Some alignment has been made 
Financial control Limited alignment 
Financial and budgetary provisions  Limited alignment149 
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From the foregoing, it appears that either Turkey has a long way to go 
before it can align its policies with all of these chapters, unless it can ask for 
a transitional measure or an opt-out, or that the Commission is intentionally 
raising its standards to delay Turkey’s accession. 
III. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS   
Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty is procedural in nature and outside 
the control of a candidate country in that the decision whether to allow 
admission lies with the European Union Council, Parliament, and member-
states.  Furthermore, because the acquis communautaire is everything the 
EU did prior to a candidate’s accession, it, too, is outside the candidate’s 
control.  Because adopting the acquis is a condition of membership, a 
candidate has no other choice than to accept its substance.  The 
development and stability of a nation’s economy is also subject to external 
conditions.  However, the political criteria—the presence of human rights 
and freedoms, respect for a nation’s minority populations, and the rule of 
law—are all within the candidate country’s control,  and it is the country’s 
constitution that sets the foundation for these items.  Moreover, because it is 
in the government’s discretion to provide or take away these rights and 
freedoms, the political criteria should weigh more heavily.  Each country 
has its own unique facts; what may be standing in the way of one may not 
be an issue for another.  According to previous progress reports, Turkey has 
many deficiencies in this area.  Some issues cannot be resolved as easily as 
the government enacting a law, such as with Cyprus, the Aegean Sea 
dispute, or the functionality of a market economy.  The same is not true, 
however, when it comes to Turkey’s domestic policies and relations with its 
citizens.  In 2010, Turkey has demonstrated this is so:  Turkey’s legal 
system underwent major reforms when its Constitution was amended 
through a public referendum,150 the Law on Fundamental Principles of 
Elections and Electoral Rolls was amended to allow for language other than 
Turkish to be used in election campaigns,151 and a Kurdish department at a 
university was established.152  It appears that after five decades of being an 
applicant, Turkey is finally liberating itself from a longstanding history of 
archaic traditions and aligning itself with the political requirement of the 
Copenhagen criteria.153  This section will focus on the specific issues 
regarding Turkey’s constitutional and other legal reforms and their flaws.  
This is only one aspect of the Copenhagen political criteria; there are a total 
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of three requirements to satisfy the political criteria—democracy, rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and protection of minorities.154 
A. Constitutional Provisions 
Modern Turkey has had three constitutions: the 1924 Constitution; the 
1961 Constitution, which brought developments in the parliamentary 
system; and the 1982 Constitution, which remains in effect today.155  The 
1982 Constitution gave great powers to the executive156  and formed the 
basis of the Turkish legal system and its defects.  After the 1982 
Constitution went into effect and prior to the referendum of 2010, 157 the 
government was severely criticized as undemocratic.  Though amendments 
were made in 2010, the Constitution remains an impediment to Turkey’s 
accession to the EU because it fails to provide the rights it guarantees.  Even 
more undemocratic and controversial is the Turkish Penal Code, which 
infringes upon the rights of its citizens and gives the government great 
powers to suppress and punish those with whom it disagrees. 
First, Article 14 of the Turkish Constitution takes away what it provides 
in later articles.  It says, “[n]one of the rights and freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible 
integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the 
existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based 
upon human rights.”158  What this seems to mean is that although citizens 
have certain fundamental rights, they cannot be exercised if they threaten to 
violate Turkey’s integrity.  The second part of the provision presumes that 
inherent in Turkey’s integrity is democracy, secularism, and human rights 
protections.  Several modern examples demonstrate this is not the case.  
One is Turkey’s ban on certain political parties.159  Another is a law that 
makes it illegal to use any language other than Turkish in political life.160  
The government has used this law to prosecute violators.  For example, in 
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1991, Leyla Zana took her oath for Parliament in Kurdish.  She also dared 
“to speak Kurdish and wear the Kurdish colors in the ribbons in her 
headband in Parliament.”161  For this she spent 10 years in prison.162  The 
policy that no language other than Turkish may be used in political life still 
exists today.163  More recently, Turkey’s Parliament Speaker reminded a 
party chairman of this policy after a political party chairman “addressed 
party representatives in Kurdish for 10 minutes during [a] meeting.”164  
Although the chairman was not jailed, he was reminded that legal action 
would be taken against anyone who does not comply with the law.165   
Related to this is a nationwide policy that the Kurdish language cannot 
be taught in schools.  However, for the first time in the country’s history, a 
Turkish university “established the first Kurdish . . . language department[], 
and started to accept students to post-graduate programmes organised  by 
these departments.”166  Despite this one development, “Kurdish language 
training in public schools is, in fact, illegal.167 
The second controversial provision in Turkey’s constitution is Article 26, 
which says 
Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion 
by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or 
collectively. . . .   
. . . . The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of 
protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic 
characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of 
the State with its territory and nation . . . . 168 
The reason this provision is controversial is because, like many others, in 
practice it has proven to be false; citizens who have attempted to express 
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their thoughts in public have been punished.169  Despite its alleged 
protection in the Constitution, freedom of expression is lacking.170  While 
the 2010 Progress Report on Turkey indicated the media is enjoying greater 
freedoms than ever before, it also mentioned that a substantial number of 
lawsuits have been brought against journalists.171  There is “[u]ndue political 
[pressure] on the media,” which greatly hinders the exercise of freedom of 
the press.”172  An important illustration of this is the case of Hrant Dink,173 
which serves as an example of Turkey’s lack of freedom of expression as 
well as radical measures taken by its society for the purpose of denying the 
Armenian Genocide.174  Dink was an editor of an Armenian newspaper 
called Agos published in Turkey.  He was a human rights activist and 
debated “openly and critically issues of Armenian identity and official 
versions of history in Turkey relating to” the Armenian Genocide.175  Even 
after receiving death threats for his views, he continued to write until he was 
murdered.176  Before his death he was prosecuted three times for writing 
about the Genocide.  He was charged with insulting the Turkish identity 
under Section 301 of Turkey’s Penal Code 177 and was “handed a six-month 
suspended prison sentence.”178   
In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights issued a judgment holding 
that Turkey failed to protect Hrant Dink’s life.179  Specifically, the Court 
found that the Turkish government was in violation of Articles 2, 10, and 13 
of the Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales.180  These articles are the right to life, freedom of expression, 
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and the right to an effective remedy, respectively.181  Accordingly, the Court 
ordered the Turkish government to pay Dink’s family 105,000 euros in 
compensation.182  Turkey’s response to this incident is somewhat surprising 
in that it said it would not appeal the Court’s judgment.  Immediately 
following the shooting, Turkey promised to bring those responsible for the 
murder to justice.  To be clear, there is no evidence that the government 
itself was responsible for Dink’s murder.  Nonetheless, the government was 
aware that Dink had received death threats and did nothing to protect him.183  
It is not for the act of murder that the EU reprimanded Turkey; rather it is 
for its failure to protect the journalist prior to the murder.184  It is also worth 
reiterating that the government prosecuted him for his expressions.   
B. Other Laws and Their Use Against the Kurds  
The Kurds are a large minority group in Turkey and comprise about 
eighteen percent of Turkey’s total population.185  The Kurds claim that 
Turkey’s Constitution discriminates against them186  and specifically point 
to Articles 3, 42, and 66.187  Article 3 provides “[t]he Turkish state, with its 
territory and nation, is an indivisible entity.  Its language is Turkish.”188  
Article 66 in relevant part provides, “[e]veryone bound to the Turkish state 
through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.  The Child of a Turkish father or a 
Turkish mother is a Turk.”189  Therefore, the Kurds argue that they are 
intentionally left out of the Constitution.190 
In response to the Turkish government leaving the Kurds powerless, the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was formed in 1984.191  It sought Kurdish 
independence and an independent Kurdish state.192  Since the PKK’s 
formation, the Turkish government has taken steps to restrain its 
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influence.193  Between 1984 and 1999, the Turkish military used its Anti-
Terror laws to suppress the PKK.  The Anti-Terror laws lay out the 
government’s emergency powers.  Article One of the Law to Fight 
Terrorism (Act No. 3713) defines terrorism: 
Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic 
as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and 
economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its 
territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and 
Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, 
eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and 
external security of the State, public order or general health by means of 
pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.  An 
organization for the purposes of this Law is constituted by two or more 
persons coming together for a common purpose.  The term “organization” 
also includes formations, associations, armed associations, gangs or armed 
gangs as described in the Turkish Penal Code and in the provisions of 
special laws.194 
From this definition, it appears that because the PKK desires an independent 
Kurdistan, its aim must be to change the characteristics of the Republic of 
Turkey.  It must logically follow that the PKK is a terrorist organization.   
Furthermore, under Article Eight of this Act, “written and oral 
propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at 
damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with[in] its territory 
and nation are forbidden, regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas 
behind such activities.”195  Under this Act, the government has closed pro-
Kurdish newspapers; banned political parties; and jailed politicians, 
journalists, and human rights activists.196  Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, 350 
children as young as 12 were characterized as terrorists by the government 
because they attended a demonstration organized by the PKK.197  They were 
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convicted under Act 3713, and serve in adult prisons. 198  Mere presence at 
such demonstrations renders these children PKK members.199  There is a 
presumption that all Kurdish protests are organized by the PKK.200 
Turkey is making progress with respect to applying this anti-terror law to 
children and prosecuting them as adults.  For example, in 2010 the 
legislature adopted the law for stone-throwing children, the purpose of 
which was to ease punishment for children charged under the Anti-Terror 
Laws. 201  
Another reform is the repeal of Articles 141 and 142 of its Penal Code 
(Act No. 765).202  The repeal came from Article 23 of the Law to Fight 
Terrorism Act.203  These two articles “banned any form of association or 
propaganda with the purpose of establishing communist, dictatorial or racist 
regimes.”204  In addition, Article 163 of the Penal Code was repealed.  This 
Article “banned any kind of association or propaganda with the aim of 
transforming Turkey’s basis social or political order in conformity with any 
religious principles and beliefs.”205  Moreover, controversial Article 301 of 
the Turkish Penal Code was amended in 2005.  Originally, Article 301 said:   
(1) Anyone who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be punished with imprisonment 
of from six months to three years. 
(2) Anyone who publicly insults the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey, the judicial bodies of the state, the military or police shall be 
punished with imprisonment of from six months to two years. 
(3) Where a Turkish citizen denigrates Turkishness in a foreign country, 
the penalty shall be increased by one third. 
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http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004
/10/20041012.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/10/20041012.htm 
(Turk.).  
 203. Anti-Terror Law, supra note 194, art. 23. 
 204. ARIKAN, supra note 39, at 126.  
 205. Id.  
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(4) Expressions of opinion with the intention of criticism shall not incur 
punishment.206 
Following the amendment, Article 301 says:  
(1) A person who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the 
Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial bodies of the State, 
shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and 
two years. 
(2) A person who publicly denigrates the military or security structures 
shall be punishable according to the first paragraph. 
(3) Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a 
crime. 
(4) The prosecution under this article shall be subject to the approval of the 
Minister of Justice.207 
In effect, the new Article 301 reduced the term of imprisonment and 
eliminated the provision increasing the penalty by one third if denigration of 
“Turkishness” is carried out in a foreign country.  It appears that the 
government liberalized Article 301 to a certain extent.  Nevertheless, it still 
remains illegal to insult Turkey since both adults and children are being 
punished for expressing themselves through such democratic practices as 
demonstrations.   
1. Conclusion 
It is no easy task to reform an entire Constitution to align it with the 
policies of the EU.  There are major differences in philosophy, culture, and 
politics between the EU as a whole and Turkey as an individual nation.  
Aligning itself with the EU will require a transformation of principles that 
have historically guided Turkish life.  However, the aforementioned issues 
with Turkey’s legal policies require some flexibility on Turkey’s part.  
While it can be commended for its progress so far, it is doubtful that Turkey 
will be at a disadvantage if it simply agrees to recognize the Kurds, allows 
  
 206. TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE], art. 301, available at 
http://www.tuerkeiforum.net/enw/index.php/Translation_of_selected_Articles_of_the_Turkis
h_Penal_Code#Section_9:_Offences_against_Privacy. 
 207. The new Article 301 is reprinted in Bülent Algan, The Brand New Version of 
Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in 
Turkey, 9 GERMAN L. J. 2237, 2239-40 (2008).  
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them to exercise their traditions and speak their language.208  As with 
recognizing the Armenian Genocide, it will only bring Turkey closer to EU 
membership.   
IV. A COMPARISON WITH OTHER RECENTLY JOINED EU MEMBERS: 
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA  
In general, after eleven years of negotiations, Turkey has only aligned 
itself marginally with the EU, and has shown the greatest improvement in 
its economic development.209  While it can be argued that recently-joined 
EU member states were not in any better shape at the time of their accession 
than Turkey is today, a closer look shows that, in fact, they were.  While 
Turkey’s liberalized trading enables it to compete better with advanced 
nations, certain other factors, including its geographic location, political and 
judicial internal policies, as well as tense relations with its neighbors, are 
what were absent from Bulgaria and Romania.  It is important to bear in 
mind that decisions are made by representatives of countries that are 
similarly situated.210  Their decisions do not necessarily reflect what is best 
for the EU; they are based on the national interests of those who have power 
to effect policy.211  After all, intergovernmental organizations are only as 
strong as their strong member-states want them to be.212  While Romania 
and Bulgaria may be less economically-modernized than Turkey, they really 
were better candidates for EU membership than Turkey is today as 
evidenced by the EU trend of offering membership to countries that are 
predominantly Christian and share European philosophy and culture.      
  
 208. Perhaps the Turkish government is concerned that if it begins to concede, the 
Kurds will unreasonably ask for more rights.   
 209. For a comparative analysis of the economic alignment of Turkey and other 
recently joined countries, see supra Part III(e). 
 210. Those that were historically strong have the most voting power today.     
 211. For example, consider Germany and France’s reluctance to support Turkey in its 
quest for EU membership.  Germany’s opposition concerns the shift in voting power in the 
European Parliament due to Turkey’s large population, which will eventually outnumber 
Germany’s.  See Smith, supra note 86 (noting that Turkey’s large voting power in the EU 
Parliament could sway Europe’s agenda); Population at 1 January, EUROSTAT, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tab
leSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).  In 
addition, Germany is worried about immigration and the cultural dissimilarities. See Damien 
McElroy, Angela Merkel Win Ends Turkey’s EU Hopes, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 29, 
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/6244276/Angela-Merkel-
win-ends-Turkeys-EU-hopes.html.  Similarly, Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking for France, has said 
that he has “always been opposed to [Turkey’s] entry and . . . remains[s] opposed.”  See 
Charter, supra note 86.  He is concerned with Turkey’s geographic location and the potential 
of destabilization of Europe if Turkey becomes a member.  See Charlie Rose, supra note 86.  
Perhaps Bulgaria and Romania were offered membership because they did not present threats 
of this sort to powerful members.   
 212. Roger Durham, Chair & Professor of Political Science, Class Lecture at Aquinas 
College (Oct. 22, 2007). 
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One important comparison point is the level of democracy in Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Romania.  Of those three countries, only Turkey bans political 
parties.  Only in Turkey are there constitutional provisions that infringe 
upon the rights of minorities by explicitly denying them citizenship.  And 
only Turkey imprisons children because they attend demonstrations.  On a 
positive note, however, in all three nations there is a general presence of 1) 
a pluralistic government system; 2) fair elections, and 3) peaceful transfers 
of power.213   There are also similarities on the issue of minority protection:  
In both Bulgaria and Romania, there is a big problem relating to the 
treatment of the Roma population who does not receive equal protection 
from the governments.  In fact, since their accession, the Roma from both 
nations have been immigrating to Western Europe.214  Turkey’s treatment of 
the Kurds has also caught the Commission’s attention, which urges Turkey 
to provide the Kurds fundamental rights. 
With respect to individual freedoms, in 2005 the Commission identified 
Bulgaria’s freedom of expression situation as having improved.  Examples 
of this include the Bulgarian courts’ interpretation of “the law in a manner 
that favoured journalistic expression” and the absence of restrictions in the 
audio and visual media sector.215  Additionally, the Commission praised the 
Bulgarian government for its progress in the area of freedom of association.  
There was an increase in the number of non-governmental organizations 
operating in Bulgaria throughout the early 2000s.  This was also true in 
Romania.  On the issue of freedom of religion, in its 2004 Progress Report 
the Commission noted there were some issues relating to “procedural 
guidelines in the Law of Denominations” in Bulgaria, while the Romanian 
government actually did provide freedom of religion both through its 
Constitution and in practice.216  Additionally, the Commission pointed out 
that while there was some mistreatment on the part of law enforcement 
agents toward certain groups of people, including the Roma, children, 
homosexuals, and prisoners, “Romania aligned its legislation with European 
practice and standards.”217   
On the issue of human rights violations, both Bulgaria and Romania 
played a role in the Holocaust218 but both have recognized the Holocaust 
  
 213. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS, supra note 139, at 282.   
 214. The French government, however, has made their stay unwelcome.  There have 
been massive deportations of the Roma out of France. See France Faces Showdown on Roma 
at European Union Summit, BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-11323053. 
 215. Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, supra note 103, at 13. 
 216. 2004 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (2004) 
657 final (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ 
key_documents/2004/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf [hereinafter Romania 2004 Report]. 
 217. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS, supra note 139, at 290.   
 218. See generally Executive Summary:  Historical Findings and Recommendations, 
YAD VASHEM, http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/about/events/pdf/report/english/ 
EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (discussing the issue of 
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and claimed responsibility.  Turkey, in contrast, fails to recognize the 
Armenian genocide despite the existence of evidence that it did, in fact, take 
place.    
On the issue of transnational disputes, Turkey compares only to 
Romania:  There was a dispute between Romania and Ukraine involving 
Serpent Island and the Black Sea maritime boundary delimitation.219  In 
addition, “Romania . . . opposes Ukraine’s reopening of a navigation canal 
from the Danube border through Ukraine to the Black Sea.”220  Turkey’s 
transnational disputes involve Greece (over the Island of Cyprus and the 
Aegean Sea),221 Syria (over Turkish hydrological projects),222 Armenia (over 
the area of Nagorno-Karabakh),223 and Iraq (over Iraq’s support of the 
PKK).224  Bulgaria has no transnational disputes.225   
Some similarities are also found in the economic sectors.  The EU 
Commission found that Bulgaria and Romania suffered from economic 
fluctuations during the same time Turkey suffered from its economic 
crises.226  Ultimately, the Commission found their economic policies were 
on par with what the EU expected.227 
Another comparison point is the judicial systems of the three countries.  
It is true that both Bulgaria and Romania rank lower on the corruption scale 
than Turkey, but it is also true that there are widespread corruption practices 
in all three countries at all levels.  In Turkey, for example, the judicial 
branch lacks independence from political pressure, 228 reflected by the 
practice of judges reporting to the Ministry of Justice.  Prosecutors also 
  
responsibility); U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Bulgaria, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005355 (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
 219. CIA, Romania, supra note 113. See also Romania 2004 Report, supra note 216, 
at 127. The resolution of Romania’s dispute with Ukraine was not a condition of EU 
membership, however.  The dispute was resolved by the International Court of Justice in 
2009, two years after Romania’s accession.  See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea 
(Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 3). 
 220. CIA, Romania, supra note 113.   
 221. See 2010 Progress Report, supra note 9, at 37.  
 222. CIA, Turkey, supra note 113. 
 223. Status Quo of Nagorno-Karabakh is not an Option, President of European 
Commission Says, NEWS.AM (March 16, 2011), http://www.news.am/eng/news/51527.html; 
Romania 2004 Report, supra note 216, at 127; see also Amendments, supra note 100, 
amend. 201 (the EU urging Turkey “to continue its efforts towards the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabach conflict”).  
 224. See Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, at 152-53, COM 
(2004) 656 final (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf; Turkey 2009 Progress 
Report, at 86, COM (2009) 533 final (Oct. 14, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf; 2010 
Progress Report, supra note 9, at 34-35. 
 225. CIA, Bulgaria, supra note 113. 
 226. Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, supra note 103, at 18-25. 
 227. Id.  For further comparisons, see supra Part III(e). 
 228. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS, supra note 139, at 285.   
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have close connections with judges and magistrates.  In Bulgaria’s case, the 
government was able to improve its judiciary, but the Commission urged it 
to better prosecute organized crime and corruption. 229  While corruption 
presented a major setback, the government was able to make significant 
progress by 2007.230  From 1998 to 2006, the Commission rated Romania’s 
progress in reforming the judiciary as insufficient; it was only in 2006 that 
the Commission noticed some progress in this area.231 
What is apparent from these comparisons is that each potential candidate 
has its own unique problems, but what can be concluded is that the 
problems specific to Bulgaria and Romania, even collectively, do not reach 
the number and significance of Turkey’s problems.  While Turkey is 
capable of aligning itself with the EU, if the EU is really delaying the 
process because it just does not want Turkey as a member, it will find ways 
to delay membership further.232  The problems presented in this paper do not 
address all problems the EU has found with Turkey and only scratch the 
surface of the major ones.    
CONCLUSION 
Turkey needs to be recognized for the reforms it has made so far.  These 
reforms did not come easy for Turkey, a nation that is less-European, both 
culturally and historically, than any EU member today.  The EU does not 
necessarily require a candidate-nation to “Europeanize” since there are no 
religious or cultural conditions.  Instead, what it requires is what every 
nation in the twenty-first century should already have respect for those 
living within its borders, respect for human rights, a stable economy, a 
functioning legal system, and at least passable relations with its neighbors.  
These are reasonable expectations.  What is unreasonable, however, is 
member-states using their voting and veto powers to serve their own 
  
 229. Id. at 286.   
 230. Bulgaria was admitted on January 1, 2007.  Ironically, Bulgaria is the most 
corrupt country in the EU today.   See Doreen Carvajal & Stephen Castle, Mob Muscles its 
way Into Politics in Bulgaria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/world/europe/16bulgaria.html?scp=1&sq=Mob%20Mu
scles%20its%20way%20Into%20Politics%20in%20Bulgaria&st=cse; ANNUAL REPORT 2009, 
supra note 118, at 49.  
 231. See generally Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU 
Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM (2006) 549 final (Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/sept/report_bg_ro_2006_en.pdf. 
 232. It has taken Turkey longer than any other current member to become a member 
since first submitting its application.  It has been 24 years since Turkey submitted its 
application for EU membership.  Bulgaria and Romania applied in 1995 and accessed in 
2007.  The Czech Republic applied in 1996 and assessed in 2004, and Cyprus applied in 
1990 and assessed in 2004.  See European Commission, Enlargement, Negotiations, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/
eu10_bulgaria_romania/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).  These statistics 
demonstrate that the EU is taking an unreasonably long time to admit Turkey into the Union.     
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interests.  The EU’s mission is to promote peace, and with that aim in mind 
it should rationally decide whether Turkey has met the EU’s accession 
requirements.   
From Turkey’s perspective, it should weigh all the benefits of EU 
membership against the burdens of meeting the Copenhagen criteria.  But 
Turkey has not been fighting for admission for the past twenty-four years to 
just simply give up.  This shows that it is dedicated to its quest for 
admission.  The reality is, Turkey has quite a bit of domestic problems and 
transnational disputes to resolve, and has a ways to go until it reaches true 
democracy.  Until it does, the EU will be hesitant to move forward.  This 
article ends with the statement that most articles on this issue end: Turkey 
has a long road ahead.   
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“As the traveler who has once been from home is wiser than he who has 
never left his own doorstep, so a knowledge of one other culture should 
sharpen our ability to scrutinize more steadily, to appreciate more lovingly, 
our own.” –Margaret Mead 
AN INTRODUCTION TO EASTER ISLAND
A. History  
Nestled in the South Pacific nearly 2,400 miles off Chile’s west coast 
and roughly 2,500 miles East of Tahiti, Easter Island is one of the most 
remote places on Earth.1 This tiny island, called Rapa Nui (“Big Island”) by 
natives, is a mere 64 square miles in area2 and is home to approximately 
4,000 people and 7,000 wild horses.3 Originally settled in 300 A.D., the 
island was annexed by Chile in 1888 and officially declared a Chilean 
province in 19664 though natives of Easter Island are descendents of the 
Maori people5 and identify themselves as Polynesians rather than Latinos 
like their mainland countrymen.6
Although the South Pacific has long been a vacation destination, the 
landscape of Easter Island is not typical of many South Pacific islands and 
 * J.D. Candidate, Michigan State University College of Law (expected May 2012). 
B.S., Grand Valley State University (2006). I would like to acknowledge and thank my 
brother for his unwavering support and faith in me, and my mom, whom I don’t thank as 
often as I should. This article is dedicated in loving memory to my grandfather, who by his 
wisdom and kindness truly led by example.  
           1. Easter Island Crib Sheet, A Profound Journey, http://www.apj.co.uk/rapanui/ 
easter-island-fact-sheet.asp (last visited May 15, 2011) [hereinafter Crib Sheet]. 
 2. Jayne Clark, Easter Island Looks to the Future, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2007), 
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2007-01-04-easter-island_x.htm. 
 3. Will Weissert, Record Tourism Could Harm Easter Island Statues, USA
TODAY (June 24, 2008) http://www.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2008-06-24-easter-
island-moais_N.htm. 
 4. Crib Sheet, supra note 1. 
 5. The Maori are an indigenous people of New Zealand. See Maori Culture, 
VIRTUAL NEW ZEALAND, http://www.virtualoceania.net/newzealand/culture/maori/ (last 
visited July 16, 2011). 
 6. Clark, supra note 2.  
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not nearly as accessible.7 Yet Easter Island “ranks on many a traveler’s 
places-to-see-before-you-die list.”8 Travelers are lured to Easter Island by 
hundreds of giant-headed stone statues called Moai, carved from the 11th
through 17th centuries by native islanders with rudimentary basalt tools.9
Almost nine-hundred such statues exist, comprising over half of the island’s 
1,524 archaeological sites.10 Found across the island, Moai stand guarding 
ancient settlements, all facing inland except seven statues at Ahu Akivi 
which gaze out over the ocean.11 The statues are almost exclusively male,12
and each is unique.13 While the average height is 13 feet and weight 
approximately 12.5 tons,14 the largest Moai ever carved is known as “El 
Gigante” and stands 70 feet high.15 “El Gigante’s” enormous dimensions are 
perhaps why it was never removed from the quarry; the largest ever moved
measured only 30 feet and weighed 87 tons.16
Like “El Gigante,” many Moai were never transported to their final 
destinations. Over 300 can be seen in various stages of completion and 
transit amidst the bedrock of one of the island’s three extinct volcanoes.17
Locals call this area “the nursery” because it is from here that 95% of the 
stone used to carve the Moai was taken,18 but some statues were moved as 
far as 12 miles.19 Today, hundreds of Moai remain here, partially buried and 
keeping watch over the volcano.20 Visitors can still see where islanders 
carved the side of the volcano in order to move the giant statues.21
Much of the allure and intrigue surrounding Easter Island is the mystery 
of how the Moai were transported to their various locations across the 
island. Though local folklore would have visitors believe “they walked,”22 a 
more commonly-accepted theory holds the island’s palm forests were cut 
down and the logs used to roll the statues.23 Whatever the actual reason for 
 7. Id. (“The island is difficult to get to. Its landscape is not lovely in the traditional 
sense.”). 
 8. Id.
 9. Id.
 10. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 11. Id.
 12. Of the 887 Moai on Easter Island, only ten unearthed statues are believed to have 
some female characteristics. Id.
 13. Id. (“[E]ach is unique, with sizes and features—even ears, lips and torsos—that 
vary.”)  
 14. Id.
 15. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 16. Id. (emphasis added). 
 17. Id.
 18. Id.
 19. Clark, supra note 2. 
 20. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 21. Id.
 22. Clark, supra note 2. 
 23. Weissert, supra note 3. 
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the deforestation, its toll on the island is well-documented.24 With the 
removal of the trees came devastating tribal warfare, increasingly scarce 
resources, eventual cannibalism, and finally the toppling of many of the 
Moai altars.25 It is also shortly after this time that the carving of Moai and 
the erection of new altars ceased.26 The mysterious end to the Moai-building 
era and its place in the Island’s history remain popular topics of academic 
publication and speculation. 
Although deforestation, tribal warfare, and cannibalism did not fully 
eradicate the Rapa Nui population, much of Easter Island’s population that 
did survive was eventually wiped out by slave raids and disease.27 In the 
1860s, slave raids removed many of Easter Island’s inhabitants, and most 
would never return.28 Those who did return brought smallpox and, as a 
result, the number of native inhabitants had dwindled to 110 by the 1870s.29
B. Tourist Economy 
The mysterious statues and near tragic history of the Rapa Nui people 
have drawn travelers to Easter Island for decades, but interest in the island 
saw a dramatic increase when Rapa Nui National Park, which covers 60 
percent of the island, was designated a UNESCO30 World Heritage Site in 
1995.31 Each year, more and more people venture to this remote corner of 
the Earth to experience this unique and mysterious culture. In the 1990s, 
supply ships arrived at Easter Island only once per year; now they do so 
every 40 days.32 Estimates place the number of visitors to the island in 2006 
at 52,000—almost ten times the annual visitors in the 1990s.33 This increase 
in visitors has had a positive impact on the island: with increased tourism 
came increased tourist spending, and now the island “depends largely on the 
hoardes of tourists who flock to visit its archaeological sites and 
monumental Polynesian statues each year.”34
 24. See, e.g., Weissert, supra note 3; Crib Sheet, supra note 1; Whitney Dangerfield, 
The Mystery of Easter Island, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Apr. 1, 2007), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/The_Mystery_of_Easter_Island.html; 
JENNIFER VANDERBES, EASTER ISLAND (2003); JO ANNE VAN TILBURG, EASTER ISLAND:
ARCHAEOLOGY, ECOLOGY AND CULTURE (1994). 
 25. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 26. Crib Sheet, supra note 1. 
 27. Clark, supra note 2. 
 28. Id.
 29. Id.
 30. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. For further 
information, see http://www.unesco.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
 31. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 32. Clark, supra note 2. 
 33. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 34. Natalie Muller, Sustainable Tourism Projected for Chile’s Easter Islands,
MERCOPRESS (June 27, 2009), http://en.mercopress.com/2009/06/27/sustainable-tourism-
projected-for-chiles-easter-islands. 
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The tourism boom also created a demand for increased tourist 
accommodations. Since by law only Rapa Nui people can own land,35
outside entrepreneurs must partner with local land owners on development 
projects, creating a direct revenue stream to the native population. In 2008, 
a local dive-shop owner partnered with Santiago, Chile-based hotel 
company Explora to build the island’s first “upscale lodging” on his land.36
In addition to more hotels and resorts, there were plans to build an art 
museum and school of archaeology—firsts for the island—and a “guide 
school to formally educate islanders in the richness of the 16,000 [sic] 
archaeological sites.”37
I. MASS TOURISM AND THE WORLD’S HERITAGE
A. The “Catch-22” 
As the largest industry in the world, tourism, particularly “cultural 
tourism,” brings countless economic benefits but also can threaten the more 
fragile sites.38 Today, the Moai are threatened by both tangible and 
intangible enemies. They face many environmental predators39 and “a host 
of natural enemies” including the “sun, surf, winds and humidity . . . blights, 
lichen and moss.”40 When these are combined with the negative effects of 
an increased human presence,41 it seems the Moai may be in graver danger 
than previously acknowledged.42 The local population has not remained 
silent as the strain on the island increased, but the Rapa Nui people have not 
exactly been heard either; any opposition has been met with rough 
resistance rather than the sought-after policy reform.43 These protests 
 35. Clark, supra note 2. 
 36. Id.
 37. Id.
 38. Henry Cleere, The World Heritage Convention in the Third World, in CULTURAL 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 99, 104 (Francis P. McManamon & 
Alf Hatton eds., 2000). 
 39. According to Hanga Roa’s Mayor, Pedro Edmunds, there are “54 types of blights 
feast on Moais.” Weissert, supra note 3.  
 40. Id.
 41. See, e.g., id. (“Most tourists are careful not to harm Moais, but some 
unknowingly walk or climb on them, exacerbating natural deterioration. Others deface them 
deliberately, including a Finnish tourist who was fined $17,000 after hacking an ear lobe off 
[a] statue.”). 
 42. Id. (“‘More tourism, more deterioration. More visitors, more loss’” observed one 
archaeologist. “‘We are at the point where, either we protect what we have or we lose it.’”). 
 43. See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40126, CHILE: POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND U.S. RELATIONS (2011).  
Frustrated by the lack of government response to their concerns, some Rapa Nui activists 
have engaged in land occupations. In August 2009, a Rapa Nui group blocked the airport for 
two days to demand greater immigration controls. Conflict erupted again in March 2010, 
when locals learned that the individual President Piñera appointed as governor of the 
territory had reportedly received his position as a result of his ties to a business group with 
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expressed legitimate concerns: projections indicate increased visitors will 
eventually overwhelm the existing waste management and water sanitation 
systems and, left unchecked, the development will be unsustainable.44 These 
so-called “congestion costs” caused by overcrowding may result in physical 
damage to the heritage sites.45 Tragically, these dangers are not unique to 
Easter Island.46
The world’s heritage is under siege from cultural tourism.47 Many factors 
have contributed to the destruction of some of the world’s heritage and the 
endangerment of the rest, not the least of which is mass cultural tourism.48
“‘[C]ultural tourism’ in its broad mass-tourism sense means large numbers 
of people, a matter of particular concern to superstar attractions such as . . . 
heritage locations, which have to deal with the pressures of visitor numbers 
on a daily basis.”49 This “mass tourism” can create “adverse cultural 
consequences . . . when the cultural integrity of a site or community is 
threatened by a flood of visitors.”50
Many world heritage sites face a similar “Catch-22” to that of Easter 
Island: more tourists bring more revenue which enables greater preservation 
efforts, but the increased tourism bringing the revenue is the source of the 
threat creating the need for protection and preservation, and the best way to 
reduce the threat may be to reduce the tourists. The vicious cycle of 
destruction to the world’s heritage created by mass tourism almost seems a 
necessary evil: “[f]or many heritage sites and attractions, tourism is virtually 
intentions to acquire land the Rapa Nui had ceded to the government for public purposes. 
Since then, Rapa Nui activists have occupied lands and taken over buildings, demanding 
stricter immigration controls, the return of their ancestral lands, and a stronger role in 
governance. In February 2011, a number of Rapa Nui activists were injured when police 
forcibly removed them from a hotel that they had been occupying.  
Id. at 9. (footnotes omitted) 
 44. Impacts of Tourism on Easter Island, EASTER ISLAND FOUND.,
http://islandheritage.org/wordpress/?page_id=58 (last visited May 15, 2011) [hereinafter 
Impacts of Tourism]. 
 45. DAVID THROSBY, THE ECONOMICS OF CULTURAL POLICY 151 (2010). 
 46. Many other countries face similar tourist-overcrowding issues. See Tracy 
McVeigh, Tourist Hoardes Told to Stay Away from World Heritage Sites by the Locals, THE 
OBSERVER (London) (Sept. 5, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/sep/06/mass-tourism-environmental-damage.  
 47. Throsby, supra note 45, at 146 (“The term cultural tourism is used to relate to 
both aspects of tourist activity.” Id. “Mass tourism, characterized in business terms as being a 
high-volume low-yield operation, and niche tourism, referring to tourism products that cater 
to small numbers of discriminating tourists with high revenue yield per person.” Id.)
(emphasis in original). 
 48. CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 224 (2010) (“[H]eritage was threatened in a great number of ways[;] . . . 
increasing urbanization, industrialization, social and economic upheaval, pollution and 
climate change were all contributing to the decay, degradation and destruction of this ‘world 
heritage’.”).  
 49. Throsby, supra note 45, at 146. 
 50. Id.
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their only source of revenue; thus investment in restoration, conservation, 
etc., is heavily dependent on future income streams from this source.”51
There are different theories as to why cultural tourism became such a 
global phenomenon. One scholar credits increased living standards and 
education levels for “permitt[ing] a substantial portion of the population not 
only to visit but also to enjoy what other countries and their past ha[ve] to 
offer.”52 Whatever the source of tourists’ interest in world heritage, 
“excessive commercialisation of cultural property” must be addressed 
because “the preservation of the cultural goods themselves must always 
prevail over their exploitation.”53 Recognizing the heritage dichotomy, 
scholars and economists alike now acknowledge the “dangers of over 
visitation of particular places” and how it is “more than a challenge to . . . 
respond adequately and preserve” threatened cultural heritage sites.54 So 
how can we approach cultural preservation to effectively convey the 
dangers to heritage sites and gain additional support? 
B. The People’s Right to Heritage 
Cultural heritage has already garnered attention from those who believe 
it should be recognized and protected as a fundamental right under 
international law. One scholar proposes it is the “notion of inheritance” 
which serves as the foundation of cultural heritage: “[a]ll that we are is an 
expression of the culture we inherited . . . [i]t is this notion of inheritance, of 
receiving something from one generation and possibly passing it on to the 
next which intuitively underpins the notion of cultural heritage.”55 Similarly, 
there does appear to be a recognition of the “‘human right’ to culture”56 and 
the acknowledgement by governments they “have a responsibility for the 
social and cultural well-being of society.”57 International texts and 
agreements speak of rights to “benefit from the cultural heritage[,] 
contribute towards its enrichment” and to “exercise[] the right to cultural 
heritage.”58
 51. Id. at 149. 
 52. UGO MIFSUD BONNICI, AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 58 
(2008). 
 53. Id. at 57. 
 54. Id. at 58. 
 55. Forrest, supra note 48, at 7. 
 56. BONNICI, supra note 52, at 26 (“Articles 22 and 27 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 and article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as article 15 of the Covenant on, [sic] Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
clearly point towards recognition of this right.”). 
 57. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 33. 
 58. BONNICI, supra note 52, at 29. 
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Despite their recognition in international agreements as “basic elements 
of civilization and national culture,”59 cultural rights may be the “most 
neglected category of human rights.”60 This is particularly true with respect 
to indigenous peoples61 such as the Rapa Nui of Easter Island. In this 
context, preserving their culture is key to their fundamental rights.62 There is 
a “powerful movement [] underway to secure a safe anchorage of 
[indigenous peoples’] rights to international law. These rights are largely 
cultural, in so far as they tend to guarantee the survival of the language, 
religion . . . and distinct way of life.”63
Though many visitors to Easter Island undoubtedly come to see the 
Moai, others come for a more comprehensive cultural experience. One 
scholar attributes “[m]uch of the significance of Rapa Nui . . . not to the 
remarkable statues but rather to the extraordinary remains of the way of life 
of the early Polynesian settlers.”64 Ensuring the survival of the Moai as 
remnants of ancient traditions, religious beliefs, and other cultural practices 
of the Rapa Nui people would seem a necessary and basic human right 
entitled to protection under international law. Merely preserving access to 
sites for indigenous people may not be enough, however—ensuring some 
local control over, or at least participation in, the preservation process may 
be “an essential condition for the enjoyment of their internationally 
recognized cultural rights.”65
II. EASTER ISLAND PRESERVATION EFFORTS
A. Preserving the Moai & the Emergence of Sustainable Tourism on 
Easter Island 
There have already been restoration and conservation efforts 
implemented on Easter Island. About 50 Moai have been restored at 11 
 59. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, pmbl., Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231; 
See JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY? MUSEUMS AND THE BATTLE OVER OUR ANCIENT 
HERITAGE 26 (2008). 
 60. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, in CULTURAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS 41, 41 (Franscisco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008). 
 61. Federico Lenzerini, Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights and the Controversy 
over Commercial Use of Their Traditional Knowledge, in CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 119, 
127 (Franscisco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008).  
 62. “Indeed, preservation of the cultural identity of peoples represents the central 
element and simultaneously the very ratio of the protection of cultural rights. The cultural 
identity of any human being is, in fact, shaped by the collective cultural context to which 
he/she belongs.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 63. Francesco Francioni, Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction, in 
CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 5 (Franscisco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008). 
 64. Cleere, supra note 38, at 103. 
 65. FORREST, supra note 48, at 141. 
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sites,66 but the restoration efforts have only hastened their deterioration:67
“[r]epairing and replacing Moais upright can cause them to deteriorate 
faster since they are more exposed than statues that remain face down and 
buried.”68  Though some preservation efforts have accelerated deterioration, 
others yielded promising results: in 2003, five Moai were treated with a 
sealant to protect against humidity and lichen.69 Although early results of 
the treatment were positive, it was simply too expensive for widespread 
use.70
In 2009, the Chilean government and UNESCO developed a plan for 
sustainable tourism on Easter Island.71 The plan “aim[ed] to develop tourism 
strategies that respect the outstanding universal value of the Rapa Nui 
National Park” by “promot[ing] training and involvement of the local 
communities . . . in sustainable ecotourism.”72 Entitled “Training in 
Sustainable Ecotourism in Easter Island,” the plan was implemented during 
the second half of 2009 thanks to a large grant by the Government of Japan 
and supported by a U.S. contribution of $200,000.73 According to 
UNESCO, “[t]he initiative aim[ed] to enable participants74 to acquire the 
skills they need for the island’s natural and cultural resource 
management.”75 UNESCO officials believe that by balancing the need for 
heritage preservation with that of community development the program will 
be able to successfully reduce the negative impact of tourism.76
Another preservation project which hoped to reduce the strain on the 
island’s fragile ecosystem began in 2009.77 This project, known as the 
“Integral Management of Tourist Destination Easter Island,” was financed 
by InnovaChile78 and introduced by the EuroChile Business Foundation79
 66. Clark, supra note 2. 
 67. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. Id. Preservation estimates are “well into the millions.” Clark, supra note 2. 
 71. UN and Chile Launch Sustainable Tourism Initiative for Easter Island, UN
NEWS SERVICE (May 29, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=30958 
[hereinafter Sustainable Tourism Initiative]. 
 72. Id.
 73. UNESCO Sets in Motion Easter Island Eco-tourism Training Program, 
UNESCO (December 6, 2009), http://portal.unesco.org/geography/en/ev.php-URL_ 
ID=11376&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [hereinafter Eco-tourism]. 
 74. The program will benefit “institutions, businesses and individuals who have 
involvement in the island’s tourist trade.” Id.
 75. Id.
 76. Eco-tourism, supra note 73. 
 77. Muller, supra note 34. 
 78. InnovaChile is an initiative that supports research in science and technology as 
well as entrepreneurship. See https://csrg.inf.utfsm.cl/twiki4/bin/view/ACS/Innova-Chile 
(last visited July 16, 2011). 
 79. The EuroChile Business Foundation is the Chilean branch of the Enterprise 
Europe Network, an organization dedicated to the advancement and foreign expansion of 
businesses.  See Gateway to the World for Small Business, ENTERPRISE & INDUSTRY ONLINE 
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and seeks to benefit as many as 289 of the island’s small tourism 
businesses.80 The program was implemented as a coordinated effort between 
the Easter Island Tourism Board, Easter Island’s Provincial Government, 
and other organizations.81 Similarly, additional efforts have focused on the 
island’s limited resources and how they are affected by increased tourism. 
International Help Fund Australia82 has been “working to alleviate some of 
the[] pressures on Easter Island by promoting recycling and composting 
programs, water sanitation projects and installing composting toilets at the 
most heavily-visited sites.”83 Since this and other restoration efforts were 
only recently implemented, their long-term successes or failures have yet to 
be determined. 
III. DEVELOPING NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD CULTURAL PRESERVATION
A. Proposed Reformation of Chilean Cultural Policy: Economic 
Approaches to Cultural Heritage 
Despite the efforts of international relief organizations, the threats to the 
Moai of Easter Island continue. As one scholar points out, “no matter how 
unobtrusive the tourist tries to be, some adverse impact may be inevitable, 
pointing to a need for careful planning and management of tourism projects 
in indigenous areas.”84 Mass tourism affects every aspect of “cultural 
enterprise” and “brings with it enormous economic potential.”85 The trend 
toward an emphasis on the economic potential of cultural heritage86
suggests this as a logical focal point for the reform and development of 
cultural heritage policy. First, the host nation must recognize the economic 
value of the heritage site and should determine which theory of cultural 
policy as it relates to economics is best suited for that particular country.87
Developing a domestic economic-based cultural policy begins with 
applying basic economic concepts such as supply and demand to the 
national heritage sites.  
MAGAZINE (Aug. 26, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/magazine/articles/smes-
entrepreneurship/article_10558_en.htm. 
 80. Muller, supra note 34. 
 81. Id.
 82. International Help Fund Australia is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization 
whose mission is “[t]o collaborate with Pacific Islanders, governments, and businesses to 
improve the quality of life by developing practical environmental management initiatives as 
well as economic, cultural, health and education programs and projects that promote 
ecologically sustainable development and self reliance.” Who We Are, INT’L HELP FUND 
AUSTL., http://www.internationalhelpfund.org/ (last visited July 16, 2011). 
 83. Impacts of Tourism, supra note 44. 
 84. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 153. 
 85. Id. at 151. 
 86. Id. at x.  
 87. Id.
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1. Determining the Value of Cultural Heritage 
Items of cultural heritage such as monuments and archaeological sites 
must first be identified as an asset having value.88 Determining the value of 
heritage is important because the “consumption behavior of individuals is 
motivated by the value they attach to the goods and services they consume . 
. . and value to society at large guides . . . the decisions of government.”89
Although there are “[f]our sources of cultural value [that] can be 
identified,”90  this paper focuses on the value derived from the 
“consumption” of cultural heritage and its “preservation and continuity.”91
2. Attributing a “Direct Use” Value  
Attributing value to cultural heritage can be achieved through the process 
of “valuation,” also known as “evaluation.”92 This process should 
“underlie[] consideration of policy in any area of public concern”  but will 
be specifically discussed as applied to cultural heritage policy.93 In his book 
“The Economics of Cultural Policy,” David Throsby argues that a “full 
assessment of the economic value must account both for the direct use value 
as revealed in the markets for cultural goods and services, and the non-use 
value as estimated by alternative analytical procedures.”94 This “use value” 
of cultural heritage is identified as “the value that accrues to individuals, 
households or firms through the direct consumption of heritage services.”95
One type of use value of particular interest to monuments and cultural 
heritage sites is that of their “direct use value,” which Throsby identifies as 
“accru[ing] to tourists visiting heritage sites” whose “relevant value can be 
measured by entrance fees, or . . . by travel-cost analysis.”96 In other words, 
a particular cultural heritage item’s value may be measured based on how 
much people are willing to pay to access the site.97 As of July 2011, 
 88. Id. at 107. 
 89. Id. at 17. 
 90. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 42. The four sources of cultural value identified by 
Throsby are: “arts production and consumption; cultural identity and symbolism; cultural 
diversity; and cultural preservation and continuity.” Id.
 91. Id.
 92. Id. at 17. “The process by which value is assigned to something is referred to as 
valuation or evaluation, described . . . as the process of ‘estimating, ascribing, modifying, 
affirming and even denying value.’” Id. (emphasis in original). The word “valorization” is 
also used occasionally and refers to “a process by which value is imparted to some object as 
a result of deliberative action or external event, such as the increase in value accorded to sites 
of cultural heritage when they are added to the World Heritage List.” Id. (emphasis in 
original).  
 93. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 17.
 94. Id. at 20. 
 95. Id. at 109. 
 96. Id.
 97. Id. at 19. 
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accommodations alone on Easter Island cost several thousands of dollars, 
while flights to Easter Island from the United States cost thousands more.98
Another way the value of a cultural heritage site might be established is 
to determine the characteristics of that particular site and how they 
contribute to its value. Ascribing economic value to a monument or site 
“requires a recognition of the fact that such goods fall into the category of 
mixed goods, i.e., goods that have both private-good and public-good 
characteristics.”99 These characteristics can help determine the value of 
cultural heritage as an asset, but a comprehensive valuation requires an 
examination of “non-market benefits” as well.100 Throsby identifies three 
“sources” of these non-market benefits as they relate to cultural heritage: 
existence value,101 option value,102 and bequest value,103 collectively known 
as “non-use values.”104 He argues that all three of these sources must be 
addressed to establish an accurate economic value.105
3. The Difficulty With Economic Measurement 
Though Throsby suggests that a way to measure these values is to 
determine how much people are willing to pay to access the site from which 
they will derive these value benefits,106 the exact value of cultural heritage 
can be hard to measure. Part of the difficulty in measuring the value of 
cultural heritage is due to the fact that sites “yield cultural value in addition 
to whatever commercial value they may possess, and that this cultural value 
may not be fully measurable in monetary terms.”107 Considering the diverse 
 98. A check of the Explora website listed single accommodation rates ranging from 
$3,360 to $4,800 U.S. for three nights, which includes roundtrip airport transfers, three meals 
per day, as well as daily island explorations. See http://www.explora.com/explora-rapa-
nui/rates-and-conditions/ (last visited July 16, 2011). Sample airfare found on the popular 
travel website Kayak.com listed the cheapest roundtrip airfare from Chicago to Easter Island 
at $1,570 per person on LAN Airlines (fare found July 16, 2011 on www.kayak.com with 
sample travel dates in August 2011 chosen at random). 
 99. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 19 (emphasis in original). Public goods are described 
by Throsby as “those whose benefits accrue to everyone in a given community,” while 
private goods are “those whose benefits accrue entirely to private agents.” Id.
 100. Id.
 101. Existence value refers to the value that people attribute to the arts “simply 
because they exist.” Id.
 102. Option value refers to peoples’ retention of the option to “consume the arts at 
some time in the future.” Id.
 103. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 19 (emphasis in original). Bequest value refers to the 
belief that “it is important to pass the arts on to future generations.” Id.
 104. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original). 
 105. Id. at 19. 
 106. Id.
 107. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). “In other words, cultural goods and services are 
valued . . . for social and cultural reasons that are likely to complement or transcend a purely 
economic evaluation. These reasons might include spiritual concerns, aesthetic 
considerations, or the contribution of the goods and services to community understanding of 
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benefits heritage sites can bring, Throsby ultimately recognizes that 
“[i]dentifying cultural value is one thing, measuring it is another” and 
acknowledges that “it is hard to see how the value of identity can be 
expressed in financial terms at all.”108
4. Maximizing the Value of Cultural Heritage 
Once a host nation assesses a value to its cultural heritage, it must focus 
on maximizing that value while simultaneously preserving and conserving 
the sites themselves.  One such way to maximize the value yet minimize the 
effects of mass tourism might be to establish a “threshold carrying 
capacity.”109 This involves identifying the maximum number of tourists in a 
given period—per day, per month, etc.—that a monument or heritage site 
can sustain without becoming at risk.110 This “threshold carrying capacity” 
concept is already in use for other types of endangered areas111 and could 
likely be implemented as part of a cultural heritage preservation policy with 
relative ease.112 Many administrators that already implement a threshold 
carrying capacity do so by simply imposing “quantitative controls” on the 
admission to sites.113  The only real foreseeable difficulty that may arise is 
in determining the particular threshold for each heritage site.114 Leaving the 
threshold number too low may cost the island’s businesses valuable tourism 
revenue. On the other hand, setting the threshold number too high will 
inevitably result in continued exploitation and endangerment of the site.  
5. Cultural Heritage as a Commodity 
Other scholars suggest effective cultural heritage preservation can be 
achieved by viewing heritage as a commodity. In his book “International 
Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage,” Craig Forrest states that 
“[a]ny cultural heritage, irrespective of its origin, may be considered as 
cultural identity” Id. “Cultural value in this context is a multifaceted concept reflecting 
qualities such as the aesthetic, symbolic, spiritual or historical values attaching to a particular 
item.” THROSBY, supra note 45, at 20. 
 108. Id.
 109. Id. at 152. 
 110. Id.
 111. “The concept has been used in connection with natural heritage sites such as 
national parks, coral reefs, [and] wilderness areas.” Id.
 112. Id.
 113. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 152. 
 114. Id.
Local and national governments that are keen to exploit the economic potential of the mass 
tourism market will frequently engage the cultural sector as one of the drawcards for 
attracting visitors, but in doing so they need to be aware of both the positive and negative 
impacts that exposure to mass tourism can bring for individual businesses in the arts and 
cultural industries. 
Id.
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being of value to the State, who directly benefits from its presence as a 
tourist attraction.”115 Forrest’s approach highlights a different perspective on 
cultural heritage: since heritage is viewed as having several types of 
economic value,116 its increasing relevance in the public policy sphere can 
lead to the “commodification of heritage.”117 The process of commodifying 
cultural heritage “involves the re-interpretation and packaging of existing 
heritage resources as new heritage products to be used by contemporary 
society and which in most cases produces direct economic benefits.”118
In fact, it “may be possible to raise particular goods to a level above that 
of a commodity when those goods are considered of such importance that 
they are ‘priceless’ and not susceptible to exchange.”119 Elevating cultural 
heritage beyond a commodity can also add legal value to the site.120 The 
attribution of legal value in turn further “elevat[es] this selected material 
above other material”121 and the “development of legal protection regimes 
has acted to then reinforce and bolster . . . cultural heritage management in 
general.”122 Despite this elevation and the increasing importance of cultural 
heritage relative to other industries,123 Forrest cautions against the liability 
of elevating cultural heritage beyond the level of a commodity: “attempt[s] 
to ‘protect’ cultural heritage by its elevation to a legal position above that of 
a commodity . . . only results in [the] market going underground.”124 From 
this perspective, overprotection of cultural heritage appears potentially as 
hazardous to the monuments and heritage sites as under-protection.  
6. The “Urbanization” of Easter Island
Whether viewed as an asset having value, a basic commodity, or 
something elevated triggering increased legal protection, a common theme 
among the discussions of cultural policy economists is the application of 
basic economic principles to cultural heritage policies. Although 
specifically focused on urban conservation and planning as they relate to 
cultural heritage, many of the principles outlined by scholars Harry 
 115. FORREST, supra note 48, at 7.  
 116. “These objects are not only economically valued in terms of the direct price paid 
for their acquisition, but also in terms of insurance premiums and evaluations, taxation 
values and security costs.” Id.
 117. Id.
 118. Id.
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. Id. at 18. 
 121. Forrest, supra note 48, at 18.  
 122. Id. at 19.  
 123. “[C]ultural heritage is no longer a burden to national budgets but an important 
industry both in itself and to other industries, such as biomedicine, sustainable agriculture 
and international tourism.” Id. at 7. 
 124. “The protection of cultural heritage in this way has led to a black market of a 
billion dollars.” Id at 6. 
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Coccossis and Peter Nijkamp are equally applicable to conservation and 
planning strategies in less-urbanized settings such as Easter Island.125
Coccossis and Nijkamp emphasize the importance of recognizing that 
cultural heritage “as with most artifacts [goes] through a long-term life 
cycle in terms of physical condition and quality. Then society has to face 
the choice between development and conservation.”126
The increased tourist interest in Easter Island has led to the recent 
construction of resorts, schools, and museums mentioned previously in this 
paper.127 This expansive development in the tourist sector could be viewed 
as one type of “urbanization” of Easter Island. Like Throsby, Coccossis and 
Nijkamp recognize the potentially devastating effects of increased 
development: “[w]hile it is generally acknowledged that urban development 
means the creation of new assets in terms of physical, social and economic 
structures, it is at the same time recognized that each development process 
often also destroys traditional physical, social and cultural assets derived 
from our common heritage.”128 Although monuments and other sites do in 
fact “represent part of the historical, architectural, and cultural heritage,” 
aside from tourist revenues they “do not usually offer a direct productive 
contribution to the economy.”129 These competing interests may require that 
a different sort of economic policy be applied to heritage. 
7. Assessing the Chosen Economic Strategy 
In order to weigh the value of monuments and sites and their influence 
on cultural heritage, Coccossis and Nijkamp advocate for the use of “impact 
assessments.”130 Also referred to as “impact analyses,” Coccossis and 
Nijkamp identify these as a “necessary component of any meaningful 
economic evaluation methodology.”131 In order to perform an effective 
impact analysis, a host nation must consider not only multiple criteria 
surrounding cultural heritage, but “all relevant consequences of all feasible 
alternatives.”132 This allows the nation to determine which policy is best 
suited for the specific heritage sites located within its boundaries as well as 
identify the reasons why other policies may not be the best fit.  
 125. See H. Coccossis & P. Nijkamp, Urban Conservation and Planning, in
PLANNING FOR OUR CULTURAL HERITAGE (Harry Coccossis & Peter Nijkamp eds., 1995).  
 126. Id. at 3. 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 128. Coccossis & Nijkamp, supra note 125, at 4. 
 129. Id.
 130. Id. at 6. 
 131. Id. at 8. 
 132. Id. at 13. 
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At the heart of the “multi-dimensional nature of a compound evaluation 
of the cultural built heritage”133 is the “need for an integrated cultural and 
functional economic urban development strategy, in which economic, 
social, architectural, and historical aspects” are addressed.134 The form of 
multi-dimensional theory advocated by Lichfield, which is perhaps best 
applied to Easter Island development, is the “community impact 
evaluation,” a modification of the traditional Cost Benefit Analysis.135 Using 
a “community impact evaluation” method of Impact Analysis allows the 
host nation to focus on both the economic impact of development and “all 
impacts affecting the welfare of that community, thus also embracing social, 
natural environment, hazard, etc.”136 When determining the impact of 
development on individual sites and monuments, the value of that particular 
site or monument must be considered. Each site’s value is based on many 
factors,137 and using this “multiple criteria analysis” demonstrates the site’s 
value “not only in the case of ‘hard’ (cardinal) information, but also in the 
case of ‘soft’ (qualitative) information.”138
8. Implementation of the Reformed Policy 
Once a site has been valued and its impact upon the heritage is analyzed, 
the host nation must devise and implement policies for cultural resource 
management that will ensure preservation of the heritage. First, the host 
nation should consider “why the resource has been set aside for special 
treatment, its nature and significance, and the contemporary setting of the 
site.”139 Next, “[o]nce the decision is made to manage a resource actively, a 
management plan should be prepared that documents the rationale for the 
treatment and describes in detail how the management is to be 
 133. N. Lichfield, Community Impact Analysis for the Cultural Built Heritage, in 
PLANNING FOR OUR CULTURAL HERITAGE 39, 46 (Harry Coccossis & Peter Nijkamp eds., 
1995). “Cultural Built Heritage” or “CBH” is defined as “that quantitatively minor part of the 
built environment which the contemporary generation resolves has cultural value, and 
accordingly merits special protection from erosion, in order that it can be better enjoyed by 
the current generation and passed on to the future.” Id. at 39. 
 134. Coccossis & Nijkamp, supra note 125, at 13. 
 135. Lichfield, supra note 133, at 46. 
 136. Id. at 47. “[T]he community in question is defined in relation to the extent (in 
geography and time) of the impact which is under consideration. In conservation this could 
range from the quite local (where the monument or site has only village value) to the 
international (where a world heritage site is concerned).” Id.
 137. Coccossis & Nijkamp, supra note 125, at 13. “Its value for society is determined 
by various attributes such as age, uniqueness, artistic value, style period, integration in urban 
structure, and economic revenues.” Id.
 138. Id.
 139. Francis P. McManamon & Alf Hatton, Introduction: Considering Cultural 
Resource Management in Modern Society, in CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 1, 8 (McManamon & Hatton eds., 2000). 
2011] The Little Island that Could 165
implemented.”140 The final step toward “[e]ffective management of cultural 
resources requires decisions about how the resources can be best protected, 
preserved, utilized and interpreted.”141
Some argue that modern cultural resource management extends beyond 
archaeological resources to the management of all culture-related activities 
at all levels of government.142 Of course, the specific culture-related activity 
with which this paper is concerned is that of cultural tourism. The cultural 
tourism phenomenon “has developed a distinct section within its broader 
sphere of interest which deals with the management of travel, access to, 
marketing and interpretation of heritage sites.”143 In light of the growing 
mass tourism industry, modern cultural resource management recognizes 
that managing large scale visitation to cultural sites has become increasingly 
important in the effective management of those sites.144
9. Local versus National Policy Management 
The ultimate objective of modern cultural resource management is to 
minimize “[t]he impacts of the visitors . . . while enhancing visitor 
experiences.”145 Scholars Francis P. McManamon and Alf Hatton contend 
that while cultural resource management must be implemented locally, it 
must also have strong national legal and financial support.146 Effective 
cultural resource management, they argue, must not only clearly define 
what the cultural resources are, but also consist of a minimum degree of 
national intent to preserve the heritage, political support, and agency 
cooperation.147 McManamon and Hatton also advocate the unification of 
cultural resources policy with as many other public policy objectives as 
possible to create a stronger, heritage-oriented policy.148 Simply aligning the 
 140. Id.
 141. Id.
 142. “[A]ll the activities covered by the various terms include both policy making at 
local, regional, national and international levels of government, as well as the day-to-day 
business of managing both the organizations that administer ‘heritage’ and the cultural 
resources themselves.” Id. at 3. 
 143. Id. at 5. 
 144. Id.
 145. McManamon & Hatton, supra note 139, at 5. “The visitor experience must be 
accomplished in such a manner and by such means as will leave the primary resources 
unimpaired for the continued enjoyment and multiple experience use of future generations.” 
Id.
 146. Id. at 6. 
 147. Id. at 6-7. 
 148. “The greater the number of other interests, such as housing, revenues, pipelines, 
etc., that can be required to take into account the protection and preservation of cultural 
resources as part of their activities, the stronger will be the public policy for cultural 
resources. . . . Likewise, the wider the range of circumstances in which the protection and 
preservation of cultural heritage sites must be considered, the stronger will be the public 
policy.” Id. at 7. 
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policies won’t be enough: “[u]nless equal consideration or priority is given 
to cultural resource protection and preservation as a result of public policy, 
the policy is not effective.”149
10. Agency Cooperation 
Agency cooperation may also be one factor in determining the success or 
failure of cultural resource management. McManamon and Hatton argue 
that “[m]inistries responsible for heritage preservation and those responsible 
for economic development, tourism, law enforcement and other related 
areas must work cooperatively” to ensure the cultural resource management 
policies are “implemented forcefully and diligently.”150 Similarly, and 
perhaps the most vital aspect of public policy as it relates to cultural 
resource management, is public involvement: “[l]ocal attitudes about 
preservation of historic structures is recognized as a key aspect for the 
preservation of these kinds of cultural resources.”151 Local involvement, 
both political and community-based, is essential for the success of cultural 
resource management policy.152
11. Community Support for Preservation 
In fact, McManamon and Hatton emphasize the importance of local 
support: “[c]ommunities residing near or among the locations of cultural 
resources have important, sometimes critical, influences on the protection 
and preservation of these resources.”153 Perhaps the best way to garner local 
public support is to portray the cultural heritage as a thing of value and 
source of not only economic revenue but community pride, as well as 
cultural resources as “precious things to be preserved, protected and 
interpreted.”154 The local community could also be persuaded to “envision 
the resources as linked personally or culturally to them and as resources . . . 
that are to be protected as part of their community’s heritage”155 by creating 
a sense of community identity.156
 149. Id.
 150. McManamon & Hatton, supra note 139, at 7.
 151. Id. at 11. 
 152. Id. at 10. “The actions of local officials and local communities increasingly are of 
importance in cultural resource preservation, protection and interpretation.” Id.
 153. Id. For specific discussions of how local populations have responded to threats to 
their cultural heritage, see McVeigh, supra note 46.  
 154. McManamon & Hatton, supra note 139, at 12. 
 155. Id. at 11. 
 156. Id. at 12. “Opportunities for local communities to learn about cultural resources 
and how they are studied and preserved, help to maintain a constituency that will support 
these activities, even to build larger and stronger public support.” Id.
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McManamon and Hatton suggest four methods to “develop supportive 
local preservation attitudes and actions”: education,157 development 
controls,158  integration,159  and “partnerships in resource stewardship.”160
While each of these methods plays an important role in local cultural 
heritage preservation, education is perhaps the best way to ensure local 
support for cultural heritage management. In fact, leaders in cultural 
heritage management and many related fields “have embraced public 
education and outreach as an important tool for preservation.”161 While 
information specific to the local community and its heritage are important, 
public education initiatives should also focus on “general points related to 
the value of cultural resources, the care that must be used when studying or 
treating or using these resources, and the often fragile, sometimes non-
renewable, nature of cultural resources.”162
Once the local public has been educated in their heritage and the 
importance of its preservation, the next step is to involve local citizens in 
the actual process of preservation. As McManamon and Hatton point out, 
locals are “among the most effective means of working for the protection of 
sites in local development schemes and land use plans.”163 After the public 
has been educated and involved in the preservation process, the cultural 
heritage preservation efforts should become assimilated or “integrated” into 
overall local development plans. Viewing preservation as separate and 
distinct from the entire community development may make it more difficult 
to see it as an integral part of the whole. Ultimately, “archaeological sites 
should be considered and incorporated into the overall cultural resource 
protection and preservation programme of a nation rather than as distinct 
from . . . other kinds of cultural resources.”164 Perhaps the most valuable 
result of public education and integration into the preservation process, 
coupled with the cooperation of local and national agencies, is the ability of 
the local community to see the fruits of its labor. Whether it results in the 
preservation of a monument or heritage site or the conservation of natural 
cultural resources, local citizens and communities can see tangible evidence 
of the difference they have made. 
 157. They suggest both formal and informal education programs. Id.
 158. “[N]ational and local statutes or development controls.” Id.
 159. “[T]he integration of resource interpretation and preservation into local economic 
development programmes.” McManamon & Hatton, supra note 139, at 12. 
 160. “[P]artnerships in resource stewardship that link national, state and regional 
preservation programmes with local communities.” Id.
 161. Id.
 162. Id. at 12-13. 
 163. Id. at 13. 
 164. Id. at 16. 
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B. Necessity of International “Fallback Provisions” 
1. Been There, Done That 
One of the ways McManamon and Hatton have identified to develop 
local support for preservation projects is to establish “partnerships in 
resource stewardship.”165 By creating an atmosphere of shared responsibility 
and local and national cooperation, they believe that cultural preservation 
goals can be more quickly and effectively realized. When it comes to Easter 
Island, however, the opposite appears true: Some of the current and former 
preservation efforts on Easter Island identified supra do seem to have 
incorporated McManamon and Hatton’s “four methods” of public 
participation. The UNESCO eco-tourism project on Easter Island, for 
example, set as one of its objectives “to enable participants to acquire the 
skills they need for the island’s natural and cultural resource 
management.”166
Another goal is to encourage and facilitate “community development of 
a resource management plan for sustainable tourism . . . with approval from 
local officials and counterparts.”167 Once these plans are developed and 
approved, the UNESCO program would expand to oversee “implementation 
of micro eco-tourism and sustainable development programs.”168 This joint 
effort by UNESCO and the local Easter Island community was heralded by 
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet as “an outstanding initiative to 
transform the community into a key protagonist that values and fosters its 
own heritage”169 and for allowing “the local community [to take] a leading 
role in the enhancement and promotion of their own heritage.”170
While local and national cooperation sounds good in theory, it has 
proven difficult in practice. The 2003 experiment discussed earlier which 
treated five Moai with a sealant not only eventually proved too costly, but 
experts from both Japan and UNESCO who jointly spearheaded the project 
“complained that problems with preservation [on Easter Island] are 
exacerbated by the fact that the island must report to Chile.”171 While part of 
the difficulty arose due to the lack of control and involvement of the Rapa 
Nui people,172 the Mayor of Easter Island’s only town, Hanga Roa, has 
stated the physical distance between the mainland and its island province is 
also to blame. “‘They don’t leave us room to be creative’” he told USA 
 165. McManamon & Hatton, supra note 139, at 12. 
 166. Eco-tourism, supra note 73. 
 167. Id.
 168. Id.
 169. Id.
 170. Sustainable Tourism Initiative, supra note 71. 
 171. Weissert, supra note 3. 
 172. Id.
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Today. “‘Everything is in Santiago, where so many have never even visited 
the island.’”173
2. A National Economic Policy toward Cultural Preservation 
Might Not be Enough 
Regardless which theory of economics ultimately underlies Chile’s 
reformed attitude toward cultural preservation, the UNESCO experiment 
serves as a reminder that often there are logistical problems with solely 
nationalist policies and preservation efforts. Although the host nation may 
have “progressively assumed a primary responsibility for the protection, at 
law and . . . in practice, of the cultural heritage, [it] does not mean that other 
entities, societies, and common citizens have been exonerated from the 
positive duty of caring, protecting and maintaining cultural property.”174
Similarly, though the duty of heritage preservation has traditionally been 
reserved to the states, “global threats to cultural heritage [have] necessitated 
the creation of international systems to assist States in their primary 
protective role.”175 As cultural heritage scholar Ugo Mifsud Bonnici 
observed, “[w]hilst the concept of special protection through law to the 
cultural heritage was evolving in the individual nation states, it was also 
becoming evident that this protection should also be extended to the sphere 
of International Law, public and private.”176
IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICY TOWARD CULTURAL PRESERVATION
A. Development of the Current International Legal Framework and 
How It Fails the World’s Heritage 
Despite acknowledging that international involvement in heritage 
preservation would clearly benefit endangered sites, developing cultural 
heritage beyond the national level has been slow.177 Though many countries 
have developed heritage preservation plans “within their own national 
boundary . . . the Conventions, Charters and Declarations which now form 
the basis of International Cultural Heritage protection Law have arrived, 
step by step, only during the twentieth century.”178
 173. Id.
 174. BONNICI, supra note 52, at 49. 
 175. FORREST, supra note 48, at 17. 
 176. BONNICI, supra note 52, at 29. 
 177. Id. at 167. 
 178. Id.
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1. UNESCO Framework 
Scholars have long identified the importance of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to 
preservation efforts. Founded in 1945, UNESCO is the arm of the United 
Nations entrusted with the duty of preserving cultural heritage.179 As such, it 
has “fallen to UNESCO to provide the legal framework for heritage 
protection, a function that is central to preservation around the world.”180 In 
fact, “the recognition that the protection of cultural heritage is the common 
concern of humankind[] provides the basis for a principle of international 
co-operation, best implemented through the co-ordinating function of 
UNESCO.”  
Although the earliest recognition of the special protection enjoyed by 
cultural heritage under international law came from the 1907 Hague 
Convention,181 in 1967 UNESCO members met in Mexico City to discuss 
“what they understood cultural policy to mean, and describe[] the practice 
of cultural policy in their own country.”182 This meeting set the stage for and 
then spawned a series of reports while demonstrating changing attitudes 
toward the protection of cultural heritage. Though there is “no shortage of 
legal texts dealing with culture and cultural rights,”183 perhaps the most 
important work directed at preserving cultural property was the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage, 
otherwise known as the World Heritage Convention.184
An “international regulatory arrangement[] which provide[s] incentives 
to governments to act responsibly towards globally significant heritage sites 
in their care,”185 the World Heritage Convention was passed in response to 
the “merging of two separate movements: the preservation of cultural sites 
and the conservation of nature.”186 Adopted in 1972 by the UNESCO 
General Conference and entered into force in 1975,187 the purpose of the 
 179. For a thorough discussion of the founding and history of UNESCO, see The 
Organization’s History, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/who-we-are/history/ 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2011); see also Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO International Framework 
for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF 
CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE 257 (James A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski 
eds., 2010). 
 180. Id.
 181. BONNICI, supra note 52, at 29. 
 182. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 1. 
 183. Francioni, supra note 63, at 2. 
 184. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 15. 1975) 
[hereinafter World Heritage Convention], available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/ 
conventiontext. 
 185. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 49. 
 186. CUNO, supra note 59, at 44.  
 187. World Heritage Convention, supra note 184. 
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convention was to “recognize heritage items in particular countries that 
[were] of ‘universal significance’ and seek to ensure their conservation and 
proper management.”188 By signing the Convention, “‘each country pledges 
to conserve not only the World Heritage Sites situated on its territory, but 
also to protect its natural heritage’ and ‘integrate the protection of the 
cultural and national heritage’” into local preservation efforts.189
Another purpose of the Convention was to “encourage the establishment 
of an inventory of endangered sites.”190 Enter the World Heritage List, an 
international database of sites deemed to have worldwide cultural 
significance. To be included on the List, heritage sites must be nominated 
and, if the individual site meets certain criteria,191 the nomination is either 
accepted or rejected by a representative committee.192 There are many 
benefits for countries to have their heritage sites chosen for inclusion on the 
World Heritage List, including international recognition, which may in turn 
“make it easier for governments to allocate funds to support the capital or 
operating expenditures involved” in their management.”193 Listing on the 
World Heritage List not only creates notoriety and economic advantages for 
the site, it also “carries with it responsibilities for ensuring the preservation 
of the site and for the regulation of its management such that the natural or 
cultural values that were the justification for its listing are properly 
maintained.”194
 188. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 126. The conference recognized “that the cultural 
heritage and the natural heritage are increasingly threatened with destruction not only by the 
traditional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic conditions which 
aggravate the situation with even more formidable phenomena of damage or destruction.” 
World Heritage Convention, supra note 184, at 1. Most notably, the conference also 
considered that “deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural heritage 
constitutes a harmful impoverishment of all the nations of the world.” Id.
 189. CUNO, supra note 59, at 45. 
 190. Id.
 191. The particular criteria for nomination and selection to the UNESCO World 
Heritage List can be found at http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
 192. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 119 (“The main mechanism that public authorities 
around the world use to regulate the built heritage is listing, i.e., the establishment of lists of 
properties within a given jurisdiction . . . that are considered to be of cultural significance. 
Criteria are generally laid down to specify the characteristics that define cultural significance 
such that any property meeting these criteria will be eligible for inclusion on a particular 
list.”; Id. at 126 (“Countries nominate particular buildings, collections of buildings, locations, 
etc., for inscription onto the List, and their acceptance or otherwise is determined by a 
representative committee.”). 
 193. Id. at 126, 127. 
 194. Id. at 127. 
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2. The Framework’s Failure 
Easter Island was designated a World Heritage Site in 1995 when it was 
added to the listing category of “cultural landscape.”195 With its listing came 
recognition of the island’s “ecological and patrimonial value” as significant 
to the world’s heritage.196 As Throsby points out, however, “[l]isting can on 
occasion be a double-edged sword, [such as] when it attracts such an 
increase in tourist numbers that threshold visitation levels are exceeded and 
damage to the site ensues.”197 As discussed in the section entitled “MASS 
TOURISM AND THE WORLD’S HERITAGE: The ‘Catch-22’,” this is precisely 
what happened on Easter Island, and led to the increased and continued 
threats to the Moai. As an UNESCO World Heritage Site, Easter Island is 
entitled to the full protection of the 1972 Heritage Convention and its 
predecessors. Therein, however, lies the problem: “International 
Conventions themselves do not have the force of law.”198 The conventions 
are merely “awareness-raising Convention[s]”: they cannot prevent 
destruction of cultural heritage nor guarantee its protection or 
preservation.”199
Among the “fundamental principle[s] of the law governing conventions” 
are that conventions are binding to the parties and must be executed in good 
faith.”200 When a State chooses to enter into an International Convention, it 
“agrees that it will assume certain international obligations in regard to [its] 
cultural heritage and which will require it to act (or refrain from acting) in 
certain ways.”201 These conventions are “essentially ‘law making,’ or 
‘standard setting’ conventions in the sense that they are intended to have 
affect [sic] generally and to introduce into international law new norms.”202
As such, however, the UNESCO conventions do not actually provide any 
protection for cultural heritage; instead, “[i]t is the States Parties to the 
Conventions who provide the protection for cultural heritage through the 
implementation of the convention in good faith.”203
Since the UNESCO Conventions themselves don’t offer heritage 
protection, Forrest Argues they are more like a contract because the 
Conventions “create[] mutual obligations between each state that is a party . 
. . and each other State Party,” and “should one State breach its obligations 
under the Convention, the State which has thereby suffered from the breach 
195. Crib Sheet, supra note 1.  
 196. Muller, supra note 34. 
 197. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 127. 
 198. CUNO, supra note 59, at 43. 
 199. Id. at 45. 
 200. FORREST, supra note 48, at 48. 
 201. Id.
 202. CUNO, supra note 59, at 49. 
 203. Id. at 48.  
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may seek a remedy against the other State.”204 Regardless of whether 
viewed as a contract or an otherwise binding agreement, there is no clear 
way to internationally enforce the Convention.205 Conventions are 
implemented when ratified by individual nations who then pass enforcing 
legislation—legislation with only “national jurisdiction.”206 In the event any 
State or group of States “contravene the terms of the national legislation, 
they can only be held accountable locally, not internationally.”207 It is this 
lack of “teeth” that has failed the world’s heritage. Unless and until existing 
International Agreements become enforceable internationally, their fate lies 
in the hands of national governments, and their status as “convention[s] that 
can be ignored” remains.208
B. Proposed Reformation of International Cultural Policy: 
Enforcement, Intervention and Appointment 
Though drafted and implemented with the best intentions, it has become 
clear that the existing international legal framework is insufficient to protect 
the world’s heritage. Many believe it is “time to question whether the 
nation-state bias of UNESCO and its Conventions has proven to be a help or 
hindrance to the protection of the world’s cultural heritage.”209 UNESCO’s 
failure to protect heritage has led many scholars and academics to believe 
that some action is now necessary.210 Much of the current debate 
surrounding the protection of cultural heritage at the international level 
arises in the context of ‘what sort of action is required?’
First, the host nation should be given the opportunity to protect its own 
heritage through national preservation policies and efforts. This falls within 
the current international legal framework. Where this framework falls short, 
however, is in failing to provide for international recourse if the host 
nation’s policies and practices have failed and the heritage is endangered as 
a result. It is in such circumstances, where the host nation has first been 
given every opportunity to protect its own heritage, where enforcement by 
way of international intervention (enforcement?) becomes necessary.211
Unfortunately, “none of the existing treaties specifically authorizes a right 
of intervention in the national policies of a host state which fails to provide 
adequate protection for culturally important property.”212
 204. Id. at 49. 
 205. Id. at 27. 
 206. Id.
 207. Id. (emphasis added). 
 208. CUNO, supra note 59, at 27, 28. 
 209. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 153. 
 211. M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of 
Protective Intervention, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 435, 448 (1994). 
 212. Id. at 455. 
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1. The Right of Intervention 
The right to intervene is not a new concept. Over a decade before the 
dramatic increase in tourism on Easter Island threatened the Moai, there 
were proposals for action which could have saved them. In 1992, the Italian 
government “proposed that U.N. inspectors monitor the world’s cultural 
heritage, and that the international community share responsibility for 
cultural sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage List” but soon “withdrew the 
proposal when it met stiff opposition from the Executive Board of 
UNESCO.”213 Though the idea was rejected nearly twenty years ago, recent 
failures to protect cultural heritage, such as that which led to the destruction 
of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban,214 now “provide a basis for the 
argument that the current protective regime, which does not authorize 
intervention, should be improved upon by adding the right of 
intervention.”215
As indicated, the right of intervention would be regarded as a virtual last 
resort, invoked only in the direst situations. As they currently exist, 
international conventions require states to agree to protect their own cultural 
heritage.216 While still imposing this obligation, future conventions would 
go even further—requiring states to consent to intervention in the event 
their national policies fail.217 The authority for intervention would be clearly 
stated in the proposed text of any future conventions, thereby requiring 
nations to consent to UNESCO’s (or whichever other organization or nation 
is so chosen by the delegates) right to intervene as a condition of adoption 
and ratification.  
There have been recent glimpses of a possibly growing acceptance 
toward the idea of international intervention. The Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 
2001218 and outlined such cooperative ventures but ultimately was little 
more enforceable than its predecessors.219 UNESCO members, recognizing 
a declaration alone would be insufficient, began the process of forming a 
“new international treaty that would be established and implemented 
through the United Nations systems and that would carry with it all the 
authority the world body could muster.”220 This in turn led to the adoption 
 213. Id. at 444. 
 214. “This is the organization that by the terms of its charter had no grounds on which 
to act to prevent the Taliban from shooting rockets at the Bamiyan Buddhas.” CUNO, supra
note 59, at 148. 
 215. Vernon, supra note 211, at 440. 
 216. FORREST, supra note 48, at 48. 
 217. Id. at 49. 
 218. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO, Res. 25, 31st Sess., 
UNESCO Doc. 31 C/25 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf. 
 219. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 175. 
 220. Id.
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and ratification of the Cultural Diversity Convention in 2007221 which “pays 
particular attention to the need for sustainable culture and economic 
development . . . [and] deals with threats . . . by affirming the right of 
countries to take protective action if vulnerable forms of cultural expression 
are in danger of extinction or serious curtailment.”222 This convention also 
does not go far enough to ensure the protection of the endangered world 
heritage. 
Once a right to intervention is established, the permissible scope of that 
intervention must also be determined. The nationalist traditions of the 
existing UNESCO conventions have recognized the authority of nation-
states to control their own heritage. When a host nation fails to protect its 
heritage, however, there must be a method by which to enforce the 
international agreement in which the host nation became obligated to 
preserve it. This method arises through intervention and the delegation of 
responsibility for the heritage. Among the rights of control given to the 
nation states under current legal framework is the right of delegation: “[t]he 
state can delegate the management or the custody, maintenance and 
exhibition of objects of cultural value to other entities.”223 UNESCO or 
other international body will not necessarily be required to physically 
intervene, though certainly if that is necessary to protect the heritage site it 
would be within its power to do so; instead, the designated international 
monitoring body will assume control over the preservation and protection 
efforts until the host nation is able to show it is once again capable of 
managing its own heritage.  
2. Appointing a Heritage Trustee 
The “right of delegation” serves as the authority upon which UNESCO 
may demand consent to intervene. There is already national precedent for 
such international action; similar policies are currently in place in Japan, 
where “in cases in which an owner cannot be located, damages or fails to 
adequately protect a designated cultural property . . . the government [has] 
the authority to name a custodian . . . for the cultural property.”224 The idea 
of an “international trusteeship” was similarly broached by James Cuno in 
his book “Who Owns Antiquity?” but he goes on to acknowledge such is 
 221. U.N. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, UNESCO General Conference, 33rd Session, Paris, 20 Oct. 2005, available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/cultural-diversity/cultural/expressions/the-
convention/convention-text/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 222. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 179. 
 223. BONNICI, supra note 52, at 45. 
 224. WHO OWNS THE PAST?: CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 
334 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2005). 
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already the function of UNESCO and highlights many of the shortcomings 
addressed elsewhere in this paper.225
Though the idea of an internationally enforceable right of intervention 
has been proposed (and subsequently rejected) for decades, the fact remains 
true that there have been no workable alternatives in place and the world’s 
heritage remains in danger. Without any realistic alternatives being 
implemented, intervention remains the best option for heritage preservation. 
As such, international interference “in the form of protective intervention 
becomes justifiable” when “a nation is not fully equipped to manage 
common cultural property located within its territorial boundaries.”226
Actually implementing an international trusteeship-based intervention 
policy, however, may depend on “increased international advocacy for a 
team of knowledgeable cultural property advisors with an internationally 
recognized right to enter, inspect, recommend, and implement protective 
action for the common cultural heritage.”227
C. A Word of Caution 
Lurking in the shadows, however, are the “notions of traditional private 
property rights under domestic law, and the concept of territorial 
sovereignty under international law . . . which support the right to exclude 
anyone or anything from interfering with a recognized property right.”228 It 
is this delicate balance between common cultural heritage rights—the rights 
to access and enjoy the heritage, the right to preserve it for future 
generations—and the long-accepted nationalist ideas of ownership and 
property which makes rallying in support of intervention difficult for the 
many who oppose it. Walking this fine line, maintaining this delicate 
balance, is also why proper safeguards and actual, imminent danger to 
world heritage must be required before any intervention can occur.  
Premature intervention could have devastating diplomatic effects. 
Scholar and economist David Throsby warns of the dangers of hasty action 
and urges application of the “Precautionary principle”229 in cases where 
intervention is considered.230 Applying this principle would therefore 
“requir[e] decisions that may have irreversible consequences to be taken 
with extreme caution.”231 Such decisions clearly would include those 
 225. CUNO, supra note 59, at 147. 
 226. Vernon, supra note 211, at 448. 
 227. Id. at 444-45. 
 228. Id. at 454. 
 229. THROSBY, supra note 45, at 195. Throsby explains the idea behind the 
precautionary principle: “When facing decisions with irreversible consequences, such as the 
destruction of cultural heritage or the extinction of valued cultural practices, a risk-averse 
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 230. Id. at 164. 
 231. Id.
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regarding any action taken against a host nation on behalf of its heritage: 
“[t]reatment and care of cultural resources raise many questions, and it is 
important to approach any intervention carefully and conservatively.”232
Intervention is certainly not something to be taken lightly; the right to 
intervene should only be invoked when all else fails, when the individual 
host nation has either willfully or negligently failed to protect its heritage.  
CONCLUSIONS
Allowing international relief organizations and other non-governmental 
organizations, as well as UNESCO, to not only participate in Easter Island’s 
cultural heritage preservation, but to establish and oversee the efforts and, 
where necessary, to intervene on behalf of the endangered heritage, may be 
the only ways to ensure adequate preservation efforts and the continued 
existence of the world’s cultural heritage. Chile should be given every 
opportunity to reform its national policies to ensure adequate protection of 
the Moai and other heritage sites. So should every other country in which 
heritage sites are found. But once the host country fails, it is the duty of all 
mankind to ensure that the legacy of the heritage of those who came before 
us endures for those who come after. The heritage cannot protect itself—it 
is up to the individual host nations to implement policies and develop plans 
to preserve it. If those national policies should fail, it is up to the rest of the 
world to step in and preserve our common heritage or risk losing it forever.  
 232. McManamon & Hatton, supra note 139, at 16. 





